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ABSTRACT
JOHN VINCENT GRAY: Essays on Manufacturing Outsourcing.
(Under the direction of Wendell G. Gilland and Aleda V. Roth.)
The outsourcing of manufacturing resources has been occurring for many years, and
is increasing in many industries. There exists some well developed theory under the
headings of “make-buy,” “firm boundaries,” “economics of organization,” and “vertical
integration.” Outsourcing, or the turning over of an activity to an outside vendor, is a
subset of these vast literature streams. In this dissertation, we draw from the manu-
facturing strategy, economics, and business strategy literature to enhance the existing
economic theory of outsourcing by incorporating an operations strategy lens. Specifi-
cally, we look how manufacturing outsourcing influences–and is influenced by–a firm’s
cost and quality capabilities. We do this through three separate essays using multiple
methods. All three essays arose from an iterative process of literature review and prac-
titioner interviews. The essays are related both in their grounding in existing literature
and theory and in their focus on the relationship between manufacturing capabilities and
outsourcing decisions and outcomes.
In the first essay, “The Effect of Learning and Strategic Behavior on Manufacturing
Outsourcing Decisions,” we analytically evaluate how the presence of learning-by-doing
and strategic behavior by both parties affects a major outsourcing decision in a two-period
game. Previous analytic work that has assessed the effect of learning on outsourcing
neglected the possibility of opportunism by the supplier. To fill this gap, we analyze a
two-period game involving a firm that has the opportunity to outsource some portion
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of its volume to a contract manufacturer. Both firms can reduce their production cost
through learning-by-doing. When the contract manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, we
obtain several interesting results. These include showing that the contract manufacturer’s
learning can benefit the buying firm, but only if the buying firm also learns. We also show
that learning by the buying firm can either help or hurt the contract manufacturer. In
addition, we find that below-cost transfer pricing by the contract manufacturer will occur.
We also analyze alternative bargaining arrangements. This essay analytically shows the
importance of considering both learning-by-doing and possible future opportunism when
deciding whether or not to outsource.
In the second essay, “Outsourcing of Manufacturing Resources: The Effect of Manu-
facturing Capabilities and Priorities” we empirically analyze relationships between oper-
ations capabilities and priorities (quality and cost) and a firm’s plans to outsource. This
essay extends the existing research on antecedents of outsourcing in two ways. First, we
make theoretical arguments about specifically which firm-specific operations capabilities
and priorities relate to plans to outsource. This is different from the extant literature
which looks at a single capability proxy, if capabilities are considered at all. Second, we
develop operational metrics and test the hypotheses using structural equation modeling.
We find, as expected, that cost capability and importance impact outsourcing plans.
Surprisingly, we find that quality capability and importance do not matter.
The third essay is entitled “Buyer Beware? Quality Risk in Manufacturing Out-
sourcing.” Here, linked to the second essay, we examine whether quality capability and
importance should relate to outsourcing plans. We draw from literature in supply chain
management, total quality management, and economics to argue that outsourcing pro-
iv
duction to contract manufacturers does pose a quality risk. We draw from similar lit-
erature to also propose that ISO 9000 does little to mitigate this risk. We use eleven
years of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection results from the United States
drug industry as a proxy for quality risk. We interview a panel of industry experts using
the Delphi process to transform the raw data to a usable “quality risk” score. After
classifying 154 plants from the database as either “contract manufacturer” or “internal
plant,” we use ordered logit regression on our quality risk score to show that outsourcing
to contract manufacturers does pose a quality risk; and that being ISO 9000 certified
does not alter a firm’s quality risk.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation investigates manufacturing outsourcing decisions, and their relationship
to operations capabilities, particularly cost and quality. Outsourcing decisions are among
the most strategic and fundamental that a manufacturing manager must make (Hayes
et al., 2005). While the outsourcing of manufacturing resources is common in many indus-
tries, the past decade has witnessed an increase in the contract manufacturing of entire
products or major subassemblies and systems. Decades of rigorous theoretical and em-
pirical work have generated important insights as to the environmental conditions under
which a firm should outsource. However, little is known about the relationship between
a manufacturer’s competitive capabilities and decisions to outsource; and, surprisingly
little is known about the performance outcomes of decisions to outsource to contract
manufacturers. In the strategy literature, only recently has the relationship between a
firm’s path-dependent capability development and outsourcing been explicitly studied
(Barney, 1999). With few exceptions, the manufacturing strategy literature has not fully
investigated the antecedents and consequences of outsourcing decisions, either empiri-
cally or analytically. There is little in the way of theory development in the operations
management literature that pertains to outsourcing and contract manufacturing.
As further motivation for this dissertation, Kasra Ferdows, president of the Produc-
tion and Operations Management Society (POMS), recently noted:
...the central circle of this debate [outsourcing] has been occupied by schol-
ars in economics, public policy, strategy, and international business. These
groups are notorious in treating production like a black box. For them, once
you determine a few key external factors like wages, tax benefits you have de-
termined the wisdom of the move....We, POM, ought to get into these debates
and open these black boxes for our colleagues in other fields....Somehow in the
last few years it has become fashionable to regard production as a non-core
activity-a function you can supposedly unbundle surgically from the rest of
the company and outsource. (Ferdows, 2006, p.2-4)
Outsourcing is a subset of “make-buy,” “vertical integration,” ”firm boundary” and
“economic organization” research. In their usefulness to manufacturing strategy and sup-
ply chain management, theories generated from these streams of research are generally
lacking in two broad areas. First, there is much to be learned about the relationship
between firm-specific capabilities and antecedents to outsourcing. The antecedents lit-
erature, primarily from strategy and economics, has theoretically and empirically shown
how a number of product and market characteristics impact outsourcing decisions (e.g.,
Leiblein and Miller, 2003). However, this literature has yet to study the impact of detailed
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firm-specific capabilities on outsourcing plans. Second, the literature on the operational
consequences of outsourcing is much less mature, especially in the long term and with
regard to difficult to measure capabilities. Much of the extant literature has focused
primarily on outsourcing’s short-term impact on relatively easily measured outcomes,
such as cost (e.g., D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994). None of the operations, strategy,
and economics literatures has adequately addressed outsourcing’s influence on factors
like learning, opportunism, and quality.
In this dissertation, we use multiple methods to address gaps in the literature re-
lated to outsourcing. We employ logic from the operations strategy literature (e.g., Giffi
et al., 1990) and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) to extend the primary theoret-
ical views of outsourcing: transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979) and property
rights (Hart and Moore, 1990). In so doing, we enhance these existing economic theo-
ries of outsourcing by adding an operations perspective. Each essay in this dissertation
is a stand-alone essay. Some of the material in this introductory chapter is redundant
with the introduction sections of each essay. The following research questions are an-
swered: How does learning-by-doing impact manufacturing outsourcing decisions in the
presence of a strategic supplier? (Essay 1) Which firm-specific operations capabilities
have a significant impact on a business unit’s outsourcing plans for manufacturing? (Es-
say 2) Does outsourcing present a quality risk? That is, does outsourcing production
to contract manufacturers pose a quality risk to the buying firm? (Essay 3) Answering
each of these questions improves the field’s theoretical and practical understanding of
the antecedents and consequences of outsourcing decisions in manufacturing. We note
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that while the answers to these questions might also present some insights into service
outsourcing, this is left for future research as the characteristics and cost structures of
services are quite different. This dissertation research is expected to contribute to the
manufacturing and supply chain literature by explicitly studying whether and how con-
tracting out production affects various aspects of manufacturing performance, focusing
on cost and quality. We draw from the operations strategy literature for our definitions
of capabilities and our understanding of how those capabilities are developed and how
they drive performance. We draw from the economics and business strategy literatures
for the underlying theories on firm boundaries.
Each essay is a stand-alone document. This first chapter summarizes existing theories
on outsourcing, documents the gaps this dissertation research is partially closing, and
identifies future work that could further enhance our theory-building and testing of the
antecedents and consequences of outsourcing decisions and contingent factors.
1.1 Scope of Research
Any theory must have boundaries (Bacharach, 1989). For this dissertation, all three
essays share some common boundaries, which we discuss now. Most of the public contro-
versy surrounding outsourcing involves “offshore” outsourcing (or simply ”offshoring”),
and the subsequent loss of domestic jobs. This is currently a prominent contemporary
issue; and several prominent economists have broadly written on the topic from a macroe-
conomic perspective (e.g., Samuelson, 2005). The issue has also been prominent in the
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popular press (e.g., Thottam, 2004). The majority of manufacturing outsourcing is, in
fact, domestic (Casale, 2000). For semantic clarity in this research, we use the defini-
tions in Table 1.1 to distinguish between 1) outsourcing, 2) offshoring, and 3) offshore
outsourcing. The focus of our research is on manufacturing “outsourcing.” We do not
focus on the location to which a firm has outsourced, but rather we consider the transfer
of ownership and responsibility for the execution of the production task. We are inter-
ested in how this transfer influences and is influenced by a manufacturer’s operations
capabilities, specifically quality and cost.
Table 1.1: Distinction between “outsourcing” and “offshoring”
Term Definition
Outsourcing “Turning over all or part of an activity to an outside
vendor” (Barthelemy, 2003)
Offshoring Relocating an operation to a foreign location, usually
lower wage
Offshore Outsourcing Turning over an activity to an outside vendor located in
a foreign location, usually with a lower wage
We further restrict our attention to the outsourcing of the manufacture of final prod-
ucts and/or major systems/assemblies to contract manufacturers. This type of outsourc-
ing of manufacturing resources has been occurring for many years. However, it has been
growing in importance and little is known about its impact.
Our interest in manufacturing outsourcing stems from the belief that the manufac-
turing function generally possesses knowledge and capabilities directly related to com-
petitiveness (as discuseed in Schroeder et al., 2002). Thus, this type of outsourcing is
inherently more interesting than the outsourcing of most other business processes, such
as janitorial, payroll, etc., because the capabilities that reside in manufacturing will usu-
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ally directly influence a firm’s ability to compete effectively (Giffi et al., 1990; Hayes
and Wheelwright, 1984). Other “strategic” functions, such as marketing, research &
development, and finance are rarely outsourced (Quelin and Duhamel, 2003).
Also, in this dissertation we do not consider specifically the characteristics of the
ongoing outsourcing relationship. This relationship can range from close partnerships
(e.g. in the Liz Claiborne case (Dalby, 1990)) to arms-length relationships, with many
possible arrangements in between (Hayes et al., 2005). Many scholars have studied buyer-
supplier relationships (e.g., Monczka et al., 1998; Liker and Choi, 2004; Kotabe et al.,
2003) of which outsourcing relationships are a subset. We readily acknowledge that the
structure of the outsourcing arrangement will affect capabilities, but it is outside the
scope of this dissertation to explicitly deal with this added complexity in any of the
three essays. Particularly in our empirical essays (2 and 3), the characteristics of the
outsourcing relationship will manifest themselves as unexplained “noise.”
1.2 Prevalence of Manufacturing Outsourcing
While outsourcing has received much attention in the popular press over the last few
years, much of the discussion has been focused on the steep rise in offshoring. The more
general notion of outsourcing manufacturing resources is not new. Contract manufac-
turers have long been performing manufacturing for companies that have chosen to no
longer perform some or all of their manufacturing in-house (Tully, 1994). Yet, the past
decade has also witnessed a significant rise in contract manufacturing. In the electron-
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ics industry, some of the contract manufacturers (e.g., Flextronics and Selectron) have
grown quite large, and their growth has been rapid, outpacing the rest of the industry
(Sturgeon, 2002). In the automobile industry, firms such as Magna Steyr and Karmann
have begun producing complete cars for their customers (Edmondson, 2003). Prevalence
and growth of contract manufacturers in FDA-regulated sectors, the subject of Essay 3,
is also evident (e.g., Jeffries, 2003; Antonelli, 2005).
The growth in the use of contract manufacturers has occurred for some rational rea-
sons. First, technology has made the management of a remote operation easier. Second,
strong and competitive supplier bases have been created in many industries. Third,
increased product variety and technological volatility have made it more difficult for a
single entity to master all of the technology required to produce its product.
1.3 The Benefits and Risks of Manufacturing Out-
sourcing
Why outsource manufacturing? Outsourcing of manufacturing resources can carry bene-
fits as well as risks. Several benefits and risks have been well-documented in the academic
and practitioner literature. We utilize Tables 1.2 and 1.3 to highlight many of the com-
monly cited benefits and risks.
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Table 1.2: Benefits of outsourcing
Benefits Example Citations
Reduce short-term costs Gilley and Rasheed (2000)
Lower costs due to economies of scale of supplier Cachon and Harker (2002)
Reduce capital expenditures Quinn and Hilmer (1994)
Reduce asset base, improve ROA, labor productivity
Supplier faces market discipline, generally more efficient
than hierarchical discipline
Williamson (1971)
Allow focus on remaining tasks Prahalad and Hamel (1990)
Decrease product/process development time Chesbrough and Teece
(2002)
Option value of secondary source of supply (if partial
outsourcing)
VanMieghem (1999)
Tap into supplier expertise Quinn and Hilmer (1994)
Gain entry into foreign market (if offshore) Deavers (1997)
Mitigation of price competition among competing buyers Cachon and Harker (2002)
Overcome inertia of internal organizations Goolsby (2003)
Avoid union difficulties Abraham and Taylor (1996)
Allow rapid growth without hiring/large expenditures executive interview
Potentially “easy” short-term career benefit executive interview
Table 1.3: Risks of outsourcing
Risks Example Citations
Opportunism: Suppliers act in their own interest Bettis et al. (1992)
Opportunism: Loss of competency/credible threat to
supplier
Quelin and Duhamel (2003)
Hidden costs: Coordination, contracting, observation, re-
contracting (conflict resolution)
Barthe´lemy (2001)
Reduction in future learning-by-doing Anderson and Parker (2002)
Lose opportunity for internal continuous improvement Cant and Jeynes (1998)
Loss of “tacit” knowledge Grant (1996)
Loss of informal interaction Monteverde (1995)
Loss of ability to design manufacturable products Bettis et al. (1992)
Loss of opportunity for accidental discovery Parker and Anderson (2002)
Cost of learning new ways to manage interfaces Novak and Eppinger (2001)
Remaining overhead spread over less value-added Bettis et al. (1992)
Outsource “crown jewels” by mistake Huber (1993)
Contract manufacturer shirks in quality or other hard-
to-measure area
Kaya and O¨zer (2005)
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1.4 The Link Between Manufacturing Outsourcing
and Capabilities
A motivation for this research is the belief that internal operations provide an avenue
for the development and improvement of competitive capabilities. Given this belief, once
operations are out of a firm’s control the majority of this capability development and
learning now occurs at another firm, which presents risks for the firm that has outsourced.
We justify this argument theoretically now.
Arrow (1962) stated that “one empirical generalization is so clear that all schools of
thought must accept it:...Learning is the product of experience” (p.155). This learning-
by-doing results in a learning curve, where production costs are reduced with volume.
The economics literature (e.g., Spence, 1981) has long known that the learning curve can
allow early movers to create high barriers to entry, and that learning rate can impact each
firm’s ability to gain market share. The learning curve has been shown to exist in many
industries (Argote and Epple, 1990). The fairly consistent observation of the learning
curve demonstrates that learning-by-doing exists in most industries, and that it should,
therefore, be considered as a factor in major strategic decisions such as outsourcing.
There are articles in economics that study the effect of a learning curve in various settings
(e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983); but not in an outsourcing setting.
Also, there is an extremely large body of literature on internal knowledge creation,
and how it can be a path to competitive advantage by accelerating organizational learn-
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ing and innovation. One such area is the research on the manufacturing interfaces with
other functions. This research indicates a synergistic affect on business performance. For
example, manufacturing’s important interface with marketing (Hausman et al., 2002)
was the topic of a special issue in Management Science in 2004 (Ho and Tang, 2004).
The importance of manufacturing’s interface with new product development is well doc-
umented (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001; Parker and Anderson, 2002; Sosa et al., 2004).
Tight coordination and cross-functional feedback have been found to be critical success
factors for organizational learning. Next we note some seminal theoretical research which
supports the belief that manufacturing contributes to organizational knowledge.
Nelson and Winter (1982) developed the idea that organizational routines, developed
through experience, are a source of competitive advantage. Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
looked at organizational “absorptive capacity,” and noted that “absorptive capacity may
also be developed as a byproduct of a firm’s manufacturing operations....Production
experience provides the firm with the background necessary” to improve costs. Leonard-
Barton (1992) (“The Factory as a Learning Laboratory”) and Roth et al. (1994) (“Knowl-
edge Factory”) both provided examples and articulated the means by which a well-
managed production system can provide competitive advantage for an entire organiza-
tion.
Teece et al. (1997) discuss “dynamic capabilities,” which “suggests that private wealth
creation...depends in a large measure on honing internal technological, organizational,
and managerial processes inside the firm” (p.509). Teece (1998) specifically discusses
outsourcing and notes that the “boundaries of the firm, and future integration and out-
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sourcing opportunities, must clearly be made with reference to learning and knowledge
issues” (76). In the strategic decision-making literature, Hall (1992) specifically addressed
the strategic analysis of intangible resources. Importantly for this dissertation research,
Hall found that CEOs considered employee know-how as one of two resources (along
with reputation) that were most important to business success. CEOs also felt that the
operations function was the area where employee know-how was most important.
In the manufacturing strategy literature, Hayes et al. (1988) noted that “the organiza-
tional and technological skills required to produce products better than one’s competitors
are extraordinarily difficult to duplicate, and therefore constitute one of the soundest
bases for achieving a sustainable competitive advantage” (20). Ferdows and DeMeyer
(1990) and Roth (1996) outlined a specific path for production facilities to build oper-
ational excellence by improving on all operations-critical capabilities. Stratman et al.
(2004), in a case study and simulation of temporary workers in an assembly operation
(i.e, outsourcing labor, not the entire production process), noted that “steady-state av-
erage productivity estimates and production standards may fall short” (p.692) as aids
in decision-making, and in so doing they “demonstrate the importance of taking the
dynamics of learning and forgetting into account when determining manufacturing strat-
egy” (p.701). The particular case studied actually eventually led to the outsourcing of
the entire manufacturing activity, as high costs and poor quality became unmanageable.
Wernerfelt (1984) took a “first cut at a huge can of worms” (p.180) by articulating the
resource-based view (RBV) and arguing that it is productive to analyze a firm not just
based on its products and market but on its “resources,” which may include technology
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and capabilities. Demsetz (1988) “revisited” the theory of the firm, and noted “roughly”
that “the vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by the economics of conservation
of expenditures on knowledge” (p.159). Barney (1991), in his seminal work, noted that
firms possess heterogeneous, non-perfectly mobile resources. And, if these resources are
rare, inimitable (either due to causal ambiguity, social complexity, or a unique history),
valuable, and non-substitutable, then the resources can lead to sustained competitive
advantage. His emphasis of the path-dependent nature of the development of these
resources is critical to this dissertation.
Several years later, Barney (1999) explicitly discussed how resource-based arguments
had been neglected in firm-boundary decisions, noting simply that “conditions under
which a firm’s decisions about how to manage its business activities should be affected
by its capabilities and those of its potential partners” (p.138). Barney also called for
the knowledge-based view (KBV) to be considered. Grant (1996) wrote about the
“knowledge-based view” (KBV); knowledge here is really a subset of the resource-based
view; the knowledge-based view emphasizes that knowledge is the key resource. Several
studies (e.g., Leiblein and Miller, 2003) have shown that firm-specific capabilities do mat-
ter in the make-buy decision (earlier studies, e.g. Walker and Weber (1984) had already
shown this but did not emphasize this result). In Leiblein and Miller (2003), the proxy
for ”firm-specific capabilities” at the operations level was “production experience.”
There are two key takeaways from this literature. First, it is well established that
learning-by-doing is a key factor that influences dynamic capability building. Thus, it is
relevant to consider leaning-by-doing specifically and the path-dependence of capability-
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building in general in any decision of such long-term importance as outsourcing. Second,
there is growing support (both empirically and theoretically) that competitive advan-
tage is obtained through the path-dependent development of internal capabilities; many
authors consider manufacturing the most difficult capability to imitate. Therefore, ca-
pability development over time should be considered in outsourcing decisions.
1.5 Outsourcing Theory and its Neglect of Capabil-
ities
We have established above that the development of competitive capabilities often oc-
curs in the manufacturing function, and that the development of these capabilities is
path-dependent and hard to imitate. We now review literature on outsourcing and firm
boundaries.
1.5.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
The classic economic theory of firm boundaries dates back to at least to the 1930s,
when Ronald Coase theorized about why firms exist at all (Coase, 1937), if markets are
known to be an efficient mechanism to facilitate trade. His work was extended by Oliver
Williamson in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Williamson, 1979). This “transaction cost eco-
nomics” (TCE) view has been the leading explanation of firm boundaries in the strategy
and economics literature ever since. TCE is based on several observations. First, con-
13
tracts, and their enforcement, are not costless. Second, it is usually impossible to contract
for all contingencies. Third, partners in a market relationship may act opportunistically
if given the chance. One relevant construct that will affect propensity to outsource is
asset specificity, which relates to opportunistic behavior. Others include uncertainty and
frequency of interaction, which relate to contracting difficulties and expense. Asset speci-
ficity refers to whether a costly asset is useful only in the specific arrangement. If an
asset is specific to an agreement, then opportunism may occur once one firm has invested
in the (now otherwise useless) asset. Environmental uncertainty may cause two firms
engaging in a market-based transaction to have to often renegotiate the terms of their
agreement. Similarly, if the nature of the activity to be outsourced requires frequent
interaction between the parties, then the costs of this market-based interaction will tend
to increase.
There is a large amount of empirical support for the asset specificity as a predictor
of outsourcing decisions, and weaker support for the other two constructs. The vast
empirical literature based on TCE has been recently reviewed in the OM literature by
Grover and Malhotra (2003) and in the strategy literature by David and Han (2004).
We now note, as Barney (1999) did, that nowhere in this theory do path-dependent
capabilities (or even differences between firms) play a role, so that TCE provides only
partial theoretical insights for addressing the research questions in this dissertation.
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1.5.2 Property Rights
The “property rights” perspective utilizes the asset specificity construct from the TCE
perspective, but uses a different theoretical framework to explain when firms should
outsource. Hart and Moore (1990) documented the property rights view. They assumed
costless recontracting and complete information, both of which are different than the
assumptions of TCE. They also assumed that asset-specific investments must be made,
and that all contracts are incomplete. The key difference between owning an activity
and contracting for it in this view is this: when one owns a firm they can fire some, but
not necessarily all, workers in the firm; whereas, when contracting, the only options are
to continue dealing with an entire firm or to fire the entire firm. Because of this, when
an activity is owned the owner has more control over the individual pieces of the activity
than if he contracts for it. Key drivers, then, of vertical integration, are that highly
complementary assets should be owned together, and that ownership should be given
to agents who are indispensable. Grossman and Hart (1986) modeled these phenomena
analytically. Grossman and Helpman (2002) determined an industry equilibrium where
firm structure is endogenous, incorporating both the TCE and property rights views.
Empirical testing of this theory has been scant. Novak and Eppinger (2001), based on
the property rights view, empirically demonstrated the impact of product complexity on
vertical integration in the automobile industry. Like TCE, the property rights approach
to outsourcing decisions does not consider path-dependent capabilities.
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1.5.3 Measurement
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) documented the importance of measurement difficulty on
firm boundaries. They noted that when measurement difficulty is present, it is often
best to have one owner who holds the residual claim to profits to monitor cooperative
productive activity, as opposed to having multiple owners who will “shirk” in the presence
of difficult-to-measure individual inputs. Poppo and Zenger (1998) provided theoretical
arguments as to why measurement difficulties may have a stronger negative performance
impact in markets than in firms, but get mixed empirical results. Again, the path-
dependent nature of capabilities was not considered.
1.5.4 Summary
The three classic economic “views” of the firm discussed in the previous section (TCE,
property rights, measurement) neglect the effect of capabilities on firm boundary deci-
sions. The ”resource-based” and “knowledge-based” views introduced capabilities into
the strategic domain, but there are still many gaps in the manufacturing and supply
chain strategy literature on how capabilities influence manufacturing outsourcing and
vice versa. As noted by Langlois and Foss (1999), the capabilities view is offered ”not
as a finely honed theory but as a developing area of research whose potential remains
largely untapped” (p.203). One of the ways the capabilities view is still untapped is in
its explanatory power in the antecedents and consequences of outsourcing.
Recent work has tried to integrate these traditional views of firm boundary deter-
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minants and the capabilities view. Even Williamson (1999), stated: “Rather, therefore,
then ask the question ‘What is the best generic mode...to organize X?’ [we should ask]
‘How should firm A-which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competences
and disabilities)-organize X?’ (p.1103). Some authors (e.g., Jacobides and Winter, 2005)
have attempted to conceptually incorporate capabilities and transaction costs into firm
boundary decisions.
1.6 Manufacturing and Supply Chain Strategy Links
to Outsourcing
Classic manufacturing strategy texts generally devote a section or chapter to make-
buy/vertical integration decisions (e.g., Hill, 1994; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Buffa,
1984). These texts discussed the benefits and risks, and provided some guidance as to
when production should be in-house vs. outsourced. Additionally, as previously men-
tioned, a large body of operations strategy literature examined supplier management for
components, subassemblies, or products that are manufactured by different firms (e.g.,
Prahinski and Benton, 2004; Liker and Choi, 2004; Monczka et al., 1998). Also, there are
bodies of analytic work on contracting between layers in a supply chain (Cachon, 2003),
tactical issues between two firms in a supply chain (e.g., VanMieghem, 1999; Kouvelis
and Milner, 2002), and stylized conditions when outsourcing makes sense (e.g., Graho-
vac and Parker, 2003). Some more recent manufacturing strategy research (Frohlich and
Westbrook, 2001; Rosenzweig et al., 2003) has expanded operations strategy to the sup-
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ply chain; and shown that integration across a supply chain (internally and externally)
improves performance. As evidence to the lack of attention that the manufacturing strat-
egy literature has paid to supply chain issues, just recently valid and reliable scales have
been developed for measuring supply chain management practices (Li et al., 2005).
Surprisingly, there is no manufacturing or supply chain strategy literature that em-
pirically investigates either the drivers or consequences of major outsourcing decisions to
contract manufacturers. Schroeder et al. (2002) explained that manufacturing strategy
has generally been focused on the adoption of practices to manufacturing performance, or
on the relationship between manufacturing capabilities and firm performance, generally
within the factory walls.
Manufacturing strategy has also only recently been explicitly linked to the resource-
based-view, although much of manufacturing strategy research has always been consistent
with the RBV. For example, manufacturing strategists have devoted much effort to the
operationalization of capabilities (e.g., Miller and Roth, 1994; Ward et al., 1995; Roth,
1996), and shown that those capabilities can lead to improved performance (e.g., Vickery
et al., 1991). But, Schroeder et al. (2002) asserted that the “manufacturing strategy
literature critically needs to incorporate ideas from the RBV” (p.114). They note that
manufacturing strategy literature does not address the inimitability of the implementa-
tion of practices.
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1.7 Gaps in the Incorporation of Capabilities in Out-
sourcing Decisions
Given the relatively recent consideration of resources in the strategic management lit-
erature as a whole, it is not surprising that there are some broad gaps in the literature
concerning the inclusion of capabilities into the manufacturing outsourcing decision. We
discuss three specific gaps, which will be filled by our essays, now.
First, one significant gap in the normative analytic literature in manufacturing and
supply chain management pertains to path-dependency. Here, models of outsourcing rela-
tionships are vitually all single-period, and do not consider the potential path-dependent
nature of capability development. That is, they do not consider whether or not outsourc-
ing today impacts a firm’s capabilities to produce in the future. The lone exception (to
our knowledge) comes from the operations literature. Anderson and Parker (2002) mod-
eled how learning-by-doing impacts the outsourcing decision. However, they neglected
the additional reality that a supplier may behave strategically in the future. Thus, there
is a gap in the normative theory on outsourcing in that it neglects the combined effect
of path-dependent learning-by-doing in the presence of a strategic supplier. Essay 1
addresses this gap.
Second, a gap occurs in the otherwise well-developed literature on the antecedents
of outsourcing. Here, several theories predict which product and market characteristics
should matter, as discussed in Section 1.5. Also, RBV proponents have recently argued
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and demonstrated that firm-specific resources and heterogeneities do matter in outsourc-
ing decisions (Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Barney, 1999). However, this literature does
not look in any depth at which firm-specific characteristics matter from a functional
manufacturing perspective. So far, what has been empirically shown is that a simple
proxy (production experience in the case of Leiblein and Miller) for capability does have
a significant impact on the decision. Essay 2 partially addresses this gap by studying
both how a firm’s cost and quality capability, and the importance that a firm places on
cost and quality, affect its plans to outsource.
By design, the antecedents literature does not test performance (outcomes) of given
decisions for manufacturing in general (Masten, 1993). There is less literature on per-
formance “outcomes” area, primarily because data collection is challenging. David and
Han (2004) noted in their review of the literature that “there was very little attention or
support for TCE propositions regarding the relative performance of governance forms”
(p.52). D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) used the 1976 Federal Trade Commission “Line
of Business Report” data to show that vertically integrated firms had marginally better
profitability than their unintegrated counterparts (they had lower administrative and R
& D costs but higher production costs). Leiblein et al. (2002) used a detailed semiconduc-
tor industry report to show both that firm-specific attributes affect decisions, and that fit
between governance decisions and market conditions improve performance. Randall et al.
(2004) studied the internet retailing industry and find that those that make the fulfillment
choice (drop ship vs. internal fulfillment) that matches that which would be expected
theoretically have less bankruptcies than those who do not. As for non-financial mea-
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sures, very few studies have looked at outsourcing and innovation empirically (Armour
and Teece, 1978) and analytically (Brocas, 2003; Plambeck and Taylor, 2005). Also, the
effect of outsourcing on quality has been studied analytically (Economides, 1999; Kaya
and O¨zer, 2005) and empirically in a few service industries. Essay 3 contributes to the
outcomes literature by performing a large study which compares the quality risk posed
by contract manfuacturers and internal plants.
1.8 Summary of the Three Essays in this Disserta-
tion
This dissertation fills three gaps in the academic literature on outsourcing discussed
above, through three separate essays. These essays enhance the development of an eco-
nomic theory of outsourcing behavior that brings in the perspectives of both manufac-
turing and supply chain management strategy. All three essays arose from an iterative
process of literature review and practitioner interviews. Each essay addresses a particular
gap in the academic literature. More details on each essay are given now.
In the first essay, “The Effect of Learning and Strategic Behavior on Manufacturing
Outsourcing Decisions,” we incorporate learning and strategic behavior together in an
outsourcing setting. Anderson and Parker (2002) had previously studied the effect of
learning on outsourcing decisions, but in their model the supplier passed on any savings
directly to the buyer. We incorporate a strategic supplier by analyzing a two-period
21
game theoretic model in which a firm has the opportunity to outsource some volume of
its finished-product production to a contract manufacturer. Both firms can reduce their
production cost through learning-by-doing. We show that the contract manufacturer’s
learning can benefit the buying firm, but only if the buying firm also learns. We also
show that learning by the buying firm can either help or hurt the contract manufacturer.
In addition, we find that below-cost transfer pricing by the contract manufacturer will
occur. We also discuss alternative bargaining arrangements. This essay analytically
shows the importance of considering both learning and a potentially strategic supplier
when making an outsourcing decision.
In the second essay, “Outsourcing of Manufacturing Resources: The Effect of Man-
ufacturing Capabilities and Priorities,” we empirically analyze the effect of quality and
cost capabilities and priorities on plans to outsouce. We extend the existing research on
antecedents of outsourcing decisions in two ways. First, we make theoretical arguments
about how specific capabilities (cost and quality) relate to plans to outsource. Also,
we make arguments about the importance that a firm places on specific manufacturing
capabilities (cost and quality) affects plans to outsource. We then test the resulting
hypotheses, and show that a firm’s cost capability and importance drive its outsourcing
decisions, and that its quality capability and importance do not relate to a firm’s plans
to outsource. This essay makes important contributions to the operations strategy liter-
ature by empirically linking a firm’s operations strategy to its propensity to outsource,
thus linking a firm’s operations strategy to its supply chain strategy.
The third essay is entitled “Buyer Beware? Quality Risk in Manufacturing Outsourc-
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ing.” In this essay, we use econometric techniques to empirically investigate the quality
performance of contract manufacturers’ and branded manufacturers’ plants in regulated
industries over multiple years. This essay links nicely to the second essay, which showed
that firms do not consider quality in outsourcing decisions, by testing whether or not
there is a quality risk. We utilize Food and Drug Administration (FDA) audits to test
our hypotheses. We empirically demonstrate that contract manufacturers do pose a
greater quality risk. Our results also support a growing body of academic literature that
ISO 9000 has no impact on quality risk.
1.9 Conclusions
Through the three independent but related essays above, this dissertation enhances the
existing economic theory of outsourcing, by explicitly bringing operations-based path-
dependent capabilities into the conceptual, analytical, and empirical literature. In so
doing, we accomplish two important things. First, with this dissertation we are heeding
the call of Ferdows (2006) and Schroeder et al. (2002) (and the initial work of Frohlich
and Westbrook (2001) and Rosenzweig et al. (2003)) to expand operations strategy’s
focus beyond the existing factory walls. Second, we bring together existing economic
and business strategy theories on capability development and firm boundaries to help
managers better assess how the development of knowledge and capabilities impacts out-
sourcing decisions. The three essays in this dissertation are clearly only a start in that
direction. A better articulated theoretical understanding of the effect of outsourcing on
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path-dependent capabilities, along with empirical support, may help managers avoid the
trap of focusing too much on short-term cost at the expense of long-term competitive
capabilities.
Poppo and Zenger (1998), after an empirical study on firm boundaries in information
services, noted “that a theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice is likely to be
complex, requiring integration of transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement
reasoning” (p.853). We believe they are correct. Some authors have attempted to rec-
oncile the views (e.g., Williamson, 1999), but all authors acknowledge that a “grand”
theory of firm boundaries is complex. Very little contribution to the theory has been
made by operations scholars. Our research incorporates more detailed aspects of the
capabilities perspective than have been previously included into the outsourcing discus-
sion, and also looks at consequences (lost capability improvement, quality risk) that are
often ignored in the high-level strategy discussions of firm boundaries. Thus, our cur-
rent and future research will enhance the emerging complex integrated theory of firm
boundaries by bringing operations strategy’s detailed understanding of capabilities into
the discussion of both the antecedents and consequences.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Learning and Strategic
Behavior on Manufacturing
Outsourcing Decisions
2.1 Introduction
In several industries, manufacturing companies have turned to outsourcing for the pro-
duction of their finished products for more than a decade (Tully, 1994). For example,
in the electronics industry, contract manufacturers (called electronic manufacturing ser-
vices or EMSs) had penetrated 13% of the total market in 2000, with the top six players
(including Selectron and Flextronics) growing at 43% per year from 1995 to 2002 (Stur-
geon, 2002). After a brief slowdown in the industry, EMSs are again expected to grow
at 15% per year through 2010 (Jorgensen, 2005). In the pharmaceutical industry, out-
sourcing accounted for 50%−60% of production in 1998 (VanArnum, 2000). Even in the
automotive industry, which has outsourced subassemblies for years, some firms are now
outsourcing the production of entire model generations to companies like Magna Steyr
(Edmondson, 2003). While the outsourcing of complete finished products can often offer
lower production costs in the short term, the opportunity for the manufacturer to learn
about his product is decreased. As Kenneth Arrow stated more than 40 years ago: “One
empirical generalization is so clear that all schools of thought must accept it...: Learn-
ing is the product of experience” (Arrow, 1962, p.155). In an outsourcing relationship,
one firm’s learning-by-doing does not necessarily benefit the other if both firms behave
strategically in order to maximize their own profits. The simultaneous consideration of
learning and strategic behavior in an outsourcing arrangement is the focus of this paper.
The increase in outsourcing mentioned above is occurring for many rational reasons.
Information technology has eased remote management and reduced transaction costs
(Williamson, 1979). Increasing volatility and product variety make it more and more
difficult for one firm to do everything, forcing firms to define their “core competence”
more narrowly than before (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). As the trend continues, capable
contract manufacturers are established in an industry; these contract manufacturers may
enjoy economies of scale and employ best practices. Also, many firms outsource manu-
facturing to focus on higher-rent activities, such as product development and service.
However, accepting an offer by a contract manufacturer to produce a product for a
lower price is not without risks. Broadly, the interaction of production and higher-rent
activities is not well-understood; it is possible that the loss of production capability can
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lead to losses in these areas. Within manufacturing, proponents of the resource-based
view (Barney, 1991) and competitive progression theory (Rosenzweig and Roth, 2004)
argue that capability development is path-dependent; that is, capabilities are developed
over time and cannot be created (or recreated) overnight. This has two major implications
for the outsourcing decision that we will model here.
First, a manufacturer’s own ability to continuously improve should not be neglected
when making the production/sourcing decision (Cant and Jeynes, 1998). Scholars in
many disciplines, from organizational behavior to economics, have observed that produc-
tion costs tend to decrease with volume; i.e, that learning-by-doing occurs (e.g., Zangwill
and Kantor, 1998). Furthermore, the supplier should not ignore its ability to learn when
making its wholesale pricing decision. Learning (or the potential to learn) leads to com-
plex interactions that must be considered when making outsourcing decisions.
Second, manufacturers must realize that the contract manufacturer may act oppor-
tunistically, especially at the completion of a contract period. As noted by Insinga and
Werle (2000, p.58), “outsourcing at the operational level can easily lead to the devel-
opment of dependencies that create unforeseen strategic vulnerabilites.” Rossetti and
Choi (2005) described mechanisms by which manufacturers in the aerospace industry
have inadvertently, through time, created monopoly sources with whom they have poor
relationships.
Surprisingly, despite the relevance and importance of learning and strategic behavior,
to the best of our knowledge these two factors have not been studied simultaneously in
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the context of manufacturing outsourcing. In this paper, we investigate how these factors
affect optimal strategies from the supplier’s and the buyer’s perspectives. We show how
the optimal wholesale price, production, and sourcing decisions can change when path-
dependent learning is considered in the relationship, and we provide descriptions of the
new optimal strategies that emerge. Our results lead to several interesting insights. For
example, we show that supplier learning can benefit the manufacturer if the latter is
also learning, but that supplier learning does not benefit the manufacturer if he is not
learning. We also show that an increase in the manufacturer’s learning rate can either
help or harm the supplier, depending on which strategy is being optimally employed by
the supplier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce the model and assumptions. We consider the
case in which the manufacturer does not have the option to outsource in Section 2.4 .
In Section 2.5, we consider the case in which the manufacturer can outsource and the
contract manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader of the game. We consider the case where
the manufacturer is the leader in Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, we conclude. Proofs of all
theorems, corollaries, and propositions can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
Outsourcing is a type of “make-buy” decision. There is a vast conceptual literature
on make-buy and vertical integration. Coase (1937) theorized about why firms exist,
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given the benefits of market discipline. Williamson (1979) extended Coase’s work and
popularized the transaction cost view–that is, firms exist when the costs of contracting,
oversight, etc. of a separate profit-maximizing entity exceed the incremental costs of
hierarchical control versus market control. Willamson presupposes the existence of op-
portunism (i.e, strategic behavior) in a vertical relationship. Grossman and Hart (1986)
modeled the transaction cost view, spawning the incomplete contracts literature. Barney
(1999) noted that while transaction costs have been a useful framework, current capa-
bilities and capability development receive too little consideration. We, like Williamson,
assume the presence of opportunism, or strategic behavior. Like Barney, we consider the
capabilities–current and future–of both players in the relationship.
The learning curve literature is also well-established. As outlined by Argote and
Epple (1990), documented observation of the learning curve first occurred in the 1930s.
Since then, learning has been observed in many manufacturing and service industries,
and different learning rates have sometimes been observed within industries.
The papers that investigate outsourcing and learning together do so in a non-game
theoretic context; i.e, the suppliers are passive entities that pass on the cost-savings from
learning. Kim (2003) showed the importance of considering the learning rates of potential
suppliers when a buying firm chooses between possible suppliers. Anderson and Parker
(2002) modeled longer term impacts of component outsourcing decisions on the buying
firm’s capabilities. Their model incorporated learning and forgetting in both component
cost and integration cost. They did not, however, incorporate strategic behavior by
suppliers. In their model, the suppliers charged a constant markup.
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There are many papers that study outsourcing in the presence of strategic behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, such papers include only a single period of production, and
thus ignore the path-dependent learning benefits of production. Kamien et al. (1989), in
a “first attempt [to include subcontracting] in the economic theory of the firm” (Kamien
and Li, 1990, p.1352) showed that for duopolists engaging in Bertrand competition, the
possibility of subcontracting to one another affects the outcome in an auction setting.
The incentive for subcontracting in their model is strictly convex costs. There are several
papers that highlight the competitive benefits for duopolists of outsourcing to avoid
overinvestment. McGuire and Staelin (1983), in a seminal paper from the marketing
literature, showed that competing firms may prefer to outsource retailing to mitigate
price competition. Cachon and Harker (2002) demonstrated the existence of contracts
where competing firms will outsource to a subcontractor with no cost advantage, also
to mitigate price competition. Gilbert et al. (2003) investigated competing Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) with partially substitutable products and find that
outsourcing may be beneficial to competing firms with opportunities to invest in lower
costs to prevent overinvesment. Grahovac and Parker (2003) found a similar result for
components, and added insight about how modularity, relevance, and development costs
affect the likelihood of outsourcing. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) showed in a duopoly
model that competition among suppliers makes inputs available at supplier average costs
and achieves economies of scale, because in equilibrium both firms outsource to the same
supplier. Corbett and van Wassenhove (1993) showed that in a bilateral monopoly,
vertically integrated supply chains perform better than unintegrated supply chains, but
that when more than one firm exists at each level of the chain, supply chain profits
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increase with disintegration.
There are several papers in the economics literature that have studied learning curves
and competition between horizontally competing duopolists with no outsourcing or sub-
contracting. Spence (1981) performed numerical work with the power learning function.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) obtained analytic results, focused on welfare and tax poli-
cies, using a linear learning curve. Cabral and Riordan (1997, 1994) also used linear
learning to show (among other things) how, in a duopoly setting, predatory pricing may
be socially optimal and learning may be privately disadvantageous. None of these papers
considered outsourcing.
We note that while we investigate the path-dependent effects of outsourcing on cost
capability, Plambeck and Taylor (2005) studied the path-dependent effect of outsourcing
on innovation. They show that outsourcing may lead to industry-wide underinvestment
in innovation.
An operational motive for outsourcing, separate from the lower cost motive modeled
here, is to subcontract part of production at a higher cost in the presence of uncertain
demand. Several papers studied this type of outsourcing (Kamien and Li, 1990; Van-
Mieghem, 1999; Atamturk and Hochbaum, 2001; Tan, 2002; Kouvelis and Milner, 2002).
We do not address this motive for outsourcing here.
The primary contribution of this paper to the outsourcing literature is that, to the
best of our knowledge, it is the first to jointly consider the ramifactions of learning-by-
doing and strategic behavior on outsourcing decisions.
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2.3 The Model
We consider a firm (the “manufacturer”), which faces a known linear price-dependent
demand for its product in each of two periods, d(p)=a-bp. A period is best understood
to represent a generation of a product. The manufacturer can, if he chooses to, purchase
some or all of the volume of his complete finished product from a contract manufacturer
(the “supplier”). The supplier offers a linear price-only, take-it-or-leave-it contract to the
manufacturer. Each contract governs a single period in the model. This approximates
reality in many contract-manufacturing arrangements, where contracts are written for a
set period of time (Quelin and Duhamel, 2003).
The sequence of events in period t = 1, 2 is as follows. First, the supplier, with per-
unit cost cts, offers the manufacturer a linear wholesale price contract (w
t per unit). Then,
the manufacturer chooses how much to produce in-house (qtm) at a cost c
t
m per unit, how
much to purchase (qts) at the wholesale price w
t, and how much to sell to the market (stm).
The supplier may also choose to produce more than it sells, a quantity we denote zts, i.e,
the quantity the supplier produces beyond what it sells to the manufacturer. We call
production beyond the amount sold by either player “strategic overproduction.” Second-
period profits are discounted by a factor δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. We note that because periods
represent different generations of products, inventory cannot be carried from period 1 to
period 2. We normalize disposal costs/salvage value at the end of each period to zero.
Both players have complete information about all parameters. We note that our intent
is not to identify coordinating contracts, as is the focus of the literature surveyed by
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Cachon (2003), but rather to understand how learning and strategic behavior together
influence the outsourcing decision.
If a firm produces in the first period, it benefits from learning-by-doing. Each unit
produced in the first period reduces the second-period costs by the learning factor γi.
We follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Cabral and Riordan (1997) by modeling
learning as a linear function of production. These papers do not include a point where
learning stops, although the learning-curve literature has discussed a “plateau effect,”
which is defined as “the eventual lack of any improvement at all with additional output”
(Muth, 1986, p.958). To model the plateau effect, we introduce a minimum attainable
cost for each firm, ci, i = m, s. With this enhancement, the second period cost function
becomes c2i = Max(c
1
i − γiq1i , ci). Note that this function could also be considered an
approximation of the power function, which is often used to represent learning. As shown
in the economics literature, the power function itself will not allow analytic results in a
two-period model (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983). As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983),
a firm with positive production gains a cost benefit only in the second period. This benefit
accrues for all first-period production until ci is reached; i.e.for q
1
i up to qi, where qi equals
c1i−ci
γi
. We restrict the manufacturer’s learning rate to not be excessively high. That is,
we require γm ≤ 2b√δ , which preserves concavity of the manufacturer’s profit function.
Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the progression of the model.
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Period 2
Manufacturer production cost for q units:
Cm2(q) = Max {cm1-?mqm1, c
Period 1
Manufacturer production cost for q units:
Cm1(q) = cm1*q
Supplier production cost for q units:
Cs1(q)=cs1*q
m}*q
Supplier production cost for q units:
Cs2(q)=Max {cs1- ?sqs1, cs}*q
Supplier
offers w1
Manufacturer
determines
quantity to 
purchase, qs1;
quantity to
produce, qm1;
and quantity
to sell to 
market, sm1
Supplier
decides
how much
extra to
produce, zs1
Supplier
offers w2
Manufacturer
determines
quantity to 
purchase, qs2;
and quantity to
produce, qm2
Figure 2.1: Progression of the model (except Section 2.6)
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2.4 No Supplier Available
It is instructive to first consider the case where outsourcing is not an option for the
manufacturer; i.e, no supplier exists. We note that if there were no learning in this
setting, the manufacturer would produce a−bc
1
m
2
in both periods, resulting in a profit of
(a−bc1m)2+δ(a−bc1m)2
4b
.
We now turn to the case where learning occurs, i.e., γm > 0. We first consider whether
it can be optimal for the manufacturer to produce more than he sells. While such a
strategy is clearly suboptimal in the second period, it is not a priori obvious whether it is
suboptimal in the first period. This is because production (q1m < qm) in the first period
leads to lower second-period costs, but selling extra units may not increase first period
revenue. We now present Proposition 1, which rules out strategic overproduction by the
manufacturer when no supplier is present:
Proposition 1 q1m = s
1
m.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, we note that selling an additional
unit to the market when total sales are less than a
2
increases revenue, so a manufacturer
will always sell any production up to a
2
. The reason that overproduction is never optimal
in this case is that in order for qm to be greater than
a
2
(and thus overproduction possibly
optimal), γm must be sufficiently small in terms of other parameters; so small, in fact,
that strategic overproduction is not profitable.
With Proposition 1 in hand, we can now limit discussion to production quantities
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with the understanding that the firm sells exactly what it produces each period when no
supplier is present.
We now proceed to characterize the optimal production strategies for the manufac-
turer. The manufacturer may embark on one of three strategies. The particular strategy
that is optimal is uniquely determined by the exogenous parameters.
Theorem 1 When there is no supplier present,
(i) there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive optimal production/sales strategies
(uniquely determined by model primitives). They are:
A1. q1m =
(2+bδγm)(a−bc1m)
4−δb2γ2m ≤ qm; q
2
m =
(2+bγm)(a−bc1m)
4−δb2γ2m .
B1. q1m = qm; q
2
m =
a−bcm
2
.
C1. q1m =
a−bc1m
2
≥ q
m
; q2m =
a−bcm
2
.
Conditions on γm and profits (in terms of model primitives) for each of the three strategies
are given in Table 2.1; the values of the breakpoints are given in Table 2.2.
(ii) As γm increases, the optimal strategies will follow the sequence A1-B1-C1.
Table 2.1: Manufacturer-only problem: strategies
Strategy γm Profit
A1 < Bg OR < Cg (a−bc
1
m)
2(1+δ+bδγm)
b(4−b2δγ2m)
B1 < Ag AND ≥ Bg,Cg 4γm(a−bc1m)(c1m−cm)+δγ2m(a−bcm)2−4(c1m−cm)2
4bγ2m
C1 ≥ Ag (a−bc1m)2+δ(a−bcm)2
4b
Values of Ag, Bg, and Cg are given in table 2.2
First, we note that if there is no learning present (γm = 0), only Strategy A1 exists
and the decision reverts to the no-learning solution. The new strategies emerge because
learning changes the marginal benefit of production in the first period.
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Strategy A1, which occurs when γm is low, represents the case in which the manufac-
turer does not produce enough to reach cm, but does produce more than he would with no
learning. This is because when employing this strategy he is still gaining a second-period
learning benefit for every unit he produces. Strategy B1, which occurs for moderate γm,
represents the case in which the manufacturer produces enough to reach cm, but no more.
Due to the plateau effect, the manufacturer has gained all of his learning benefit. He
therefore does not find it worthwhile to produce beyond this amount just for first-period
benefits. Strategy C1 represents the case in which γm is high enough (and therefore qm
low enough) that the manufacturer produces beyond q
m
to the amount he would produce
with no learning. This strategy arises when the manufacturer is still gaining a marginal
first-period benefit for each unit of production when he reaches q
m
.
Figure 2.2 shows the first-period production quantity q1m as a function of γm, and
Figure 2.3 shows the manufacturer’s profit as a function of γm for a set of parameters
that will remain consistent throughout the paper (a = 10, b = 1, c1m = 1, cm = .8, δ = .9).
The profit is increasing in γm throughout. For low γm, the manufacturer is in Strategy
A1, and thus q1m increases in γm. Then, as γm increases further, q
1
m reaches qm, and
the manufacturer enters Strategy B1. Within Strategy B1, q1m begins to decrease in
γm, because q
1
m = qm in this strategy and qm itself decreases as γm increases. Finally,
Table 2.2: Manufacturer-only problem: parameters
Parameter Value
Ag
2(c1m−cm)
a−bc1m
Bg
bc1m−a+
√
(a−bc1m)2+4δb(c1m−cm)(a−bcm)
bδ(a−bcm)
Cg
2(c1m−cm)
a
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4.49
4.5
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
4.58
4.59
γ
m
q1 m
Strategy A1 
Strategy B1 
Strategy C1 
Figure 2.2: q1m as a function of γm (no supplier)
the manufacturer reaches the point where he produces a−bc
1
m
2
and no longer benefits
from learning; this is Strategy C1. The relatively small size of the region where the
manufacturer produces exactly q
m
is typical of many numerical examples investigated.
Note that we restrict the graphs to the relevant region of γm for clarity; profits and q
1
m
proceed linearly outside of the region.
2.5 Supplier Available
Having characterized the optimal production/sales strategy in the absence of a supplier,
we now proceed to consider the case of a manufacturer that can outsource to a sup-
plier. Throughout the paper, we assume that if the manufacturer is indifferent between
outsourcing and producing in-house, he will outsource.
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Figure 2.3: Manufacturer profit as a function of γm (no supplier)
In the presence of the supplier, a mild assumption is necessary for analytic tractability.
This assumption is that c1m ≤ a2b + cs2 . Fortunately, the majority of industries would
operate within this assumption. For example, with cs = 0, we are restricted to cases
where the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand is less than or equal to 3 at
the optimal second-period monopoly price. This is true in the vast majority of industries
(Gwartney, 1997). Further, as cs increases from zero, this assumption gets less and
less restrictive. For example, if cs =
c1m
2
, i.e, the supplier’s lowest cost is half of the
manufacturer’s period 1 cost, then we are restricted to cases in which the price elasticity
of demand is less than 5. It is a very rare industry that exhibits such high elasticities
(Gwartney, 1997). Thus, in spite of this assumption, our results apply to most industries.
Before proceeding to the general problem with learning, we first introduce three propo-
sitions that will be of use later.
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Proposition 2 (i) In the second period, the supplier always charges w2 = c2m if c
2
s ≤ c2m,
and does not participate if c2s > c
2
m.
(ii) The supplier’s second-period profit is (c2m−c2s)a−bc
2
m
2
if c2s ≤ c2m and is zero if c2s > c2m.
(iii) The manufacturer’s second-period profit is always (a−bc
2
m)
2
4b
. The manufacturer either
produces or purchases a−bc
2
m
2
. He purchases a−bc
2
m
2
if c2s ≤ c2m. He produces a−bc
2
m
2
if
c2s > c
2
m.
A key result from Proposition 2 is that cost savings achieved by the supplier are not
passed on to the manufacturer in the second period. These results are driven by the
assumption above that c1m ≤ a2b + cs2 . We again note that the assumption driving this
proposition still allows the results to apply to the vast majority of industries.
The fact that the manufacturer never benefits in the second period from the supplier’s
learning in the first period means that actions by the manufacturer specifically to reduce
the supplier’s second-period cost do not benefit the manufacturer. This leads to the
following two propositions.
Proposition 3 The manufacturer will never purchase product that he will not sell, i.e.,
he will never “strategically overpurchase.”
Proposition 4 w1 > c1m → q1s = 0.
We note that the above propositions do not imply that the manufacturer can never
benefit from the supplier’s learning, but only that he will not benefit in the second period
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from supplier learning in the first period. Supplier learning, however, may drive changes
in the first period that may benefit the manufacturer, as we will see later in Section 2.5.3.
Before proceeding to analyze the impact of learning on outsourcing, we first consider
the simple case in which neither party learns. The manufacturer will completely outsource
in both periods if he is at a cost disadvantage, and will produce all product in-house in
both periods otherwise. That is:
Remark 1 When γm = γS = 0,
If c1s ≤ c1m, wt = c1m, qts = stm = a−bc
1
m
2
, qtm = 0 for t = 1, 2.
If c1s > c
1
m, the supplier does not participate, q
t
s = 0, q
t
m = s
t
m =
a−bc1m
2
for t = 1, 2
We now turn to cases in which learning is occurring. In Section 2.5.1, we examine
the case where only the supplier learns. In Section 2.5.2, we study the case where only
the manufacturer learns. Finally, in Section 2.5.3, we present results for the most general
case where both learn.
2.5.1 Learning Only by the Supplier
In this section, we analyze the game with supplier learning (i.e., γs > 0), but no manu-
facturer learning, i.e., (i.e., γm = 0). This could represent a case when the manufacturer
is far along its learning curve and the supplier is relatively new to producing the product;
for example, an established manufacturer considering outsourcing something for which
he has experience and the supplier does not.
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Theorem 2 When γm = 0,
(i) Neither player strategically overproduces. That is, z1s = 0 and s
1
m = q
1
m + q
1
s .
(ii) The supplier participates if and only if:
c1s ≤ c1m + δ(c1m − cs) when c1m <
a
b
− 2(c
1
s − cs)
bγs
c1s ≤ c1m + δ
γs(a− bc1m)
2(1 + δ)
when c1m ≥
a
b
− 2(c
1
s − cs)
bγs
(iii) If the supplier participates, her optimal strategy is to charge w1 = w2 = c1m. Fur-
thermore, the manufacturer outsources in both periods. That is, q1s = q
2
s =
a−bc1m
2
, and
q1m = q
2
m = 0.
(iv) If the supplier does not participate, the manufacturer produces everything in-house
in both periods. That is, q1s = q
2
s = 0, q
1
m = q
2
m =
a−bc1m
2
.
Corollary 1 (i) The supplier’s profit is non-decreasing in γs.
(ii) The manufacturer’s profit is constant in γs.
As in the case with no learning (Remark 1), we again see that there are two possible
manufacturer strategies–outsource everything or produce everything in-house. The main
difference here is that outsourcing in both periods may occur even when the supplier is
at an initial cost disadvantage.
One of the key insights from this theorem is that the supplier gets all of the benefit
of her learning. The manufacturer sees no benefit from the supplier’s learning. This
is in contrast to the model of Anderson and Parker (2002), who explicitly assume that
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the supplier will pass on any savings to the manufacturer, always charging a constant
markup. While this insight is a result of the supplier’s being the leader in this game, it
shows that allowing for a strategic supplier substantially alters the effect of learning on
outsourcing.
Another important result is that the supplier may charge less than her costs in the
first period; i.e., she is potentially willing to lose money in the first period so as to learn
and profit in the second period. Thus, in this environment it may be optimal for the
supplier to engage below-cost pricing, analogous to “predatory pricing” discussed in a
horizontal setting by Cabral and Riordon (Cabral and Riordan, 1997, 1994).
This section has shown that the supplier will always charge the manufacturer’s costs
to get all the business when learning. This leads to the supplier’s gaining all of the benefit
from her learning when the manufacturer is not learning.
2.5.2 Learning Only by the Manufacturer
Now, we turn to the case in which γs = 0 and γm ≥ 0. This situation may exist with a
mature supplier that has already reached a plateau. It also may exist if a supplier has a
natural cost advantage but does not aggressively invest in cost improvement. This case
also may be approximated when the manufacturer is in the early stages, perhaps even
the startup phase, of a product, but the supplier has experience with similar technology.
Another example may be when a manufacturer is considering bringing a product back
in-house after several years of outsourcing.
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The optimal first-period price w1 charged by the supplier, and the resulting outsourc-
ing strategy chosen by the manufacturer, are both largely determined by the relative cost
structure of the two players. We say that the manufacturer has an initial cost advantage
if c1s > c
1
m, that he has an attainable cost advantage if c
1
s ≤ c1m but c1s > cm (i.e., the
manufacturer can attain a lower cost position through learning), or finally that he has a
definite cost disadvantage if c1s ≤ cm.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal supplier pricing strategy and the
resulting manufacturer production/purchasing/sales decisions in each period. Figure 2.4
characterizes a number of results from Theorem 3, as they relate to outsourcing occurring
or not occurring in any given period.
Resulting Manufacturer
Outsourcing Strategy
Manufacturer
Cost Structure
Strategy
Label
Supplier Strategy
Period 1 Period 2
Initial cost
advantage
- Supplier does not participate
in either period.
Zero
Outsourcing
Zero
Outsourcing
A3 Supplier does not participate
in either period.
Zero
Outsourcing
Zero
Outsourcing
C3 Supplier obtains first-period
residual business only, and
does not participate in second
period.
Partial
Outsourcing
Zero
Outsourcing
E3 Supplier obtains all business
in both periods.
Complete
Outsourcing
Complete
Outsourcing
B3 Supplier obtains second-
period business only (and
gets all the second period
business).
Zero
Outsourcing
Complete
Outsourcing
D3 Supplier obtains first-period
residual business and all the
second-period business.
Partial
Outsourcing
Complete
Outsourcing
E3 Supplier obtains all business
in both periods.
Complete
Outsourcing
Complete
Outsourcing
Definite cost
disadvantage
Attainable cost 
advantage
Figure 2.4: Strategies, learning only by the manufacturer
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Theorem 3 When γs = 0,
Neither player strategically overproduces. That is, z1s = 0 and s
1
m = q
1
m+ q
1
s . The optimal
supplier prices and resulting manufacturer production/purchase strategies are as follows:
(i) When the manufacturer has an initial cost advantage (i.e., c1s > c
1
m) the supplier does
not participate and all results of Theorem 1 apply.
(ii) When the manufacturer has an attainable cost advantage (i.e., c1s ≤ c1m and c1s > cm)
then one of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive supplier-manufacturer strategies
emerges. The particular strategy is uniquely determined by model primitives.
A3. The supplier does not participate in either period. The manufacturer’s produc-
tion/purchase quantities are given by q1m = qm or q
1
m =
(2+bδγm)(a−bc1m)
4−δb2γ2m , q
1
s = 0 and
q2m =
a−bcm
2
, q2s = 0. Exogenous parameters (given in the proof) determine which q
1
m is
optimal.
C3. The supplier participates in the first period only and charges w1∗, where w1∗ = c1m
or w1∗ = a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
− c1m−cm
bγm
< c1m (w
1∗ is uniquely identified from model primitives). The
manufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = qm, q
1
s =
a−bw1∗
2
− q
m
and q2m =
a−bcm
2
, q2s = 0.
E3. The supplier participates in both periods, charging wc in the first period and c
1
m in the
second period. The manufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = 0,
q1s =
a−bwc
2
and q2m = 0, q
2
s =
a−bc1m
2
, where wc depends on exogenous parameters. The
possible values and conditions for wc are given in the appendix.
As γm increases, the strategies will follow one of the following progressions, depending
entirely on model primitives: E3, E3-C3, E3-A3-C3.
(iii) When the manufacturer has a definite cost disadvantage (i.e., c1s ≤ cm) then one of
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three mutually exclusive and exhaustive supplier-manufacturer strategies emerges. The
particular strategy depends solely on model primitives.
B3. The supplier participates only in the second period, charging cm in that period.
The manufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = qm or q
1
m =
(2+bδγm)(a−bc1m)
4−δb2γ2m , q
1
s = 0 and q
2
m = 0, q
2
s =
a−bcm
2
. Exogenous parameters (given in the
proof) determine which q1m is optimal.
D3. The supplier participates in both periods, charging w1∗, where w1∗ = c1m or
a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
−
c1m−cm
bγm
< c1m, > we or we (we = wc+ε; ε is a very small positive number). w
1∗ is uniquely
determined by model primitives. The supplier charges cm in the second period. The man-
ufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = qm, q
1
s =
a−bw1∗
2
− q
m
and
q2m = 0, q
2
s =
a−bcm
2
.
E3. The supplier participates in both periods, charging wc in the first period and c
1
m in the
second period. The manufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = 0,
q1s =
a−bwc
2
and q2m = 0, q
2
s =
a−bc1m
2
, where wc depends on exogenous parameters. The
possible values and conditions for wc are given in the appendix.
As γm increases, the strategies will follow one of the following progressions, depending
entirely on model primitives: E3, E3-D3, or E3-B3-D3.
For the case in which there is no manufacturer learning, we proved that one of two
strategies can occur: zero-outsourcing in both periods or complete outsourcing in both
periods. From Theorem 3 (and Figure 2.4), we see that a richer set of strategies emerges
for the case of manufacturer learning. In particular, the outsourcing strategy can differ
from period 1 to period 2, and in addition the manufacturer may engage in partial
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outsourcing (that is, both produce and purchase) in the first period.
In strategies A3 and C3, when the manufacturer has an attainable cost advantage, the
manufacturer produces in period 1 to lower his internal production costs for the second
period, when he takes all the business. We call this production for cost reduction. Here,
the manufacturer is losing money (relative to if he purchased at w1 < c1m) in the first
period in order to lower his actual costs of production in the second period. There is
a similar interesting partial outsourcing case (strategies B3 and D3) that occurs when
c1s < cm < c
1
m. Note that in this case the manufacturer is at an absolute cost disadvantage–
his lowest cost is higher than the supplier’s cost. In this case, the manufacturer is
producing only for strategic reasons. He produces in the first period to force the supplier
to charge a lower price in the second. We call this production for leverage. The important
distinction between these two sets of strategies is that when the manufacturer is producing
for cost reduction he keeps production in-house both periods, whereas when he produces
for leverage he produces in-house in one period and outsources the next. The only benefit
from learning in the production for leverage case is strategic; the manufacturer forces the
supplier to reduce the price she can charge.
To induce the manufacturer to choose a complete outsourcing strategy (E3), the sup-
plier must now offer a lower wholesale price (wc) than was the case with no manufacturer
learning. This is because the manufacturer now recognizes that he will benefit from pro-
ducing in-house in the first period by lowering his second period costs. Figure 2.5 (with
the same parameters as in Section 2.4 and c1s = 0.9) demonstrates this. Observe that
w1 declines as γm increases while the supplier is employing strategy E3 to induce total
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Figure 2.5: w1 as a function of γm
outsourcing.
The existence of strategies that include both “partial outsourcing” and “complete
outsourcing” leads to an interesting response of the supplier’s profit to changes in man-
ufacturer learning. We denote supplier profit as a function of γm as Πs(γm):
Corollary 2 (i) Πs(γm) < Πs(0) for γm > 0.
(ii) For γm > 0,
∂Πs
∂γm
can be > 0 or ≤ 0.
There are two important things to note from Corollary 2. First, the supplier is never
better off when the manufacturer has some learning as compared to none. But once the
manufacturer has some learning, an increase in manufacturer learning can either help or
hurt the supplier, depending on which strategy (zero outsourcing or partial outsourcing)
is being employed. If the full outsourcing strategy (E3) is being employed, then as γm
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Figure 2.6: Supplier profit as a function of γm
increases the supplier must charge a lower price to get the business and thus earns less
profit. If one of the partial outsourcing strategies is employed (C3 or D3), an increase in
manufacturer learning leads to a lower q
m
. This results in more residual business, and
hence an increase in profit for the supplier. Recall that in Corollary 1 we showed that the
manufacturer never benefits from supplier learning when the manufacturer itself is not
learning. Here, differently, we have shown that the supplier may benefit from increases
in manufacturer learning, even when the supplier is not learning (see Figure 2.6). With
no learning, the supplier is able to charge c1m and get all of the business. However,
with learning the supplier must charge a lower w1 (reducing her profit) to get all of the
business, until at one point the supplier decides to get only the residual business. If
a supplier is employing a residual business strategy, an increase in the manufacturer’s
learning actually is helpful to the supplier, because there is more residual business to be
had.
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Figure 2.7: Manufacturer profit as a function of γm
Figure 2.7 illustrates the effect of γm on manufacturer profit. In general, the man-
ufacturer benefits from his learning. The profit function increases with learning when
Strategy E3 is being employed, because the supplier must continually charge lower w1 in
order to get the business. The profit function is constant in γm in in the residual business
case, because C3 (with w1 = c
1
m) is employed in Figure 2.7. As shown in Figure 2.7, the
profit function can undergo a slight dip when γm gets large enough that the supplier
abandons her attempt to induce complete outsourcing in both periods. Since wc is the
point at which the manufacturer is indifferent between complete and partial outsourcing,
charging anything greater than wc will result in merely partial (i.e., residual) business
for the supplier. Knowing this, the supplier charges the amount that maximizes her
profit when getting residual business–almost always a step change up from wc. This sud-
denly higher price causes the manufacturer’s profit to dip. At the γm where the supplier
switches her strategy, the supplier’s profit is at its lowest point.
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This section has shown that complex strategies emerge when the manufacturer is
learning and both players are behaving strategically. The manufacturer will demand
a lower w1 to completely outsource to the supplier. The manufacturer may engage in
production just for leverage in the second period, knowing it will eventually outsource.
Also, the supplier can benefit or be hurt by increases in manufacturer learning. This
result is in contrast to a result in Section 2.5.1, where we proved that when only the
supplier learned, the manufacturer did not benefit from the supplier’s learning.
2.5.3 Learning by Both Players
We now investigate learning by both players. We first note that (as a result of Proposition
2) the first-period choices for the manufacturer in period 1 are unchanged from the model
in Section 2.5.2 in which just the manufacturer learns. Therefore, for a given wholesale
price, the manufacturer will respond the same way he would have in section 2.5.2.
Due to the increased complexity, from this point forward in the paper we make a new
restriction on γs for this section. Specifically, we assume γs <
2c1s
δ(a−bcm) . This assumption
allows us to a priori eliminate the possibility of strategic overproduction by the supplier,
without carrying s1s and z
1
s through the proof as we did in previous sections. This
assumption still allows virtually all realistic learning rates to be considered.
Supplier learning may make it optimal for the supplier to participate even if she
is at an initial cost disadvantage; only when the manufacturer has a significant initial
cost advantage will it be optimal for the supplier to not participate. Theorem 4 char-
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acterizes the optimal supplier pricing strategies and the resulting manufacturer produc-
tion/purchasing/sales decisions in each period. To save space, we do not present a table
analogous to Table 2.4; the only things that would change would be the addition of the
word “significant” to cost advantage, the labeling of the strategies (A3 would become A4,
etc.), and the addition of Strategy C4’ (see Theorem 4). For this theorem, we introduce
∆c ≥ 0. This represents the maximum value of the supplier’s initial cost disadvantage
such that she will still participate. This value is analogous to the conditions given for
supplier participation in Theorem 2, when only the supplier learned.
Theorem 4 When γs > 0 and γm > 0,
Neither player strategically overproduces. That is, z1s = 0 and s
1
m = q
1
m+ q
1
s . The optimal
supplier prices and resulting manufacturer production/purchase strategies are as follows:
(i) When the manufacturer has a significant initial cost advantage (i.e, c1s > c
1
m + ∆c),
the supplier does not participate and all results of Theorem 1 apply.
(ii) When the manufacturer has an attainable cost advantage (i.e., c1s ≤ c1m+∆c and c1s >
cm), the results are the same as Theorem 3, section (ii), with the following differences:
(1) A fourth strategy emerges (C4’), in which the supplier participates in the first period
and charges w1∗, given in (2) below. Her first period production drives c2s < cm. The
manufacturer’s production/purchase quantities are given by q1m = qm, q
1
s =
a−bw1∗
2
− q
m
and q2m = 0 and q
2
s =
a−bcm
2
.
(2) There are three more possible values of w1∗, in addition to the two given in Theorem
3, part (ii). These are a
b
− 2
bγm
(c1m− cm)− 2bγs (c1s − cs) and a2b +
c1s
2
− c1m−cm
bγm
− δγs
4
(a− bcm)
and we. we is defined in Theorem 3, part (iii)
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(iii) When the manufacturer has a definite cost disadvantage (i.e., c1s ≤ cm), then the
possible strategies are the same as Theorem 3, part (iii).
One substantive difference between this theorem and Theorem 3 (i.e., no supplier
learning) is that there are three new possible wholesale prices that result in the manufac-
turer’s choosing partial outsourcing strategies when he has an attainable cost advantage.
Another change, which also occurs when the manufacturer has an attainable cost advan-
tage, is the addition of strategy C4’. This strategy arises because it now may be possible
for the supplier’s second-period cost to drop below cm via her first-period production.
Thus, when the supplier learns, it is possible that although the manufacturer has an
attainable cost advantage, he may not attain it.
Another key difference when both players are learning is that the presence of supplier
learning has given the supplier more motivation to induce complete outsourcing. This
is because supplier learning makes first-period production by the supplier more valuable
(for 0 < q1s ≤ qs). Figure 2.8 (using the same parameter values as in Section 2.5.2, plus
cs = 0.81) shows w
1 as a function of γm for several values of γs. Note that for γs = 0, the
graph is the same as in Figure 2.7. As γs increases (up to the point where q
1
s = qs), the
supplier is willing to charge a lower wc for higher and higher values of γm. The fact that
supplier learning motivates the supplier to charge wc for more sets of parameters leads
to the following corollary.
Corollary 3 If γm > 0, then the manufacturer’s profit is non-decreasing in the supplier’s
learning rate.
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Figure 2.8: w1 as a function of γm for several γs
Recall that when there was no manufacturer learning, the supplier always charged c1m
and therefore the manufacturer did not benefit from supplier learning. Importantly, we
show here that when the manufacturer also learns, he can benefit from supplier learning.
This is because the more the supplier learns, the more incentive she has to charge wc
to gain all of the business. Thus, there are cases where the supplier charges wc if she
is learning but would have charged a wholesale price greater than wc if she were not
learning. The manufacturer cannot be worse off (and can be better off) when faced with
an offer of wc instead of a higher wholesale price. The manufacturer’s profit therefore
can improve, for some parameters, as γs increases (Figure 2.9).
Thus, when both players learn, the form of the solution is similar to the case when
only the manufacturer learns. The addition of supplier learning increases the likelihood
the supplier will be willing to induce complete outsourcing and adds new w1∗ values that
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Figure 2.9: Manufacturer profit as a function of γm for several γs
the supplier may charge to obtain residual business. Finally, only when both players
are learning can the manufacturer benefit from supplier learning; he never benefits from
supplier learning when his learning rate is zero.
This section has featured the supplier as the leader of the game, making the first offer.
In the next section, we investigate the outcomes if the manufacturer is the Stackelberg
leader.
2.6 Manufacturer as Leader
Up to this point, the supplier has been the Stackelberg leader. This reflected situations
in which she has all (or nearly all) of the power in the relationship. In this section,
we investigate the case in which the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. With the
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manufacturer as the leader, the sequence of the game changes. In each period, the
manufacturer decides how much to produce in-house and how much to purchase from the
supplier and also determines wi, the per-unit price he offers the supplier. The supplier
then accepts or declines the offer. If she declines, she earns zero profit. For this section,
we make the assumptions on learning rates that a priori eliminate the possibility of
strategic overproduction. That is, we assume γi <
2c1i
δ(a−bc1i )
, (i ∈ m, s). We also must
assume that γs ≤ 2b√δ , analogous to the assumption made earlier on γm.
Because the supplier does not have to recoup any investment, it is optimal for the
manufacturer to choose a wholesale price that is equal to the supplier’s marginal cost;
that is, for him to offer to pay wt = cts per unit in each period. Therefore, the supplier
earns zero profit in both periods. In essence, the problem reduces to a problem in which
the manufacturer chooses the production quantities at both facilities to maximize the
supply chain profit. Because of this, the problem is equivalent to one in which there is
a single company with two facilities that differ in their costs and learning rates. The
possible strategies are listed in Theorem 5. Note that, without loss of generality, we
assign the superscript j to the facility with the higher first-period cost, and superscript i
to the facility with the lower first-period cost. If the manufacturer is indifferent, he will
choose facility i.
Theorem 5 When the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, the following strategies
emerge:
(i) When ci ≤ c1i ≤ cj, facility i has an absolute cost advantage. The optimal strategy is
to source product from facility i, following the strategies of Theorem 1.
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(ii) When ci ≤ cj < c1i or cj ≤ ci < c1i , one of the following six production strategies may
be optimal, depending entirely on exogenous parameters:
A5i. Facility j does not participate. Facility i follows production strategy A1 of Theorem
1.
B5i. Facility j does not participate. Facility i follows production strategy B1 of Theorem
1.
C5i. Facility j does not participate. Facility i follows production strategy C1 of Theorem
1.
A5j. Facility i does not participate. Facility j follows production strategy A1 of Theorem
1.
B5j. Facility i does not participate. Facility j follows production strategy B1 of Theorem
1.
D5. Facility j produces q
j
in the first period and
a−bcj
2
in the second period. Facility i
produces
a−bc1i
2
− q
j
in the first period and nothing in the second period. The resulting
profit is
(a−bc1i )2+δ(a−bcj)2
4b
− (c
1
j−c1i )(c1j−cj)
γm
.
(iii) When cj < ci = c
1
i , strategies A5i and B5i are no longer feasible.
The conditions on parameters which lead to each of the different strategies are dis-
cussed in the proof. The possible production and sourcing strategies are not significantly
different from the cases in which the supplier was the Stackelberg leader. Note that since
facility j has a higher first-period cost, it will produce only if it will be the source of
product in the second period.
In contrast to the supplier-as-leader analysis, here the manufacturer gains all benefits
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from learning. Thus, he can benefit from the supplier’s learning in any case in which
q2s > 0.
Corollary 4 When the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, his profit is non-decreasing
in both his own learning and the supplier’s learning. The supplier’s profit is always zero,
and is therefore unaffected by learning rates.
This corollary is a result of the fact that when the manufacturer has all of the power
in the relationship, the supplier is forced to pass on all of her cost improvement to the
manufacturer. Recall, differently, that when the supplier was the leader of the game in
Section 2.5, she was not able to take all of the benefits of learning when both players
were learning.
If the supplier has a reservation profit that she must earn to ensure her participation,
then the following two-part tariff is optimal for the manufacturer: set the fixed fee equal
to the reservation profit and the wholesale price in period t equal to the supplier’s cost in
period t. As an aside, we note that such a contract would coordinate the supply chain.
We also note that because this is game of complete information and the gains from trade
are known to both parties, that if the players behave cooperatively or bargain as in Nash
(1953), then the optimal strategies will still be as in Theorem 5. However, in this case
the two parties will divide the gains from trade evenly.
To conclude, making the manufacturer Stackelberg leader allows him to take all of
the profits of both players, and thus benefit from either player’s learning. The supplier
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then makes no profit; her ability to behave strategically has been completely eliminated
due to her lack of power.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper is based on three realities: outsourcing decisions have implications beyond
the current time period, firms learn through experience, and independent firms will act
in their own interest. Incorporating these facts into one model has led to several new and
interesting insights about the longer-term effects of major manufacturing outsourcing
decisions.
The purpose of this research was to study the effects of learning and strategic behavior
on outsourcing decisions over multiple periods. Prior research that investigated the effect
of learning on outsourcing assumed a passive supplier that would pass on its savings to
the buying firm, e.g., Anderson and Parker (2002). We argue this is not realistic in
many cases, as Rossetti and Choi (2005) have shown in the aerospace industry. Our
research indicates that when the supplier behaves strategically, the manufacturer may
maintain some in-house production even when he is at an absolute cost disadvantage. In
addition, when the manufacturer is learning, he will demand greater savings to outsource
from the supplier in order to protect himself from future strategic behavior. When
only the supplier learns, only the supplier benefits from this learning. Differently, when
only the manufacturer learns, the supplier may benefit from or be hurt by manufacturer
learning, depending on which strategy is being employed in the given situation. When
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both are learning, even more interesting dynamics arise. Whereas supplier learning does
not benefit a non-learning manufacturer, it actually can benefit a manufacturer that is
learning. Similarly, manufacturer learning can help or hurt the supplier when both learn.
Major outsourcing decisions are complex, even if only near term costs and benefits are
incorporated into the decision. This paper highlights two important, and often neglected,
longer-term risks in outsourcing decisions. Learning and future strategic behavior are of-
ten neglected because their impact occurs at a future time and their effects are difficult
to quantify. All of the strategies which emerged when learning was added to the model
(e.g. keeping production in-house when at an absolute cost disadvantage, partial out-
sourcing, etc.) would be less likely to occur as δ gets smaller. Low δ can be thought of as
a proxy for short term thinking. Short term thinking can exist for very “good” reasons
(cash shortfall, company survival), or, too often, for the “wrong” reasons (short term
incentives, short managerial assignments). This paper shows how short-term thinking
can lead to a sub-optimal decision to outsource.
While this research has generated interesting insights, it is necessarily an abstraction
of reality. It would be interesting to empirically investigate outsourcing arrangements
in order to build a richer understanding of how the factors examined here influence
decisions, contracts, and relationships. Specifically, how do manufacturers reduce the
risk of supplier opportunism in future contract periods? How do they continue to learn
about their product if they are outsourcing production? Also, do suppliers engage in
below-cost wholesale pricing if they know their learning rate to be high? Finally, it would
be interesting to see whether firms that do consider learning and future opportunism in
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the relationship, and put plans in place to deal with them, outperform firms that seem
to be thinking only in terms of the short-term impacts of outsourcing arrangements.
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Chapter 3
Outsourcing of Manufacturing
Resources: The Effect of
Manufacturing Capabilities and
Priorities
3.1 Introduction
In this study, we link a firm’s operations capabilities and priorities to its outsourcing
strategy. In doing so, we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we extend the
literature which has recently brought together firm boundaries and the resource-based
view by showing which operations capabilities (cost and quality) impact outsourcing
plans. Second, we extend the operations strategy literature by linking a firm’s operations
strategy with its outsourcing strategy, which is a component of its supply chain strategy.
We do this by studying the effect of individual manufacturing priorities on outsourcing
plans.
While the relationship between product and market characteristics on outsourcing
decisions is well studied (Grover and Malhotra, 2003; David and Han, 2004), the liter-
ature that relates a firm’s heterogeneous operational characteristics and firm boundary
decisions is in its infancy (Barney, 1999). The first major contribution of this paper is to
answer the question: “How do operations capabilities (specifically quality and/or cost)
affect outsourcing plans?” The strategy and economics literature have recently concluded
that capabilities do matter in outsourcing decisions, but have only studied weak proxies
for capabilities. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide insight the effect of
specific operations capabilities on plans to outsource.
Additionally, to our knowledge, no one has linked the priority that a firm places
on different competitive capabilities to its outsourcing plans. Doing so links a firm’s
operations strategy to a key part of its supply chain strategy. Thus, the next major
contribution of this paper is to answer the question: “How does the importance that a firm
place on a specific competitive capability impact its outsourcing plans?” Understanding
this provides insight about how a firm’s manufacturing strategy links to whether it plans
to keep manufacturing in-house.
“Outsourcing” is a term that is often used loosely and in different contexts, so it is
important to clearly define its meaning for this research. Our definition is adapted from
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Barthe´lemy (2003) for manufacturing: “turning over all or part of [a manufacturing]
activity to an outside vendor” (p.87). Implicit in this definition is that the company at
one time performed the activity in-house. As such, outsourcing is one special type of
“make-buy” or “firm boundary” decision.
While it has recently grown in prominence, “outsourcing” of manufacturing has been
around for a long time. Henry Ford’s River Rouge production system was “integrated
from the production of wood and steel through final assembly” (Hayes et al., 2005, p.116),
and has clearly since disintegrated significantly. Although outsourcing is not new, there
is a trend toward outsourcing of manufacturing resources over the last decade in many
important industries, include electronics (Sturgeon, 2002), pharmaceuticals (VanArnum,
2000), biotech (Mirasol, 2004), and aerospace (Destefani, 2004). This trend is occurring
for some rational reasons. Rapid technological change has made it difficult for corpora-
tions to maintain internal expertise on all components of their products. The Internet
has made remote information sharing (and management) easier. Finally, the growth of
the outsourcing practice itself has created a base of suppliers who are well along on the
learning curve and may be benefiting from economies of scale. Outsourcing carries many
documented benefits, but also many risks. In the introductory chapter to this dissertation
(Tables 1.2 and 1.3), we document the commonly cited benefits and risks.
To make the decision to outsource versus keep in-house, a manager must trade off
these benefits and risks. This is very difficult to do in practice, especially given that
many benefits (e.g., focus on core competence) and costs (e.g., possible future losses in
competences) are hidden and difficult to measure. Studying the factors that relate to
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plans to outsource provides some insight about how managers weigh different capabili-
ties and priorities when making a decision. As will be discussed below, antecedents of
outsourcing decisions have been studied in terms of transaction costs, property rights,
the resource based view, and other frameworks. We will investigate the effect of specific
operations capabilities and priorities on a business unit’s plans to outsource.
This research will contribute to existing research in two ways. First, we will contribute
to the resource-based view by showing not only that some broad proxy for firm-specific
capabilities matters in a firm’s plans to outsource, but by showing which of these ca-
pabilities matter. Second, we will contribute to the operations strategy literature by
being the first to explicitly link a firm’s operations strategy–its priorities–to outsourcing
decisions. For practicing operations managers, this research will provide guidance as to
which capabilities impact their firm’s plans to outsource.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide theoret-
ical background from both the manufacturing strategy and business strategy literatures
as they relate to our study, as well as a review of closely related empirical literature. We
present a conceptual model and hypotheses in Section 3.3. Data and methodology are
discussed in Section 3.4. Results are given and discussed in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6
we conclude.
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3.2 Theoretical Background
This paper enhances two literature streams, the literature on “firm boundaries” and the
manufacturing strategy literature. We discuss the relevant aspects of those literatures,
and the gaps which we will fill, now.
3.2.1 Firm Boundaries
In the strategy and economics literatures, firm boundaries have been studied since at
least the 1930s. At that time, (Coase, 1937), in discussing the nature of the firm while
developing the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective, framed the outsourcing
decision as one of minimizing transaction costs. Extended by Williamson (1985), TCE
looks at make-buy decisions as a trade-off between governance costs and opportunism.
Hierarchical governance is the management of internal production, whereas market gov-
ernance directs a competitive supplier market. Market governance is considered to be
generally more efficient, but the efficiency benefit must be weighted against the increased
transaction costs and risks of opportunism caused by dealing with a separate firm. These
risks will be increased if there exists asset specificity and uncertainty, the two main in-
dependent variable constructs in transaction cost analysis.
Asset specific investments are those that are only useful in production of a certain
good, and therefore are not valuable for any other use. When such assets are involved in
a transaction, then the possibility of “hold-up” exists by the firm that does not put the
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up front investment into the assets. This possibility requires detailed contracts between
the firms and/or may result in underinvestment by the firm that needs to make the in-
vestment. The presence of uncertainty can also increase the costs of market governance,
as it is not possible to contract for a large number of possible outcomes; these may be
dealt with by the presumably more flexible hierarchical control. We note here that some
(e.g., Shelanski and Klein, 1995) have pointed out that the effect of uncertainty depends
on competitive conditions; and as a stand-alone first-order construct may not predict
outsourcing plans. Perhaps consequently, the empirical support for uncertainty as a pre-
dictor of outsourcing behavior has been mixed (David and Han, 2004). In summary, the
TCE would expect, all else equal, that a firm’s plans to outsource manufacturing would
be decreased by the presence of high asset specificity and the presence of uncertainty.
Reasonable proxies for asset specificity and uncertainty are included as control variables
in our study. By including these, we acknowledge the importance of TCE constructs in
explaining outsourcing plans.
Barney (1999) notes that in the TCE framework “never once do questions about the
relative capabilities of a firm and its exchange partners arise. Firm capabilities simply
do not play a significant role in traditional transaction cost analyses of firm boundaries”
(p.140). As a tool to analyze firm boundaries and outsourcing decisions, this may be seen
as a shortcoming of the traditional TCE approach. The resource-based view augments
TCE by incorporating path-dependent capabilities.
The “resource-based view” (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) has been em-
braced by strategy scholars as a complementary view to study not only the boundaries
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of the firm, but the attainment of sustainable competitive advantage. Barney (1991) de-
scribes resources that are inimitable, rare, non-substitutable, and valuable as being the
ones that lead to competitive advantage. The development of such resources is generally
path-dependent and complex. RBVs main contribution to firm boundary antecedents re-
search is to supplement the TCE view by noting that these path-dependent firm-specific
characteristics play a major role in outsourcing decisions in addition to the characteris-
tics of the product and the transaction. Recently, Ray et al. (2004) have condoned using
dependent variables other than broad performance to test the value of different resources
in a firm. Along this line, plans to outsource as a dependent variable can be considered
an assessment of the value placed by top management on the resource of capabilities
possessed by the manufacturing function.
The key takeaway from the above discussion is that while the boundaries of the firm
have been studied for decades, only relatively recently have firm-level capabilities been
studied as a key explanatory variable. While other papers have looked at the effect an
overall firm-specific variable (e.g., Leiblein and Miller, 2003), this paper is the first that we
know of to investigate the effect of specific manufacturing strategy variables (capabilities
and priorities) on outsourcing decisions. In this research, we are both acknowledging
the importance of TCE in firm boundary decisions and extending the resource-based
empirical literature on determinants of firm boundaries.
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3.2.2 Manufacturing Strategy
We discuss the ways in which manufacturing strategy has covered outsourcing in Section
1.6 of this dissertation. While much has been written, it is surprising that we know of no
manufacturing strategy literature that empirically investigates the drivers of outsourc-
ing decisions from an operations perspective. This work has been left to the strategy
and economics literatures, which have generally treated operations capability as a single
construct, if at all.
Manufacturing strategy has developed the definitions and has operationalized the
constructs we use in this study. Classic manufacturing strategy defined four key manu-
facturing capabilities as quality, delivery, cost, and flexibility. The importance an orga-
nization puts on these different areas reveals manufacturing’s priorities. An assessment
of performance in each of these dimensions identifies manufacturing’s capabilities (Miller
and Roth, 1994; Roth, 1996; Ward et al., 1995). We focus in this study on the competitive
dimensions of cost and quality.
In sum, manufacturing strategy has discussed vertical integration as a key decision,
but most of the manufacturing strategy research either assumes control of the operation
under study, or studies how to interact with suppliers for material not produced in-
house. The manufacturing strategy literature has given us constructs to assess operations
strategies, through the definitions and operationalizations of manufacturing capabilities
and priorities. But, to our knowledge, no one in the manufacturing strategy literature has
linked these fundamental operations strategy variables to a firm’s outsourcing strategy.
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3.2.3 Related Empirical Studies
There have been many empirical studies testing TCE’s impact on firm boundaries. This
body of work has been reviewed recently by Grover and Malhotra (2003) and David and
Han (2004). Grover and Malhotra (2003) note that “most studies view the operations
context as a black box” (p.465). Leiblein and Miller (2003) state that “existing research
has largely followed the precepts put forth in transaction cost economics (TCE) and ar-
gued that the optimal form of organization is primarily a function of the characteristics
underlying a given exchange” (p.839). They go on to note that while empirical support
for TCE has been obtained, “the existing literature provides almost no discussion of the
role of firm-level differences and how they might influence the boundaries of the firm
in existing empirical transaction-based models of the firm” (Leiblein and Miller, 2003,
p.840). The authors then provide evidence that operational characteristics (operational-
ized as fabrication experience) significantly impact sourcing decisions, along with some
other variables predicted by the TCE literature.
Argyres (1996) performed a case study, to investigate “the capabilities approach to
strategic management [which] has argued that the relative capabilities of buyers and
suppliers are important factors in vertical integration decisions” (p.129). He investigates,
in-depth, several make-buy decisions of a firm, and finds that in some cases transaction
cost logic dominates, but that in others the relative capabilities dominate. Capabilities
seem to matter when knowledge related to the activity is tacit and team-based; or when
long-term goals to produce in-house outweigh a short-term cost disadvantage.
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In addition to work done since the advent of the capabilities approach to strategic
management, a couple of classical studies on TCE found evidence that interfirm capa-
bility differential makes a difference in the make-buy decision. For instance, the most
important explanatory variable for the sourcing decision in Walker and Weber (1984)
was “supplier production advantage”; it proved more important than supplier compe-
tition and environmental uncertainty; traditional TCE variables. Also, in Monteverde
and Teece (1982), the most significant explanatory variable in their study of the auto
industry was the dummy for the firm (a control variable). This was more significant than
their proxies for asset specificity and supplier market competitiveness.
In short, it has been established that firm-specific capabilities do matter in firm
boundary decisions. As Barney (1999) points out, if you ask a manager how he makes
a sourcing decision, he will surely include capability differential, and will most likely
consider that among the most important factors. Our interviews with managers support
this assertion. Empirical evidence has shown that broad operationalizations of firm-
specific variables (e.g., production experience, production advantage) do significantly
impact outsourcing decisions. However, we do not know specifically which firm oper-
ational characteristics-capabilities and priorities-matter most to the firm’s decision to
outsource manufacturing. That is the focus of this study.
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Figure 3.1: Path diagram of model to be tested
3.3 Conceptual Model
Figure 3.1 depicts the model to be studied. The relatively simple structure of the model,
a test of first-order effects, is customary in research which studies the antecedents of a
decision. We will discuss each of the relationships presented in the model in this section.
As discussed above, previous empirical studies have used such variables as “production
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experience”-i.e, the cumulative number of similar products produced by a firm–as proxies
for capabilities. In this research, we look at specific capabilities, relative to competitors,
and study how these capabilities individually affect plans to outsource. We make specific,
directional hypotheses on those capabilities and priorities-cost and quality–which we
believe will have a significant, stand-alone effect in a known direction. At the end of the
results section, we also test a competing model that includes the moderating effect of a
competitive priority on a competitive capability’s influence on plans to outsource.
3.3.1 Plans to Outsource–The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is “plans to outsource.” Most empirical studies of
outsourcing decisions have a dependent variable which identifies the level of outsourcing
of an activity, either dichotomously or continuously. This approach works well when the
objective is to look at how the characteristics of a single activity relate to whether that
specific activity will be outsourced. Our intent here is to determine what role business-
unit level operations capabilities and priorities play on a business unit’s outsourcing
strategy. The outsourcing strategy is revealed based on whether a manufacturing business
unit leader intends to increase or decrease its outsourcing activity, on a continuous latent
variable. We call this intention to outsource a firm’s “plans to outsource.”
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3.3.2 Competitive Capabilities–Cost and Quality
All else equal, if a firm has a higher level of manufacturing capability in a given dimension,
one would expect that it would be less apt to outsource part or all of its manufacturing
function. This is the premise of studies which link the resource-based view to firm
boundaries, and also at the root of the debate in the strategy literature on whether
the traditional transaction cost view of firm boundaries, which focuses only on market
structure, is adequate. The strategy literature has shown that firm-specific capabilities
do matter, but has not dissected which capabilities matter. We do that now.
The importance of capability should certainly be true in the area of overall quality.
High quality capability is generally the end result of a time-consuming development of
processes, routines, and skills. Successful quality leadership involves developing in-house
intangible, behavioral capabilities that are valuable, hard to imitate, and rare (Powell,
1995). Inimitable, rare, value, and non-substitutable capabilities per the RBV are the
key to long-term competitive advantage, as discussed above. In the TQM literature,
it has been suggested that it is not the practices of quality but the hard to imitate
“infrastructural” components of the programs that make the difference in performance.
The infrastructural components of the programs are the “soft” parts–the tacit knowledge
developed, the open culture, the empowerment of workers to perform improvement work,
etc. (Flynn et al., 1995; Sousa and Voss, 2002). Further, an emerging belief in operations
strategy is that quality capability serves as the basis for building capabilities in other
areas (Ferdows and DeMeyer, 1990; Roth, 1996; Rosenzweig and Roth, 2004). Based on
the above, it seems likely that firms that have achieved quality capability will be less
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likely to outsource all or part of their manufacturing function.
Hypothesis 1 A firm’s OVERALL QUALITY CAPABILITY will negatively affect its
PLANS TO OUTSOURCE.
Another competitive capability that may affect a firm’s outsourcing decisions is cost.
Cost improvement is still frequently cited as the leading reason firms outsource (Casale,
2004). Our conversations with outsourcing decision-makers also indicate that short-term
measurable costs are the main decision-driver. It is interesting that while cost is still
given as the leading reason for outsourcing, much more attention in the academic and
management literature has been on concepts such as “strategic outsourcing” (Quinn and
Hilmer, 1994). Bounded rationality (Simon, 1979) has shown that managers cannot
possibly understand all of the effects of their decisions, and thus are more likely to base
their decisions on something readily measurable, like cost. Also, many managers are
awarded on short-term profitably during their tenure. Given the expected supremacy of
measurable costs in the decisions, a firm with low manufacturing costs will be less likely
to seek to outsource manufacturing. This is simply because there will be fewer contract
manufacturers who can effectively compete with them regarding manufacturing costs.
Hypothesis 2 A firm’s COST CAPABILITY will negatively affect its PLANS TO OUT-
SOURCE.
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3.3.3 Competitive Priorities–Cost and Quality
The priority a firm places on different manufacturing-based capabilities can give some
insight into whether or not a firm will be likely to outsource. Quality is known to be
difficult to contract (Kaya and O¨zer, 2005), and there is evidence from the franchise
literature that vertically integrated firms have higher quality (Michael, 2000). Therefore,
outsourcing may present a quality risk. Additionally, a firm for which quality is a high
priority would tend to value continuous improvement, integration between manufacturing
and other functions, and the development of tacit knowledge. Powell (1995) linked the
tacit, casually ambiguous and difficult to imitate aspects of Total Quality Management
to improved performance. These are capabilities that cannot be purchased on factor
markets. Given this, we believe that a firm which places a high priority on quality will
be less likely to outsource.
Hypothesis 3 A firm’s QUALITY PRIORITY will negatively affect its PLANS TO
OUTSOURCE.
The analysis of possible cost savings in an outsourcing decision is difficult. If a firm
looks long enough, and only looks at hard numbers and the “promised” results of a
supplier vs. the actual, proven past performance of in-house production, it is likely it
can find a “lower cost” supplier. In addition to survey data (Casale, 2004), our discussions
with managers indicate that firms for whom cost is a priority may be more likely to seek
the outsourcing option as a seemingly easy and rapid way to lower costs. Thus, firms who
put a high importance on cost performance are more likely to be tempted by a “lower
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cost” offer from a supplier. Form this, the following hypothesis emerges:
Hypothesis 4 A firm’s COST PRIORITY will positively affect its PLANS TO OUT-
SOURCE
3.3.4 Transaction Cost Variables
Asset Specificity TCE would predict that asset specificity would negatively affect out-
sourcing plans. Continuous flow and machine-paced lines are processes that would
generally entail asset-specific investments. Having such a process is thus a proxy for
asset specificity, and as such it may have a negative impact on plans to outsource
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003; David and Han, 2004). Also, such assets represent
significant investments, and structural inertia theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1984)
would indicate that firms with such sunk investments may be less willing to out-
source. Based on this, we expect our proxy for asset specificity to negatively impact
plans to outsource, and include it as a control variable.
Technological Uncertainty TCE would predict that technological uncertainty would
negatively impact plans to outsource, due to renegotiation/recontracting costs, es-
pecially in the presence of asset specificity. Empirical validation of this has been
inconsistent (Grover and Malhotra, 2003; David and Han, 2004). However, be-
cause uncertainty is often included in studies on the antecedents of outsourcing, we
include it as a control variable in this study.
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3.3.5 Other Control Variables
The database is rich, but does not include some variables previously shown to be sig-
nificant in firm boundary research. For example, the data set does not include usable
information on the supplier market, such as competitiveness and number of suppliers
(Walker and Weber, 1984; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). However, the data set does include
several variables of interest, some that have been included as control variables in other
studies and others that have not. The actual survey questions are included in Appendix
6.2.1. This list gives the control variables of possible interest, as well as some brief
discussion of how they may affect a firm’s outsourcing strategy.
Emerging Market Geography may impact plans to outsource. Other studies (e.g.,
Leiblein and Miller, 2003) have found location of firm (US, Japan, other Asian) to
be non-significant in their study. Our database is unique in that we have many firms
from emerging economies. Thus, we include emerging/non-emerging (based on the
classification of Hoskisson et al. (2000)) as our 1-0 control variable for location.
Market Leader Market leaders may behave differently with regard to outsourcing. This
is a 1-0 variable as to whether a firm assessed itself as a market leader.
Firm Size This is a control variable in most studies, and has been shown to increase
outsourcing (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) and increase vertical integration (Leiblein
and Miller, 2003). There are reasons to believe size would increase outsourcing
(complex operations, outsource to support growth) and decrease outsourcing (re-
sources available to do in-house). Buzzell (1983) found that larger firms benefited
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more than small firms from vertical integration.
Life Cycle It has been proposed (Coming et al., 2003), that products follow a natural
cycle from in-house early in the life cycle to significant outsourcing late in the
life cycle. Grant and Gregory (1997) make an opposite argument-that outsourcing
should decrease late in the life cycle. Given the possibility that life cycle plays a
role in outsourcing plans, we include it in the study.
Highly Custom Producing a custom product (vs. standard) may require special skills
that demand outsourcing, or, on the contrary, may warrant maintaining specialized
skills in-house. Therefore, we include this as a control variable
Industry Although not reported for parsimony, we did run tests including six industry
dummies in the model, accounting for the effect of seven industries (consumer
products, pharmaceutical, high tech, aerospace, automobile, chemical, and general
manufacturing/other). None of these dummies had a significant impact on the
dependent variable, nor did their presence significantly alter other key substantive
findings.
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3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Database
The data are from the 1997 VIM survey, administered by Deloitte and Touche and Aleda
Roth of Clemson University. Roth et al. (1997) describe the focus of this survey as
“manufacturing strategies, including competitive capabilities, key action programs, and
performance” (Roth et al., 1997, p.168). The unit of analysis of the survey is manufac-
turing business unit (MBU). This is where manufacturing strategy is formulated. MBU
leaders would certainly play a major role in outsourcing decisions.
The VIM survey was administered in 35 countries. The Gallup Organization was used
to administer the survey. The sample was administered to a wide variety of industrial sec-
tors and regions. The surveys were administered by a professional research organization;
they followed the procedures recommended by Dillman (1978). Professional translators,
together with bilingual business people, ensured the surveys were acceptable to foreign
respondents. The overall response rate was 10% (resulting in 867 companies); the re-
sponse rate in emerging market countries was less than half of that from industrialized
countries.
Single-respondent bias and common methods bias are common issues with survey-
based research. Several aspects of the survey design and administration help to mitigate
common methods bias, as discussed in Mitchell (1994) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). First,
high level respondents (senior manufacturing executives), who were regular participants
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in their manufacturing business unit’s manufacturing strategy process, were the respon-
dents for the survey. Second, the survey is complex, containing over 900 items. Third,
most questions are of different forms. Fourth, the relevant questions are quite simple
and unambiguous. As further evidence that bias is not an issue here, an earlier survey of
similar design was found by field studies to exhibit minimal measurement bias. Common
method bias is especially a concern if the independent variables and dependent variables
exhibit correlation (and therefore a significant effect) due to common method bias instead
of for theoretical reasons. Fortunately, when considering bias between the independent
and dependent variables, none of the seven common causes of common rater effects listed
in Table 2 of Podsakoff et al. (2003) apply in this case. This is partially driven by the
fact that the dependent variable questions are both far away from the others in the sur-
vey and are in a different form. To test for method bias, we ran two commonly used
tests: Harman’s single-factor test and the inclusion of a method factor as discussed by
Podsakoff et al. (2003). These tests as a whole indicate that some common method bias
may be present among the independent variables, but, importantly, we have no evidence
that a non-negligible amount of common method bias exists between the dependent vari-
able (plans to outsource) and the independent variables. We partially deal with common
method bias in the independent variables by freeing the covariance of the error terms of
similarly worded capabilities and priorities. We discuss common methods bias in more
detail in Appendix 6.2.3
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3.4.2 Measures
To evaluate the model in Figure 3.1, structural equation modeling (SEM) will be em-
ployed. We know that measurement error will be present in the survey responses. Of the
readily available alternatives, structural equation modeling allows the weakest assump-
tions regarding measurement error. The construct names and definitions of each latent
variable used in the model of Figure 3.1 are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Constructs and definitions
Construct Definition
Plans to Outsource(PTO) A firm’s plans to increase outsourcing of its manufactur-
ing activities in the coming years
Overall Quality Capability
(QC)*
The current ability of the company to deliver several di-
mensions of product quality
Overall Quality Priority
(QP)
The current priority the business places several dimen-
sions of product quality (same dimensions as above)
Cost Capability (CC)* The current ability of the manufacturing function to sup-
port competing on price
Cost Priority (CP) The current priority the business places on the ability to
compete on price
*-same scale used in Rosenzweig et al. (2003)
3.4.3 Validity and Reliability
The measures used for each construct capture the essence of the underlying construct.
Perceptual measures are used for all items in the analysis. In all, 26 items are used for
this model. The number of questions per construct ranges from one (for most of the
control variables) to five (for the quality capability and priority, and for the dependent
variable; plans to outsource). The constructs are operationalized using the scales given
in Table 6.2.1 in the appendix. Scale reliabilities for multi-item scales are also given in
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Table 6.2.1. Content validity is assured by the tight linkage between the definitions and
the manufacturing strategy literature. Many of the scales have been used in previous
published research. As indicated in the appendix, all scales with more than two items
have item reliabilities (Hair et al., 1998, p.612) greater than 0.70. The two cost items
(priority and capability) are two item scales; the two items are strongly correlated.
Descriptive statistics for the variables are given in Table 6.2.2 in the appendix. Cor-
relations were examined for all variables and are given in Tables 6.19 and 6.20 in the
appendix. The correlations within a factor are in all cases significant to the p < 0.001.
Additionally, inter-item correlations are in all cases greater than the correlation of an
item outside of its factor, with one group of exceptions. In the cases where the same cat-
egory of item is used to obtain the capability and priority of an item (e.g., see QC1 and
QP1 in Appendix 6.2.1), the correlation between the two items is high. Because identical
question wording may bias these correlations high for reasons beyond what theory would
predict, we allow the error variances of these items to correlate in the model. We discuss
common methods bias in this study in Appendix 6.2.3.
The scales were checked for unimodality and approximation of normality by viewing
histograms and normal probability plots of the data. All of the capability and plans to
outsource items exhibited reasonable approximations to normality. However, most of the
priority items were skewed the high end of the scale. We do not use Shapiro-Wilk (or
other) tests because of the categorical nature of our data. Given that the normality of
each of the variables cannot be assumed (and therefore multivariate normality cannot
be assumed), we examined bootstrapped standard errors in AMOS after completing the
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analysis in LISREL and found no difference in key substantive results; we will discuss
more in the results section.
We tested for discriminant validity of the scales by analyzing the difference in chi-
square between pairs of multi-item constructs when they are allowed to correlate freely
and when the correlation is fixed to one. A significant difference provides evidence of
discriminant validity. All chi-square differences were highly significant, as indicated in
Appendix 6.2.4.
We first performed an overall confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using LISREL 8.54.
LISREL was chosen for the CFA and the structural equation modeling tests of hypotheses
because of its capabilities for handling missing data. The missing data was not excessive.
In the observed variables used in the model above, there are a total of 9% missing
values. However, due to the amount of variables (26) used in the analysis, listwise
deletion with this model would have reduced the sample size to approximately 300 usable
companies from the original number of 867 companies. Also, listwise deletion requires
an assumption of missing completely at random (MCAR). Full Information Maximum
Likelihood (FIML) allows us to make an assumption that the data are missing at random.
“Missing at random” (MAR) means that a value’s missingness “may depend on observed
values but not on missing ones” (Schafer, 1999). This is a weaker assumption than MCAR
and therefore preferable.The model fit for the CFA of the multi-item scales is in Table
3.2.
First, note that LISREL does not give standard fit statistics (GFI, CFI, etc.) when
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Table 3.2: Fit statistics for confirmatory factor analysis
χ2 (df=135) p-value RMSEA All loadings
sig?
CFA 249 .000 .031 YES
using FIML. This is because “the specification of a means structure (required for esti-
mation) renders certain fit indexes undefined” (Enders, 2001, p.135). However, the low
RMSEA, significantly less than 0.05, is the most important stand-alone measure of model
fit. The “probability of close fit” in the LISREL output is 1.00. The significant chi-square
is common in large sample sizes; the fact that χ2/df is less than 2 indicates reasonable
fit by the chi-square test (Carmines and McIver, 1981). As further evidence that the
measurement model is acceptable, we note that all loadings were highly significant on
their factors, with t-values ranging from 5 to over 20.
3.5 Results
The complete structural model of Figure 3.1 was also tested using LISREL 8.54, and han-
dling missing data with FIML. As indicated in the Table 3.3, the RMSEA is comfortably
below the cutoff for “good” fit of 0.05; again, the “p-value for close fit” =1.00.
Table 3.3: Fit statistics of the SEM of Figure 3.1
χ2 (df=226) p-value RMSEA All loadings
sig?
SEM 414 .000 .030 YES
As in the CFA, commonly discussed fit statistics are not given by LISREL. However,
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we ran the structural model using data sets formed by multiple imputation with missing
data imputed in AMOS 6. The commonly used fit indices (CFI, GFI, IFI, TLI) all had
values above .9, further indicating acceptable fit. Additional indications of acceptable fit
include normal-looking standardized residual plots, very few residuals greater than 2.6,
and relatively few modification indices greater than 4 (Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom, 2001).
3.5.1 Tests of Hypotheses
Looking at the path values predicted by the hypotheses in Table 3.4, two of the four
hypotheses–the two related to cost–are supported to the 0.05 level. This is a one-tailed
test, so the critical t-value is 1.65.
Table 3.4: Tests of hypotheses
Hypothesis Loading t-value Significant? Hypothesis
Supported?
(1) Quality Capabil-
ity
.026 .427 NO NO
(2) Cost Capability -.119 -2.89 p < .05 YES
(3) Quality Priority -.009 .093 NO NO
(4) Cost Priority .187 2.46 p < .05 YES
Some interesting things can be observed by the results. Surprisingly, neither quality
capability nor priority appears to play a direct role in plans to outsource. This indicates
that product quality does not have a strong, independent impact on the decision to
outsource manufacturing resources. It is possible that firms that had already obtained
high quality were embracing the core competence paradigm (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990)
and strategically outsourcing non-critical operations. Also, quality is multi-dimensional.
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The independent impact of cost capability and priority is telling. It indicates that
cost is driving the manufacturing outsourcing decision. If low cost is a priority, then
firms are more likely to outsource manufacturing. If internal cost capability was high,
they were less likely to outsource manufacturing. It will be interesting to see if this
capability continues to have such a large impact in the future relative to the other reasons
to outsource. Our expectation is that it will, as recent interviews with manufacturing
executives at world-class companies indicate that cost is still the main driver of their
outsourcing decisions.
3.5.2 Impact of Control Variables
Next, we list the control variables tested, including our proxy for asset specificity. There
are a couple of key things to note on Table 3.5. First, the most empirically robust
construct from transaction cost theory has again withstood empirical validation-asset
specificity reduces plans to outsource. Second, uncertainty has again not been shown to
have a stand-alone first-order effect on outsourcing. (David and Han, 2004) and (Grover
and Malhotra, 2003) showed that both of these results (support for asset specificity,
mixed results for uncertainty) are common.
A surprising result is that operating in an emerging economy significantly increases
plans to increase outsourcing. This could be because these countries are generally more
collectivist (Hofstede, 2001) and more open to resource sharing. Further work based on
this result is left to future research.
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Table 3.5: Tests of the control variables
Variable Loading t-value Significant?
Asset Specificity -.140 -3.086 p < .05
Technological Uncer-
tainty
.003 .019 NO
Emerging Market .142 2.961 p < .05
Market Leader .007 .152 NO
Large Firm .072 1.67 NO
Early in Life Cycle .042 .838 NO
Custom Product -.048 -1.19 NO
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the model to the choice of methodology, some additional tests
were performed. First, multiple imputation and regression (with collapsed scales) were
performed in SAS. The key substantive results did not change. Second, standard errors
were bootstrapped using AMOS with each multiply imputated data set. Bootstrapping
the standard errors did not affect any of the key substantive results. Also, hierarchical
regression (with collapsed scales) was performed in SAS using multiply imputed data sets
to ensure that the four hypothesized variable explained a significant amount of variance
over and above the control variables; they did. These checks ensure that the main results
did not depend on the method chosen or how missing data was handled-they are robust
and exist in the data set.
3.5.4 Competing Model
The first-order effect model presented above gives the effect of a given operations capabil-
ity on plans holding priority constant and vice versa. It may be argued that the priority
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a firm places on a competitive dimension would moderate the relationship between the
realized capability and plans to outsource. For example, a firm that places a high priority
on cost may be more likely to outsource due to low capability than a firm that places a
low priority on cost. Thus, the priority a firm places on a competitive dimension may
alter the effect of a capability on outsourcing plans. For cost, this possible interaction is
represented conceptually in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Possible interaction of cost priority and capability
Low Capability High Capability
High Priority HIGH MED
Low Priority MED LOW
Impact on plans to outsource
We note that our theory for quality differed, in that we believed firms that place a
high priority on quality may be less likely to outsource, all else equal. We conceptually
present this in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Possible Interaction of quality priority and capability
Low Capability High Capability
High Priority MED LOW
Low Priority HIGH MED
Impact on plans to outsource
Moderation is generally modeled by including a product term between the two inde-
pendent variables of interest with mean-centered data, as given in the equation below:
PTOi = β0+β1QCi+β2QPi+β3CCi+β4CPi+β5(CPi∗CCi)+β6(QCi∗QPi)+βj(Cont.V ar.)
(3.1)
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Because of the extreme difficulties of including interaction terms in such a large struc-
tural equation model with missing data, we included an interaction term in a regression
framework using collapsed scales. This is justifiable as regression with collapsed scales
and no interaction terms led to the same substantive results as the structural equation
model presented above. When interaction terms are included, none of them have sig-
nificant coefficients, meaning the first-order effects (when present) dominate. However,
the inclusion of the interaction terms did slip cost priority to non-significance. More
complicated relationships between capabilities, priorities, and plans to outsource will be
the subject of future research.
3.5.5 Limitations
We now discuss some limitations of our study. First, the data are cross-sectional. This
concern is somewhat minor in this study because we are studying how current operations
strategy impacts current outsourcing plans, but it would be appealing to determine how
a firm’s operations strategy relates to actual outsourcing performed. Second, the survey
was not designed to have multiple indicators of a single construct, so the constructs had to
be gleaned from the available questions and are sometimes multi-dimensional. While the
constructs reasonably reflect the questions used as indicators, a study designed explicitly
for this purpose would probably have used slightly different, more unidimensional indica-
tors of the underlying constructs. Third, the overall R-squared of the model was 14.1%,
quite low but not unreasonable in research studying such a complex dependent variable.
In spite of the above limitations, we have provided further evidence that capabilities do
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matter and obtained new evidence about which specific manufacturing strategy variables
matter most in outsourcing decisions. There is ample opportunity for future research to
investigate more and different aspects of firm-specific characteristics that drive a firm to
have a plan to outsource.
3.6 Conclusion
By linking a firm’s operations strategy to its outsourcing strategy, this study makes sev-
eral contributions to the academic literature. First, it adds further empirical evidence
that firm-level attributes (capabilities and priorities) do matter in outsourcing decisions,
lending support to the resource-based view as important in boundary decisions and re-
inforcing that firm boundary research that neglects firm-specific capabilities is lacking.
Second, it looks at specific operations-based competitive capabilities and priorities, as
opposed to a single variable such as “production experience” (Leiblein and Miller, 2003),
and measures the influence of these individual priorities and capabilities on a firm’s out-
sourcing plans. Third, this study provides a first step in utilizing operations strategy
concepts not just to predict plant or business performance, but also to predict the health
of the production function within the firm.
From a practitioner perspective, this research is not prescriptive-it does not provide
guidance as to the conditions under which outsourcing should be undertaken. However,
we can make statements of interest to managers. First, for practicing operations man-
agers, this study reiterates the importance of attaining and articulating leadership in cost
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to avoid being outsourced-the “soft stuff” does not seem to have great influence to high
level managers’ plans to outsource. For higher-level managers, we suggest that difficult-
to-measure, longer term criteria should perhaps be given a larger weight in outsourcing
decisions, as opposed to a focus on costs.
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Chapter 4
Buyer Beware? Quality Risk in
Outsourcing
4.1 Introduction
Pan Pharmaceuticals was a large contract manufacturer in the Australian pharmaceuti-
cals industry in early 2003. But, in mid-2003 a travel sickness pill it produced on contract
resulted in 19 hospitalizations. Investigations of Pan’s operations revealed such serious
violations as the fabrication of test results and the substitution of raw materials. In the
end, 1650 export products were recalled (Nowak, 2003; Schmetzer, 2003). For the firms
who outsourced production of those 1650 products to Pan Pharmaceuticals, outsourcing
certainly posed a quality risk. Although outsourcing has been on the rise over the past
decade, the extent to which the case of Pan Pharmaceuticals is an isolated event is un-
known. More generally, this research aims to subject to empirical scrutiny the degree
to which outsourcing production to a contract manufacturer poses a quality risk to the
buying firm relative to producing in-house.
The research question we ask is: “Do contract manufacturer’s plants pose a higher
quality risk than internal plants, on average?” For semantic clarity in this dissertation
essay, we operationally define the three main variables associated with this question. A
contract manufacturer’s plant is an establishment that manufactures finished or nearly
finished products to another company’s specifications. An internal plant is an establish-
ment that manufactures products under the brand name and specifications of its own
company. Quality Risk is the propensity for product shipped from a given establishment
to fail to perform as intended, due to manufacturing-related issues.
To address our research question, we develop theoretical arguments and an empirical
model to enable us to test hypotheses concerning the influence of contract manufacturing
relative to maintaining production in-house, as well as ISO 9000 certification, on quality
risk. We included ISO 9000 certification because many practitioners consider it a process-
based factor in an outsourcing decision that should act to lower quality risk. To develop
a valid measure of quality risk at the plant level, we employed a Delphi approach using
a panel of experts and eleven years of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection
reports. Using a systematic approach, we developed a sample of contract manufacturers
and internally owned plants. We apply our research in a sample of 154 plants in the
over-the-counter (OTC) and pharmaceutical drug industry.
Evaluating the potential quality risk posed by outsourcing production to contract
manufacturers is important to operations management. The practice of outsourcing pro-
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duction to contract manufacturers is common in many industries (Tully, 1994), including
the prescription drug, over-the-counter drug, and regulated cosmetic industries which we
study here (VanArnum, 2000; Jeffries, 2003; Antonelli, 2005). In fact, the global phar-
maceuticals outsourcing market is predicted to reach $53 billion by 2010 from $24 billion
today (Anonymous, 2006). Given that off-quality drugs can be harmful to humans, it is
important for firms to understand whether or not outsourcing to contract manufacturers
poses an added quality risk. While manufacturing outsourcing continues to increase in
many industries, the theoretical underpinnings of the quality risk implications of using
contract manufacturers are lacking.
In this paper, we make several contributions to the academic literature and practice.
First, we draw from the economic incentives and measurement literature, the supply
chain literature, and the total quality management (TQM) literature to propose a theory
on the effect of outsourcing on quality, as it pertains to contract manufacturing. Second,
we create an innovative measure of plant-level quality risk from publicly available FDA
inspection reports. We do this utilizing the Delphi process with a diverse panel of experts.
Next, using our summary metric, we provide empirical support that the use of contract
manufacturers poses a greater quality risk than producing in internal plants. We control
for several potentially relevant variables in this analysis. Finally, counter to conventional
wisdom, our empirical results show that ISO 9000 certification does not mitigate quality
risk. This is relevant to outsourcing decision-makers because ISO 9000 is often used to
signal low quality risk.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we review the
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related literature and present our theoretical model. We discuss our database and mea-
surement in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we present the results of an ordered logit regres-
sion analysis of the data. In Section 4.5, we discuss limitations and future research, and
give our theoretical and managerial conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical Model
Our research seeks to improve our understanding of the quality risk implications of out-
sourcing production to contract manufacturers by empirically studying the model in
Figure 4.1. This model demonstrates that we will test two plant-level characteristics-
production source and ISO 9000 certification-to see how they impact quality risk. We
also consider the effect of several potentially relevant control variables, including the
continuous variables of company size, plant size and plant age, and three dummy vari-
ables. These indicate whether plant produces primarily regulated products, whether the
company has any credit issues, and whether the company is public or private.
4.2.1 Source of Production
The primary focus of this study is on the effect of source of production on quality risk.
In this section, we draw upon the supply chain literature, the total quality management
literature, and the literature on measurement and incentives to make an argument that, in
general, outsourcing to contract manufacturers can pose a quality risk. Outsourcing can
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual model
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range from components to complete products. Here, we focus on contract manufacturers
who make finished or nearly finished products. Focusing on finished product outsourcing
to contract manufacturers allows us properly measure quality risk, as an undetected
quality failure at either type of plant will be shipped to the consumer. In terms of
vertical integration, the distinguishing characteristic of the two types of plants is forward
vertical integration. They may have varying levels of backwards integration. Internal
plants are vertically integrated in the sense that they are manufacturing product with
their own brand name for a retail or distribution center. Contract manufacturers are
disintegrated in that they are transferring ownership to another firm who then ships to
distribution or retail. This distinction is important to the theoretical discussion below.
4.2.1.1 Supply Chain Management
The supply chain literature has documented a quality risk in outsourcing, particularly in
the special case of a monopoly market, with one buyer and one contract manufacturer. In
these papers, “quality” is operationalized as perceived quality to the consumers; higher
quality products are valued more by consumers. While this is a different type of quality
than our “quality risk,” these papers provide insight to our study as defect-free products
will clearly be more valued by customers. Economides (1999) shows that outsourcing, as
opposed to vertical integration, leads to lower quality. He explains, “because of double
marginalization, the impact of marginal improvement in quality on price is higher under
dual ownership....[dual, disintegrated] monopolists can achieve the same strategic effects
while providing lower quality and saving on costs” (p.904). Kaya and O¨zer (2005), who
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also utilize the term quality risk, specifically define quality as “product attributes for
which the customers prefer more to less” (p.2). They state that difficulty in contracting
on quality and lack of information by the OEM about the CM’s costs to achieve quality
are the factors that lead to a quality risk. They show that “the CM exerts less effort on
quality than what a vertically integrated OEM would have exerted” (p.3) due both to
double marginalization and the fact that the OEM cannot through contracts enforce his
desired quality level. Sheopuri and Zemel (2005) assume a contract manufacturer who
will shirk on quality, and look at the effect of buyer quality auditing costs on the actions
of the buyers and suppliers. Thus, there is limited but consistent normative theory from
the analytic supply chain literature that quality performance will be lower in the presence
of outsourcing than in vertical integration in a simplified setting due primarily to double
marginalization and the difficulty of contracting on quality.
We found no empirical research on quality in manufacturing outsourcing in the supply
chain literature, but a few studies in the service management literature lend some insights.
Harris and Winston (1983) found that service quality was higher in railroads after vertical
mergers. Their results indicate that “insourcing” of railroad operations improved quality.
Michael (2000) found that in the hotel and restaurant industries, that firms with more
franchised outlets had lower quality performance (measured by Consumer Reports data),
due to the difficulty in contracting for quality and resultant “free riding” by franchisees.
Franchises are like contract manufacturers in that they are producing a clearly defined
product on contract. There are some differences, however. Franchisees interact directly
with the customer and perform some level of local marketing activities, whereas contract
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manufacturers do not. Also, in many contract manufacturing arrangements, contract
manufacturers retain the right and responsibility to the detailed process, whereas this
would normally be dictated in a franchise relationship. Thus, while the theory and
results of this study are aligned with ours, the results of this study do not directly relate
to outsourcing production to a contract manufacturer.
Finally, Hsieh et al. (2004) show that outsourcing lowers delivery reliability in several
segments of the international courier services industry. The authors assert that “vertical
integration, while costly to employ, provides advantages over outsourcing for designing
and tailoring the production process to improve reliability by avoiding under-investment
in product and process design” (p.3).
We found one study that proposed that outsourcing would improve quality. Benson
et al. (1991), in a larger study on organizational context’s effect on quality management,
hypothesized that a high proportion of products purchased (i.e., outsourced) would corre-
late to higher quality due to less internal complexity. This hypothesis was not supported.
In summary, the supply chain literature has provided both analytical and empirical
evidence that there is a quality risk in outsourcing. The context for the analytic models
is generally for simple settings; the empirical studies have been mostly in services. We
now turn to the TQM literature to motivate the theoretical argument underpinning our
study in the drug manufacturing industry.
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4.2.1.2 Total Quality Management (TQM)
The literature on total quality management provides an important part of our theoretical
arguments. The literature has demonstrated that rote implementation of TQM practices
does not consistently improve performance; a change in “tacit” culture is required, as we
discuss now.
In their review of the TQM literature, Sousa and Voss (2002) found that quality
practices alone do not drive quality performance. Rather, it is the infrastructural (Flynn
et al., 1995) components of TQM that more consistently drive performance than im-
plementation of the practices (Anderson and Rungtusanatham, 1994; Dow et al., 1999;
Giffi et al., 1990; Handfield, 2004; Powell, 1995). The infrastructural practices are more
tacit and cultural than the core practices. The infrastructural practices include “softer”
components of TQM such as executive commitment, open organization, employee em-
powerment, and zero defects mentality. These ”intangibles” are a necessary component
for a TQM program to successfully improve quality performance (Powell, 1995; Giffi
et al., 1990).
In a contract manufacturing setting, the fact that the infrastructural practices are
those that drive quality performance and that they are difficult to observe can present
problems for the buying firm. For example, a buyer could observe, through audits or
surveys, that a contract manufacturer utilizes written procedures, performs validations,
etc. However, these systems would matter only if they are rigorously followed. For
example, do employees take the extra effort to stop production to report observed defects?
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Does line management ensure that all process changes are reviewed and revalidated? Do
key decision-makers ensure that out-of-specification results are thoroughly investigated?
Table 4.1 lists several quality “risk-reducers,” clearly spelled in the regulations which the
FDA audits, which will be difficult for buyer audits to detect. FDA inspectors have the
legal authority to pull records, interview employees, etc. to observe the robustness of the
quality systems. It is likely that even careful buyers will have difficulty assessing their
supplier’s ”infrastructural” quality programs.
Thus, while one could argue that a buyer could enforce the implementation of certain
practices (e.g. written procedures, documented training program) on a contract manu-
facturer, it is more difficult to argue that a buyer can enforce a contract manufacturer’s
“tacit” culture. In fact, it will be difficult to even observe such a culture in a typical
negotiation.
4.2.1.3 Measurement and Incentives
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) discuss how when multidimensional incentives are present,
shirking can occur in the harder-to-measure dimension. As discussed above, it is difficult
for a buyer to compare quality risks posed by different contract manufacturers when nego-
tiating a contract. However, it is relatively easy to compare cost, delivery time promises,
etc. Recall, the second essay of this dissertation showed that neither a firm’s self-assessed
quality capability nor the importance it placed on quality affected whether it planned to
outsource; while costs did. Similarly, a recent Gartner survey showed that costs are still
the main driver of outsourcing decisions in process manufacturing (Woollacott, 2006).
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Table 4.1: Examples of systems to lower quality risk
Term Definition
Prior to Startup -Training: Assuring all production and laboratory per-
sonnel know proper operating procedures, process condi-
tions, and what to do in unusual circumstances
-Process Validation: testing and ensuring the produc-
tion and laboratory processes will perform as intended,
including under unusual conditions
-Raw Material Qualification: Ensuring vendor knows ac-
ceptable range of raw material specifications, and has
capability and systems to continuously meet those spec-
ifications
-Computer System Qualification: Ensuring all automatic
systems are validated across the range of scenarios they
may possibly face
During Normal Pro-
duction
-Following Procedures: Ensuring written procedures are
continuously followed and any deviation is justified
-Calculation of Yield: Ensuring two individuals indepen-
dently account for all materials
-Addition of Materials: Ensuring two individuals inde-
pendently confirm the proper amount and type of ingre-
dient is added
-Testing of Product: Ensuring proper items tested at
proper intervals; ensuring two individuals test that prod-
uct meets specifications
-Hygiene: Ensuring personnel and plant are clean and
sanitary; including free of pests.
-Release Authority: Ensuring only trained quality control
personnel are authorized to release product to the trade
During Changeover
and Shutdown
-Ensuring that proper cleaning and sanitization proce-
dures are in place and followed for transition from Prod-
uct A to Product B or extended shutdown
-Ensuring maintenance procedures are consistently fol-
lowed and documented
Change Management -Ensuring all changes are reviewed by qualified QA per-
sonnel; and validations, procedures and retraining are
done as needed
Out of Specification
Product
-Ensuring proper procedure followed after the discovery
of any out-of-specification results
-Ensuring QA has the power to prevent release of product
until cause of out-of-specification is determined
Source: Code of Federal Regulations, 21 CFR-Parts 210 & 211
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Contract manufacturers are aware of the supremacy of costs in outsourcing decisions,
and therefore may tend to focus on those capabilities that earn the business, possibly at
the expense of quality.
Similarly, once the contract manufacturer is producing product for the customer,
they will see immediate benefit (or cost) from any decrease (or increase) in production
costs. They will also feel immediate pain for late deliveries. However, quality must just
be ”acceptable.” Thus, if existing systems have yet to lead to a known problem, the
contract manufacturer is less likely to invest in improving the robustness of its quality
systems, due to the conventional wisdom that managers are rewarded more for providing
immediate benefits (cost, delivery on time) more than for preventing an infrequent failure.
There is also some classic work on the effect of measurement capability on firm bound-
aries (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This work shows that hierarchical organization
may be superior in cases where measurement is difficult. Grossman and Hart (1986),
modeling the property rights view of firm boundaries, show that vertical integration may
be preferred in cases where all possible outcomes cannot be specified in the contract.
4.2.1.4 Mitigation of Risks
We have documented several reasons why contract manufacturers may operate with less
robust quality systems (and thus pose a higher quality risk) than internal plants, due to
lack of investment in robust quality systems. Unfortunately, these contracting hazards
are not mitigated by a strong understanding of how to manage quality at contractors.
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While the practitioner literature have given anecdotal advice (Watkins, 2005), there is
little rigorous understanding of how to mitigate these quality risks. Phelps (1998) noted
that “managers are frustrated in their efforts to transfer quality concepts directly to their
contracting activities. This frustration has been largely unaddressed by management ed-
ucators” (p.464). More recently, Robinson and Malhotra (2005) observe that few studies
examine quality management and supply chain management jointly. An exception is a
recent paper by Fynes et al. (2005), which shows that communication, trust, and adap-
tation among supply chain partners leads to improved quality performance. Activities
between buyers and contract manufacturers to mitigate quality risk are not explicitly
studied in this paper. While certain practices may mitigate quality risk, we believe that,
on average, there will be a quality risk in outsourcing manufacturing.
4.2.1.5 Counter-Arguments
One could argue that for contract manufacturers, manufacturing is a core competency
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Also, contract manufacturers may benefit from economies
of scale and/or scope by producing similar product for several customers. Both of these
factors could lead one to expect contract manufacturers to, in fact, pose a lower quality
risk. We believe that the factors described in the preceding sections will overwhelm these
arguments, on average.
Therefore we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 Contract manufacturer’s plants will pose a higher quality risk than in-
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ternal plants, all else equal.
4.2.2 ISO 9000 Certification
ISO 9000 is a quality management certification. As of December 2004, almost 700,000
certificates have been issued worldwide in 154 countries. In the United States, there have
been approximately 37,000 certificates issued (Helberling, 2005). ISO 9000 certification
fees can be thousands of dollars, and that does not include the time, labor, and (often)
consultants required to implement the systems. And, many registrars seem to be giving
certifications without assurance that requirements are being met, hindering ISO 9000’s
credibility (Dalgleish, 2003). Despite ISO 9000’s broad reach and high costs, the evidence
regarding performance improvement due to ISO 9000 certification is still inconclusive.
ISO 9000 certification is intended to provide assurance that a certified plant has strong
systems that will lower quality risk. As discussed in the previous section, practices
that can be described and easily audited do not always relate to quality performance
improvements; “infrastructural,” “soft,” or “tacit” behaviors matter (Giffi et al., 1990;
Powell, 1995). Perhaps because of this, the empirical research on the ISO 9000-quality
performance link has been mixed.
A few studies have found a link between ISO 9000 certification and quality perfor-
mance, but usually with some qualifiers. For example, Naveh and Marcus (2004) note
the performance improvement depends upon how much an organization “goes beyond”
the base standard. Voss and Blackmon (1998) showed no link between ISO 9000 and im-
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provements in quality when the use of TQM is controlled for. Interestingly, some authors
have shown financial improvements correlated to ISO 9000 certification (Corbett et al.,
2005; Wayhan et al., 2002; Sharma, 2005).
Given our theoretical belief that easily documented practices cannot alone drive qual-
ity performance, the apparent inconsistent enforcement of registration standards, and the
mixed previous literature, we do not expect that ISO 9000 will lower quality risk.
Hypothesis 2 ISO 9000 certification will not independently affect plant-level quality
risk.
4.3 Database and Measurement
In this section, we will document the empirical methodology used to measure the de-
pendent variable, quality risk. The resultant measure is a key contribution of this work.
We first document other methods of measuring quality risk in operations management.
Then, we provide details about our FDA database, which provides the raw data for the
measure. Finally, we review the process we used to convert the raw FDA data into a
valid measure of quality risk.
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4.3.1 Other Methods of Measuring Quality Risk
Quality risk is approximately the reverse of conformance quality capability. Comformance
quality is defined as “the degree to which a product’s design and operating characteristics
meet established standards” (Garvin, 1987, p.105). Since few have used the term “quality
risk” in empirical studies, in this subsection we discuss approaches that researchers have
used to measure conformance quality capability.
A few studies have directly measured conformance quality by observing defects in
multiple plants (e.g., Garvin, 1983). While theoretically appealing, this approach would
be prohibitively time-consuming and costly for a large scale empirical study such as ours.
For example, Garvin (1983) thoroughly investigated the internal and external defects of
18 room air conditioner plants over two years. To perform a similar study with 154 plants
with diverse products, we would need to clearly define failing to perform as intended for
each product. This would include contaminations, mislabeling, high/low active ingredient
level, etc. Then, we would need to sample from the trade and test each product for each
sample. One can see why, except in small, focused studies, the actual measurement of
defects is rarely done in large-scale research projects.
Partially because of this difficulty, the vast majority of previous research which mea-
sures quality has utilized survey data, usually managers self-assessments of their quality
capability relative to others. Surveys ask managers about quality performance either at
the plant-level (Adam, 1994; Dow et al., 1999; Flynn et al., 1999; Maani et al., 1994; Shah
and Ward, 2003; White, 1996) or the firm or business-unit level (Cleveland et al., 1989;
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Forker and Vickery, 1996; Frohlich and Dixon, 2001; Kaynak, 2003; Miller and Roth,
1994; Rosenzweig and Roth, 2004; Ward et al., 1995). A tremendous amount of theoret-
ical knowledge has been gained by these studies. However, perceptual survey research is
not without problems. First, surveys are time-consuming and expensive to administer.
Second, it is difficult for managers to assess their performance relative to others, as dis-
cussed in Ketokivi and Schroeder (2004) and Podsakoff and Organ (1986). An indication
of the difficulty of self-assessing performance is that average scores on “performance”
relative to others are often much higher than the average on the scale, as in Safizadeh
and Ritzman (1996), even in studies not explicitly focused on “high performing compa-
nies.” As Boyer et al. (2005) have noted, “identifying alternative, innovative sources of
data is becoming increasingly important” (p.446). Aside from assessing outsourcing’s
quality risk, a key contribution of this research is the utilization of an innovative source
of plant-level data on quality risk, which we introduce now.
4.3.2 FDA Inspection Database Description
Regulated industries are subject to inspection by governmental organizations. In the case
of FDA-regulated industries, these inspections are relatively frequent and thorough, and
thus provide a detailed look at the quality risk posed by manufacturing facilities. The
inspections generally last from three days up to two weeks, and usually involve spot checks
of records, conversations with random employees, and tours of manufacturing facilities.
The FDA has the authority to ask for any information related to any production of a
regulated product. We know of no better assessment of establishment-level quality risk
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in manufacturing that is available in large quantities.
FDA inspection data are available via the Freedom of Information Act; although
obtaining data can be expensive and time-consuming. We obtained a large database
from the FDA, which contains every establishment inspection in the drug industry in
the United States from January, 1994 to April, 2006. The beginning date of the data
follows a major legal decision involving Barr Laboratories which greatly increased the
FDA’s regulatory authority (Farley, 1993). The drug database contains information on
over 5000 plants and more than 15,000 audits.
Figure 4.2: Flow chart of FDA inspection process
Figure 4.2 gives a flow chart of the process by which the FDA creates and codes the
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data into the database. The database contains the company name and establishment lo-
cation, the date of the audit(s) at each establishment, and (for every audit), two different
indicators of quality risk. First, there is “Yes/No” variable that indicates whether or not
a Form 483 was issued by the auditor. A Form 483 is issued to the firm if at the conclu-
sion of the inspection the auditor believes there is a quality risk (that is, a deviation from
“Good Manufacturing Practices”) significant enough to warrant formal documentation.
A single Form 483 may contain many observations, but the database does not contain
information about the number of observations on each Form 483. In 56% of the audits
in the total drug database, a Form 483 was issued. The complete inspection report, in-
cluding a Form 483 if issued, is then sent to the district office. The district office reviews
the Establishment Inspection Report (EIR), as well as other information related to the
plant, and makes a district decision on the inspection. The district office indicates one of
the actions in Table 4.2. Together, the Form 483 decision and district decision provide
plant-level evidence of quality capability.
In addition, although not included in the database, we obtain from the Enforcement
section of the FDA website information about establishment inspection related seizures,
injunctions, and recalls related to any companies in our study.
4.3.3 Delphi Process to Operationalize Quality Risk
Given this data source, some difficulties emerge. It is obviously desirable to utilize the
FDA inspector’s decisions (483 Yes/No), the District Decision for each audit, and any
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Table 4.2: Coding of FDA district decisions
District
Decision
Code
% of
data
District Decision
Description
Explanation
N 39.1% No Action Indi-
cated
Establishment has no objectionable
conditions; or objectionable condi-
tions found during the inspection
were so minor that routine reinspec-
tion is the only action indicated.
Automatically entered by the com-
puter when inspection conclusion is
NAI.
E 41.4% Voluntary Ac-
tion Indicated
Objectionable conditions are found
but the District is not prepared to
take or recommend any administra-
tive or regulatory action. The Dis-
trict may advise the establishment
following the inspection of findings
that should be corrected, but the
findings are not significant such to
warrant warnings of administrative
or regulatory actions or to request
a response. Any corrective action
is left to the establishment to take
voluntarily.
A 18.0% Official Action
Indicated
Regulatory or administrative sanc-
tions will be recommended.
I 0.1% Referred to State
(for Action)
The findings of the inspections were
such that any action towards cor-
rection should be taken by a state
or other local or federal authority.
P 0.4% Pending–
Referred to
Center
Inspection conclusions will be cor-
rection indicated. Inspectional in-
formation has been forwarded to a
Center for decision; or The District
Decision has not yet been made.
Un 1.1% Unknown–not
yet reported
District Decision is Unknown or has
yet to be reported.
Source: FDA coding in response to Freedom of Information Act Request
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audit-related seizures, injunctions, or recalls, but how? Also, since we want to perform
our study at the establishment level, we need to know how to assess a plant with multiple
audits. We decided to form a panel of experts to help us decide how to use the data. To
rigorously draw out the expertise of the panel, we chose to use the Delphi method.
Anderson and Rungtusanatham (1994) described the Delphi process as “a technique,
developed by RAND corporation in the early 1950s, intended for systemically soliciting,
organizing, and structuring judgments and opinions on a particularly complex subject
matter from a diverse panel of experts until a consensus is reached” (p.478). We asked
our panel to help us determine how we can mathematically transform the raw spread-
sheet data into a valid measure of quality risk. The Delphi method is ideally suited for
situations in which there is a question with a clear objective, but for which finding an
answer requires subjective reasoning by people with expertise in the area (Linston and
Turoff, 1975); our question certainly fits that description.
We utilized four experts for this study. The experts all had experience both with
manufacturing in regulated industries and FDA inspections. All experts voluntarily
participated in the research, and were willing to spend the time necessary to complete
the process. Brief biographies of each of the four experts are given in Appendix 6.3.1. Our
experts have diverse backgrounds, no history of communication, and have heterogeneous
knowledge and experience which we wish to preserve. Also, it was important for us
to understand why each expert believes what he/she does, and we did not wish group
dynamics/confrontation to lead to a forced consensus or suppression of some experts’
ideas. Per Linston and Turoff (1975), the Delphi process is ideal for an expert panel with
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the above characteristics.
Following the Delphi process, we did the following in each of three rounds: (1) created
an interview script, (2) interviewed each expert individually, following the script, and (3)
sent a summary of the round to the expert panel. After three rounds, we conducted a
fourth “wrap-up” conference call. The average interview lasted about an hour. Calls
were recorded and reviewed each round prior to sending out summaries. While the
experts expressed some concern about the “coarseness” of FDA audits as a proxy for
quality risk, they felt that FDA inspections provided a reasonable assessment of a plant’s
quality risk. They compared our approach favorably to both perceptual surveys and
actual measurement of defects in different processes. The expert solicitation letter, as
well as interview scripts and summaries for all three rounds are presented in Appendix
6.3.2. The process did lead to a consensus mathematical transformation of the available
components into a measure of quality risk, which we document now.
4.3.4 Operationalization of “Quality Risk” Using FDA Inspec-
tion Data
As discussed earlier, there are seven possible audit outcomes when the FDA enters
a facility. There are two possible decisions by the inspector (483 issued-“Yes”; No
483 issued-“No”). In addition, there are three meaningful district decisions which we
can use (No Action-“N”, Voluntary Action-“E”, Official Action-“A”). Finally, and
only in cases where official action is indicated, the FDA could take enforcement ac-
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tion (Seizure/Injunction/Recall) during or as an immediate result of the audit. For each
of these possibilities, Table 4.3 shows the single audit consensus “Quality Risk” scores
determined by the expert panel; Table 4.4 gives the distribution of outcomes by audit.
Table 4.3: Single audit “quality risk” score based on audit outcome
483 District Decision Quality Risk Score
No N-No Action 0
No E-Voluntary Action 0.5
No A-Official Action 3
Yes N-No Action 1
Yes E-Voluntary Action 1.5
Yes A-Official Action 3.5
Enforcement A-Official Action 10
Table 4.4: Distribution of outcomes (n=972 audits of 154 plants)
483 District Decision % of Inspections
No N-No Action 39.4%
No E-Voluntary Action 6.7%
No A-Official Action 1.1%
Yes N-No Action 1.9%
Yes E-Voluntary Action 37.0%
Yes A-Official Action 12.9%
Enforcement A-Official Action 1.0%
We note that the database from the FDA did not have information about seizures,
injunctions, and recalls. To get these we included all FDA Enforcement Reports found on
the FDA website that were manufacturing-related, and within the following time-frame:
2 weeks prior to the end of the inspection up to 3 months after an inspection which was
classified official action. The reason for linking seizures, injunction, and recalls to audit
timing is that major problems uncovered during an inspection would lead to enforcement
during or shortly after the completion of the audit. Items on the enforcement report
that could not be attached to an objectionable audit were not included, for two reasons.
115
First, our data source for all other quality risk information is audits, so this remains
consistent. Second, the number of firm-initiated recalls may confound both the quality
risk presented by the plant and the firm’s caution and care for protection of the public.
Note on Table 4.3 that the panelists put much more weight on an official action (A)
than a voluntary action (E) by the district. The authors had no idea a priori that official
action would carry so much weight and voluntary action so little. Similarly, the panelists
put significant weight on seizures/injunctions/recalls.
With single audit scores determined, the panel discussed the difficulties presented by
multiple audits for a single plant. One option, of course, is to simply average the quality
risk scores. The key questions discussed were: (1) does the fact that the FDA chose
to do multiple audits indicate an increased quality risk?, and (2) does the trend of the
audit scores affect the quality risk? On question (1), the most FDA-experienced panelist
educated the panel (through the Delphi summaries) that the majority of inspections
are either part of annual work plans or for pre-approval inspection. And, “for cause”
inspections (which are done due to a perceived quality risk) will often be the result of, or
result in, official action. Thus, the panel was convinced that raising quality risk due to the
number of audits was not appropriate. On question (2), the panel agreed that a company
that has shown the ability to improve its quality systems over time presented a lower
quality risk than one that did not or was getting worse. Thus, the panel felt the need to
adjust the average quality risk for trend, but not frequency. After much discussion, the
final quality risk score that resulted from the work is given now (QR=Quality Risk score
from Table 4.3, n=number of audits, i=indicator for a specific audit):
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∑n
i=1QRi
n
+
∑n−1
i=1 QRi+1 −QRi
n + 1
The first term is simply the average of the quality risk scores from the individual
audits. The second term is a straightforward trend adjustment. Note that it is divided
by n+1, when there are only n-1 terms in the numerator. This is to ensure that quality
risk scores for plants with few audits are not modified excessively for their improvement
or decline in an audit scores. As a validity check, the panelists reviewed the resulting
quality risk scores for a selection of companies and felt that the numbers matched the
“subjective” quality risk, based on audit results. The audit histories and resulting quality
risk scores used for this check are also given in Appendix 6.3.2.
4.3.5 Plant Classification–Contract Manufacturer or Internal
Plant
Aside from transforming the dependent variable, another key task of this research was
to search the database for contract manufacturers and internal plants. This search was
partially semi-random, and partially convenience. The semi-random portion was a me-
thodical search of one of every four plants (alphabetically by establishment name) in the
database. Each plant was given one of eight classifications, two of which were “contract
manufacturer” and ”internal plant.” This search utilized company websites, industry
websites, SEC reports (if public), and occasionally even phone calls. Separately, pub-
lished lists of contract manufacturers and brands in the OTC, regulated cosmetics, and
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pharmaceutical industries were used to find possible candidates. Also, news alerts and
news searches led to the classification of some firms. Finally, local store shelves were
searched as a source for some of the ”internal plants.”
After a first round of classification, we rigorously rechecked all plants that were clas-
sified either contract manufacturers or internal plants in the first round. For all of these
plants, news searches were performed in Lexis-Nexis to find more detailed evidence of
the exact operations of the establishment. Appendix 6.4 discusses in more detail the
process by which plants were selected for the study. We ended up with a sample size of
154 firms, 77 of which were contract manufacturers and 77 of which were internal plants.
It is purely coincidence that the sample was balanced between contract manufacturers
and internal plants.
4.3.6 ISO 9000 Certification
The Quality Digest database was searched in the spring of 2006 to see if plants were ISO
9000 certified. The database is searchable on Quality Digest’s website by company name.
The database is maintained by Quality Digest. The data come from the registrars, who
send information to Quality Digest which is then incorporated into the database.
We coded plants as “ISO 9000 certified” if they were registered in the database, and
more than half of their inspections had occurred after the estimated beginning of their
registration process (15 months prior to the certification date (Meyer, 1998)). This left
with only ten plants which we classified as ISO 9000 certified, so any results should be
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interpreted with caution.
4.3.7 Other Control Variables
In addition to our dependent variable (quality risk) and our two key independent variables
(contract manufacturer/internal plant dummy and ISO 9000 dummy), we felt it necessary
to obtain control variables. Data at the plant-level are difficult to obtain for any firm;
and many of the firms in our study are private, further compounding the problem (Ojala,
2004). After an extensive search, we decided to purchase Harris’s Company Reach, a Dun
and Bradstreet database. This was our primary source of data for plant age (age), plant
size, total company sales, and whether plant was part of a public or private firm. We
also used ReferenceUSA, an InfoUSA database. We utilized ReferenceUSA for “credit
rating” score; ReferenceUSA has a 1-5 scale for this score, but virtually all plants had a
score of “5.” Thus, we created a 1-0 variable (”credit”) where “0” indicates a credit rating
of 5, and “1” indicates anything else. Since ReferenceUSA did not have information on
all plants, we have some missing data with this variable. Because of the low frequency
of missing data, we used single imputation with logistic regression to fill in the missing
values. In addition, by examining company websites and other available information, we
created a dummy variable to distinguish between companies that made almost exclusively
regulated products and those that made non-regulated products.
By examination of bivariate plots of the continuous independent variables (Total
Sales, Employees, and Age), we determined that three independent variables should be
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transformed. Transformations are appropriate if there is a reason to believe that there is
a nonlinear effect that can be made linear and/or there are a small number of large values
that could be overly influential. In the cases of Total Sales, Employees, and Age, it is likely
that the strength of the association decreases as the value gets large. For example, will
the impact of size on quality risk be four times as much for an 8000 employee operation
vs. 2000 person operation; or the plant of a $40 billion company vs. $10 billion. We
choose the log transformation, one of the most common. This transformation reduces
the effect of very large independent variables to a more realistic effect. In addition, the
significant bivariate second-order (non-linear) effects that existed prior to transformation
were eliminated.
4.3.8 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for all variables measured are given in Table 4.5. Correlations of
relevant variables in the database are given in Table 4.6. Note from the correlations that
there is a significant positive correlation between the quality risk (Qrisk) and process
choice (CM for contract manufacturer). As shown in Table 4.7, simple t-tests show that
contract manufacturers and internal plants differ in all control variables. This underlines
the importance of controlling for plant characteristics when assessing quality risk.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics
Name Description N Mean StDev Min Max
QRisk Quality risk 154 1.08 .84 0 3.5
CM 1=Contract manufacturer 154 .50 .50 0 1
ISO9000 1=plant in Quality Digest
ISO9000 database
154 .08 .27 0 1
TSales Total company sales, $mil-
lions
154 9,213 16,926 .069 56,741
Emp Plant employees 154 363 769 1 8000
Age Age of plant, in years 154 43.5 40.1 2 200
OnlyReg 1=plant makes primarily
regulated products
154 .40 .49 0 1
Credit 1=evidence of credit issues
(4 or less in R-USA)
148 .14 .34 0 1
Public 1=public 154 .32 .47 0 1
Table 4.6: Pearson correlations (n=154)
Qrisk CM ISO9000 TSales Emp Age OReg Credit Public
QRisk 1
CM .29*** 1
ISO9000 -.03 -.19** 1
TSales -.27*** -.52*** -.10 1
Emp -.06 -.27*** .05 .25*** 1
Age -.10 -.34*** .01 .23*** .25*** 1
OnlyReg .02 -.32*** -.14* .22*** .11 .03 1
Credit .13 .17** -.12 -.20** -.14* -.20** .06 1
Public -.17** -.55*** -.04 .68*** .34*** .35*** .25** .-.28*** 1
Table 4.7: Differences in means between CMs and IPs
Name Mean-CM Mean-IP t-stat Pr > |t|
QRisk .832 1.32 -3.79 .00
ISO9000 .026 .130 2.44 .02
TSales ($mill) 499 1790 7.44 .00
Emp 159 568 3.42 .00
Age 30 57 4.45 .00
OnlyReg .247 .558 4.13 .00
Credit .195 .078 -2.139 .03
Public .065 .584 8.22 .00
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4.4 Results and Discussion
4.4.1 Multicollinearity and Leverage
We first assess the independent variables for multicollinearity, utilizing PROC REG in
SAS 9.2. The variance inflation factors (vif) are all below 4, whereas a commonly used
indication of multicollinearity is a vif above 10. In addition, the highest condition index
in the variance-decomposition matrix is 4.1, a commonly used threshold value for this
is 15 to 30. There are also no rows in the variance-decomposition matrix with two
variables having a proportion of variance above 0.5, where 0.9 is the accepted threshold
values. Threshold values are based on Hair et al. (1998). We can strongly conclude that
multicollinearity does not present a major problem in our data set.
We also check for leverage using only the independent variables. The Hat Matrix is
checked against a commonly used threshold (Hair et al., 1998). There are no observations
with high leverage in the data set, indicating that no observations are highly distinct
from others in terms of their overall set of independent variables. This indicates that it
is unlikely that an individual observation will have too much influence over the results of
any analysis.
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4.4.2 Estimation Method
It is reasonable to expect that the concept of “quality risk” would have an underlying
normal distribution. At the extreme left tail of the distribution are plants for which
there is almost no risk of nonconforming product being released to the trade. At the
extreme right of the distribution are plants knowingly and willingly releasing product
that is defective (e.g., Pan Pharmaceuticals in 2003). However, our quality risk score
does not capture this normal distribution for two reasons. First, our quality risk score
censors true quality risk at zero. Second, the distribution of plants’ quality risk scores
do not follow a normal distribution; the distribution is “lumpy.” Both the censoring and
“lumpiness” can be seen in Figure 4.3. These two issues, censoring and “lumpiness,”
must be dealt with in the econometric method.
The first issue is censoring. When an FDA inspector does not issue a Form 483,
and the district indicates that no action is required, we score the quality risk of the
plant (for that audit) as 0. However, there is considerable differentiation in actual,
unobserved quality risk below this point. Said differently, plants with low levels of true
quality risk would, if measured, have a negative score on our scale. These plants have
quality systems that are robust enough that the FDA does not issue any action but they
still have some propensity for quality problems. Reviews of inspection reports where no
483 or district action was warranted indicates that there are still often varying levels of
minor quality issues observed in these “clean” audits. Thus, the dependent variable is
censored at a fixed quality risk, zero. In addition to being censored, the distribution
of the dependent variable is not normally distributed. A single audit can only result
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in one of the seven scores on Table 4.3. And, as shown in Figure 4.4, four of those
seven measures rarely happen. While averaging and adjusting for trend at the plant level
helps alleviate this coarseness, Figure 4.3 shows our risk score for multiple audits does
not capture an underlying normal distribution; it is a “lumpy” measure of quality risk,
particularly for plants with few audits. There is a clustering of observations around the
most common single-audit results (0, 1.5, 3.5). In summary, we assume that there exists
a true, unmeasurable quality risk and that the FDA audits and our scoring system are
imperfectly measuring a plant’s quality risk, due to censoring and “lumpiness.”
The method that can best deal with both “lumpy” measures and censoring is ordered
logit. To perform this regression, we must first divide the sample into discrete categories,
ordered in the dependent variable. We have created 5 categories of companies, as de-
scribed in Table 4.8. Categories 2,3,4 each contain .75 units of ”quality risk,” and are
clearly ordered. Table 4.8 shows that there are far more very low-risk internal plants
(17) than contract manufacturers (5); and, that there are far more high-risk contract
manufacturers than internal plants (15-8 high risk and 11-1 very high risk). In the low
and moderate risk categories, there is no statistically significant difference between the
groups.
4.4.3 Econometric Specification
The econometric specification, adapted from Verbeek (2004), of the ordered logistic model
for this analysis is given now (γj is an unknown, estimated parameter, QRi is the quality
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of audit-level quality risk (n=972 audits)
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risk score for plant i, i = 1 to 154):
QR∗i = β1CMi + β2log(Agei) + β3log(TSalesi) + β4log(Empi) +
β5ISO9Ki + β6ORegi + β7Publici + εi
QRi = 1 if QR
∗
i ≤ γ1
QRi = 2 if γ1 < QR
∗
1 ≤ γ2
QRi = 3 if γ2 < QR
∗
1 ≤ γ3
QRi = 4 if γ3 < QR
∗
1 ≤ γ4
QRi = 5 if QR
∗
1 > γ4
Table 4.8: Discrete categories for use for ordered logistic regression (qr=Qrisk)
Cat. Qrisk Range Description # Plants
(mean
Qrisk)
#CM
(mean
Qrisk)
#IP (mean
Qrisk)
1 qr = 0 Plants with all
clean inspections
(lowest risk)
22(0) 5(0) 17(0)
1 0 < qr ≤ .75 Plants with gener-
ally clean inspec-
tions (low risk)
38(.49) 19(.48) 19(.50)
3 .75 < qr ≤ 1.5 Plants which, on
average, receive a
483 but no official
actions
59(1.18) 27(1.21) 32(1.15)
4 1.5 < qr ≤ 2.25 Plants with at least
one official action
(high risk)
23(1.77) 15(1.76) 8(1.77)
5 qr ≥ 2.25 Plants that average
close to official ac-
tion (highest risk)
12(3.09) 11(3.05) 1(3.50)
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The descriptions of the variables are given with the descriptive statistics in Table 4.5.
4.4.4 Results
To perform the ordered logit regression, we employed STATA 8.2’s “ologit” procedure.
We used the “cluster” option to adjust the standard errors to account for correlation
among plants from the same company. There are 120 companies represented by the 154
plants. The estimators are determined by maximum likelihood. Because the maximum
likelihood estimators are asymptotically normally distributed, and our sample size is 154,
we bootstrap the standard errors using 200 repetitions. The results are given in Table
4.9.
Table 4.9: Results of ordered logit regression (n-154)
Parameter Estimate StdError t-Value Pr > |t| Odds Ratio
CM 1.17** .49 2.39 .02 3.23
ISO9000 .21 .71 .30 .77 1.24
log(Age) .20 .21 .94 .35 1.22
log(TSales) -.20** .10 -2.13 .03 .816
log(Emp) .21 .15 1.39 .16 1.24
OnlyReg .98*** .40 .2.44 .02 2.67
Credit -.04 .44 -.09 .92 .96
Public .73 .58 1.25 .21 2.06
Wald χ2 = 24.74(8) p = .00 Pseudo R2 = 6.2%
The significant Wald chi-square indicates that the omnibus effect of all variables in
the model is statistically significant from zero; this indicates reasonable model fit. The
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is 6.2%, but we note this is not comparable to that obtained in
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an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and should be interpreted with caution. For
example, SAS 9.2 PROC LOGISTIC calculates a different pseudo-R2 with a value of
16.8%. As noted in Borooah (2002), there is no natural interpretation to the values of
R2 in logistic regression.
We utilize Table 4.10 to show the marginal probability of the effect of being a contract
manufacturer on quality risk. The table gives the marginal probability of being in a
specific category for a plant which is average on all variables except contract manufacturer
or internal plant. As further explanation, the model predicts that a plant which is average
on all other variables in the analysis has a 7% chance of being in category 1 if it is a
contract manufacturer, and a 20% chance of being in category 1 if is an internal plant.
Table 4.10: Marginal probability of being in category X (all other variables average)
Category CM IP
1 .07 .20
2 .18 .32
3 .44 .30
4 .21 .15
5 .10 .03
4.4.5 Discussion
The first thing to note from Table 4.9 is that Hypothesis 1 is supported. That is, there is
a quality risk in outsourcing. Even after controlling for basic plant characteristics, being
a contract manufacturer does significantly influence the quality risk of a plant. This
result provides empirical support to our theoretical arguments that, due to difficulty of
observing quality risk and the resulting incentives, contract manufacturers take on more
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risk than internal plants, on average. The odds ratio of 3.23 for the contract manufacturer
indicates that a being a contract manufacturer significantly increases the odds of ending
up in the higher category of any subset of the five categories (Borooah, 2002). For
example, the ratio of the probabilities of being in categories 4 or 5 over the probability
of being in categories 1, 2, or 3 for a contract manufacturer is 3.23 times the same ratio
for an internal plant. This odds ratio is true for any continuous subset of categories (e.g.
(1), (2345); (12),(345); etc.).
Thus, due to misaligned incentives derived from the unobservability of robust quality
systems, contract manufacturers pose a quality risk, even after controlling for several
potentially relevant plant and firm characteristics. Firms considering outsourcing are
faced with a difficult task with regard to quality. The same factor that leads to quality
risk–difficulty of observing robust quality systems–makes it hard to mitigate.
The second notable result is that Hypothesis 2 is also supported. As predicted, but
counter to the conventional wisdom of many, ISO 9000 certification does little to improve
actual quality risk. On average, companies that have obtained the certification have not
reduced their quality systems any more than those that have not. Note that this finding
holds across the sample, for both internal plants and contract manufacturers.
These two results are quite tightly linked theoretically. They both result from the fact
that the implementation of relatively easy-to-observe practices do not correlate directly
to quality risk. The fact that ISO 9000 does not relate to quality risk indicates that
cursory methods of assessing quality systems are not enough.
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Not surprisingly, large companies (those with high total sales) have lower quality risk.
These companies generally have the means to invest in quality assurance departments
that can help create a culture of reduced risk. We note that this control variable has a
relatively small coefficient and odds ratio (.82, comparable to 1.22 if direction reversed)
but also a small standard error. The other control variable (only regulated products)
that became significant in the regression is quite surprising, for two reasons. First, its
univariate correlation with quality risk is very low and insignificant. Second, it seems
producing primarily regulated products increases quality risk. One would hope the effect
would be opposite; those plants producing exclusively regulated products would have
better systems to reduce their quality risk. One possible explanation is that the FDA
has more to observe (and therefore find) when they enter a plant with only regulated
products; or, it may be possible that auditors are more stringent with these plants. This
result is an opportunity for further study.
4.5 Conclusions
In this section, we first discuss limitations and some opportunities for future research.
Next, we review the implications and key contributions of the research.
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4.5.1 Limitations and Future Research
This study was innovative in its use of publicly available secondary data to research a
question very important to operations management. We were innovative both in ob-
taining the data and utilizing experts and the Delphi process to transform it for use in
research. The data source and approach both have some limitations, some of which can
be addressed with future work. While FDA audits are thorough, standard, and designed
to assess quality risk, the data available to use on the spreadsheet are a coarse filter, with
essentially seven quality risk “scores” possible for a given inspection. In addition, there is
variability in FDA auditors, and many audits are either focused on a specific item or for
pre-approval; and therefore do not inspect an entire facility. While the regulations have
been reasonably consistent since 1994, auditors may interpret them differently depending
on their assessment of the risk of different drug products. Also, in determining a plant
level quality risk using experts, it is possible that a different set of experts would have
scored the audits differently, but this risk is somewhat reduced by the similarity of the
independent panelists’ scores. Another limitation is that the reliability of most of the
control variables cannot be assessed. And, even if perfectly reliable, the data are from
spring 2006 but the audits date back as far as 1994; some firms and plants have changed
during that time. Another limitation is that other drivers of quality are neglected in this
research. For contract manufacturers, these drivers include customer expectations and
practices, as well as internal practices. The theory developed in this paper may aid in
designing an empirical study to assess the success of practices that mitigate quality risk
in outsourcing relationships. Finally, because of the nature of the data, only industries
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regulated by the Food and Drug Administration could be included in the study; and only
the drug industry was included in this particular study. While a limitation, we note that
the presence of regulations makes our finding of a significant difference in quality risk
between contract manufacturers and internal plants more robust, as regulation should
reduce the variance of quality capability across the industry.
Some of the limitations lead to opportunities for future research. The most logical
next step would be to survey contract manufacturers to see what internal systems and
customer behaviors seem to lower quality risk. This would fill in some of the missing
explanatory variables in our model. Another opportunity is to repeat this study in other
regulated industries; we have data on medical devices and biologics, and are awaiting data
on food plants to possibly perform replication studies. These would assess the robustness
of the results. Future work in different industries would enhance the generalizability of
the findings, but a new dependent variable would need to be created.
Another area of future research is to more deeply study the dynamics of outsourcing
in the drug industry. In this industry, there is a great amount of variance in the manu-
facturing strategies of firms. Many have outsourced all of their production; many others
have maintained production in-house, many produce some product in-house and out-
source other product. This study will hopefully spur future research on the implications
of outsourcing in this industry.
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4.5.2 Implications
This research has made several contributions to the research community. First, we have
introduced an innovative plant-level measure of quality that is available in FDA-regulated
industries. We hope more studies will utilize our measure of quality risk. Also, we hope
this data usage spurs other creative uses of available plant-level data for research.
We have linked the quality management literature to the measurement and incentives
literature, explaining the mechanisms by which outsourcing can pose a quality risk. We
then tested the resulting hypothesis in a regulated industry. Detailed regulation should
force both the mean and variance of quality risk to be lower than in an unregulated
industry. In spite of this, we have provided evidence that outsourcing poses a quality risk
in this industry. It is quite plausible that industries without rigorous external regulation
may have an even more significant quality risk.
Also, we have supported theory developed in the TQM literature by showing that
easy to observe practices, like those required by ISO 9000, do little to independently
reduce quality risk.
Managers can learn several key things from this study. First, in spite of the efforts by
some companies to ensure quality production by their contract manufacturers, contract
manufacturers still pose a higher quality risk, on average. Second, we found no empirical
evidence that ISO 9000 reduces this risk. Third, because the underlying mechanisms
that cause the risk are difficult to eliminate, potentially costly measures must be taken
to avoid taking on a higher quality risk when outsourcing. When choosing a contract
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manufacturer, buying firms must thoroughly investigate potential contract manufacturers
to attempt to assess the robustness of their quality. However, prior to signing a contract,
full knowledge of the quality risk is not possible to observe. Some effort to reduce
quality risk will be necessary on an on-going basis. As an example, one quality-conscious
company sends full-time employees to observe every unit of production produced by many
of its contract manufacturers. Even with careful selection and monitoring, when making
an outsourcing decision, firms must understand that they are likely accepting higher
quality risk, ceteris paribus, when they outsource than could be obtained internally.
In summary, we have shown that outsourcing to contract manufacturers results in a
quality risk, on average. While extremely poor quality systems are rare even for contract
manufacturers, there is more of a tendency for contract manufacturers to operate with a
high quality risk than there is for internal plants. Unfortunately, evidence of documented
quality systems provides little assurance of reduced quality risk.
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Chapter 5
Dissertation Conclusion
This dissertation has investigated the interface between manufacturing outsourcing and
plant-level operations characteristics. As most literature on outsourcing has originated
from economics and strategy, plant-level characteristics are often ignored (Ferdows, 2006).
We studied the interface in three distinct essays. Essays 1 and 3 showed how the consider-
ation of important plant-level characteristics affects outsourcing decisions and outcomes.
These plant-level characteristics included manufacturing plant learning rate (Essay 1)and
the robustness of quality systems (Essay 3). Essay 2 studied how the importance and
current capability of two classic operations competitive dimensions affects outsourcing
decisions. Together, these three essays have shown various ways that the failure to con-
sider operations characteristics in outsourcing decisions can lead to suboptimal decision-
making.
The first essay focused on two path-dependent aspects of outsourcing decisions in a
two-period model. One path-dependent aspect of outsourcing decisions is the presence of
learning-by-doing. That is, we make the common assumption that when a plant produces
product it may lower its per-unit costs; and, when a plant does not produce a product it
cannot lower its costs. The second path-dependent aspect is the presence of a strategic
supplier who will not necessarily pass on production cost reductions to the buyer in
future periods. Together, these factors greatly change the analysis for an outsourcing
decision-maker. If not considered together, the decision-maker would be more likely to
outsource, and will do so at a higher per-unit price. We also show that is often optimal
under reasonable circumstances for a manufacturer to keep production in-house even
when he can never reach the supplier’s costs, for purely strategic purposes. We also find
that partial outsourcing is optimal in reasonable circumstances. And, we observe many
interesting dynamics about the effect of each player’s learning rate on strategies.
The second essay looked at how current operations strategy at a business-unit level
impacted plans to outsource manufacturing resources. Here, we study the characteristics
(cost and quality) of operations function as an antecedent to outsourcing decisions. As
noted, studies have only relatively recently explicitly considered competitive capabilities
at all in outsourcing decisions. The most well-developed theories look only at product
and market characteristics. In this essay, we show using structural equation modeling
on a sample of 867 business units, that cost considerations drive decisions, not quality.
Both the importance that a company puts on cost and its current capability significantly
affect a firm’s plans to outsource. Counter to conventional wisdom, quality has no affect.
This is consistent with practitioner literature that has shown cost to be the driver of
outsourcing decisions.
The third essay builds on the second essay by showing that quality should matter
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in outsourcing decisions. Why? Because outsourcing poses a quality risk. We show
this using Food and Drug Administration inspection data of internal plants and contract
manufacturers. Further, we showed that ISO 9000 certification did not mitigate this
risk. We argue that no simple inspection or ”checklist” type system will, by itself, fully
mitigate the quality risk in outsourcing. The results of this essay tell managers that they
must be sure to incorporate the cost of quality risk into any outsourcing decisions.
We started this dissertation by noting that outsourcing decisions are among the most
challenging and important that managers must make. We finish this dissertation hoping
that we have shed some light on some of the more difficult aspects of the decision: learn-
ing, quality, and capabilities. Managers can easily assess an outsourcing decision’s likely
impact on per-unit cost, return on assets, etc. But, we believe that short-term metrics
are not the ones that lead to sustained competitive advantage in healthy companies. We
have demonstrated that some important and often taken for granted benefits of internal
production (learning-by-doing, quality) may be lost if outsourcing is pursued carelessly.
We have contributed to the economic theory of outsourcing by explicitly incorporat-
ing vital operations capabilities into the discussion and, therefore, have begun to open
the“black box.” Key gaps in the current theories of firm boundaries are the inclusion of
firm-specific characteristics in the antecedents (Essay 2), and the consideration of longer-
term (Essay 1) and harder-to-measure (Essay 3) consequences of outsourcing decisions.
Hayes et al. (2005) posed the question: “Under what conditions should an organization
vertically integrate, and under what conditions should it outsource?” (p.116). We’ve
shown that, while cost consderations are the key decision drivers in practice (Essay 2),
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companies should outsource with caution if the supplier may gain power in the relation-
ship or internal learning rate is high (Essay 1). We have also shown that they should
also be careful if exposure to quality risk is important (Essay 3).
Limitations were discussed in each essay, but we discuss broad limitations now. The
environment faced by managers is far more complicated than that modeled in Essay
1. However, the lessons from Essay 1 should ring true. It is a good starting point
for assessing the temporal impacts of outsourcing in a game theoretic setting. Essay 2
showed what managers actually plan to do, but does not tell us what they, in fact, should
do. Essay 3’s empirical results indicate that a quality risk is more prevelant in contract
manufacturing plants versus internal plants. However, we did not get to the depth
necessary to understand the variance within the groups. Finally, each essay looked at a
piece of an outsourcing decision. A complete theory would allow managers to understand
how each characteristic of their firm, product, and market impact their decision. While
we are a long way from that point, we will continue to strive to completely understand
the conditions under which firms should outsource. As many outcomes of firm boundary
decisions take years to manifest themselves, detailed longitudinal data would likely be
necessary to empirically test a complete economic theory of outsourcing.
Using this dissertation as a starting point, we plan to continue to fill gaps in the
economic theory of manufacturing outsourcing with a focus on outsourcing’s impact
on manufacturing competitiveness. An important gap in our understanding is in the
area of innovation. Conventional wisdom has companies outsourcing manufacturing to
focus on innovation, but we believe that in many industries manufacturing knowledge
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is essential for innovation. We hope to study outsourcing’s impact on innovation in the
future. Additionally, we plan to utilize our quality risk metric to study the impact of
outsourcing on quality in other industries, and we hope to obtain foreign audit data
to study how offshoring differs from outsourcing. Also, we hope to supplement Essay
3 with surveys of contract manufacturers to determine what buyer behaviors lead to
reduced quality risk. Finally, we hope to combine our longitudinal quality data with
other available longitudinal data to understand the long term effects of outsourcing on all
manufacturing capabilities. These are ambitious goals, but understanding the conditions
when firms should outsource is critically important.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
6.1 Essay 1 Appendices
6.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the second period, Π(q2m, s
2
m) = (s
2
m)(
1
b
)(a − s2m) − c2mq2m, subject to s2m ≤ q2m. We
see that ∂Π
∂q2m
= −c1m < 0 for all q2m > s2m. Thus, q2m = s2m and the production and
sales problem therefore collapses to a single variable (e.g. production) maximization
problem with a concave objective function. Solving, q2∗m =
a−bc2m
2
and the period 2 profit
is δ
4b
(a−bc2m)2 where c2m = Max(c1m−γmq1m, cm). The manufacturer’s total profit is given
by:
Π(s1m, q
1
m) =


(s1m)(
1
b
)(a− s1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 , q1m < qm
(s1m)(
1
b
)(a− s1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bcm)2 , q1m ≥ qm
For any q1m > 0, Π(s
1
m, q
1
m) is concave in s
1
m, and s
1∗
m = Min(q
1
m,
a
2
). It is now necessary
to show that q1m ≤ a2 . Substituting s1∗m into Π(s1m, q1m), we obtain:
Π(q1m) =


(q1m)(
1
b
)(a− q1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 if q1m < qm & q1m < a2
(q1m)(
1
b
)(a− q1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bcm)2 if q1m ≥ qm & q1m < a2
a2
4b
− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 if q1m < qm & q1m ≥ a2
a2
4b
− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bcm)2 if q1m ≥ qm & q1m ≥ a2
The restriction γm ≤ 2b√δ makes Π(q1m),q1m < qm & q1m < a2 concave. Across all q1m,
Π(q1m) is continuous but not necessarily concave.
If a
2
> q
m
, then Π(q1m) is concave and
∂Π
∂q1m
|q1m≥ a2< 0; this proves that s1m = q1m for this
case. If a
2
< q
m
, then Π(q1m) is not concave in q
1
m. For q
1
m <
a
2
, the function is concave in
q1m. For
a
2
≤ q1m ≤ qm, the function is convex in q1m. For q1m ≥ qm, the function is strictly
decreasing in q1m. To prove that s
1
m = q
1
m, we only need to show that
∂Π
∂q1m
< 0 for the
region a
2
≤ q1m ≤ qm. Due to convexity, ∂Π∂q1m < 0 in this region if
∂Π
∂q1m
|q1m=qm< 0. It is if
c1m >
δγma
2
− δγmbcm
2
. But, for this profit region to exist, q
m
> a
2
, or c1m >
aγm
2
+ cm. Since
aγm
2
+ cm >
δγma
2
− δγmbcm
2
, then the existence of the profit region q
m
> q1m >
a
2
implies
the condition that profit is decreasing throughout it. Hence, s1m = q
1
m, always.
6.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
(i) Given Proposition 1, we can restrict attention to q1m ≤ a2 . In this region, the manu-
facturer’s profit function is:
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Π(q1m) =


(q1m)(
1
b
)(a− q1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 , q1m < qm
(q1m)(
1
b
)(a− q1m)− q1mc1m + δ4b(a− bcm)2 , q1m ≥ qm
Given γm ≤ 2b√δ , we see that Π(q1m) is strictly concave in q1m. The relevant interior
optima are q1m =
(2+bδγm)(a−bc1m)
4−δb2γ2m ≤ qm and q
1
m =
a−bc1m
2
> q
m
. Other possible optima
are boundary conditions. Basic assumptions on parameters make ∂Π
∂q1m
|q1m=0> 0 and
∂Π
∂ q1m
|q1m= a2< 0 The necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the optimal strategies
are listed in Theorem 1, Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
(ii) We first observe that Ag > Cg > 0, by inspection. Also, Ag > Bg since
∂Π
∂q1m
|q1m=q−m>
∂Π
∂ q1m
|q1m=q+m . That is, it takes a smaller value of γm to make
∂Π
∂q1m
|q1m=q−m= 0
than it does to make ∂Π
∂ q1m
|q1m=q+m= 0. Thus, Strategy A1 is always employed when γm = 0.
Strategy C1 is always employed for large γm. And, since Ag > Bg and Ag > Cg, Strategy
B1 is always employed in between.
6.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) The supplier’s second period profit function is Π(w2) = (w2 − c2s)(a−bw
2
2
) subject to
w2 ≤ c2m. This function is concave in w2 and the optimal is w2∗ =Min(c2m, a2b + c
2
s
2
). We
have assumed that c1m ≤ a2b + cs2 . Since c2s ≥ cs and c2m ≤ c1m, we know that c2m ≤ w2∗.
Thus, ∂Π
∂w2
> 0 for the entire relevant range up to c2m, and therefore c
2
m is optimal.
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(ii) Substituting c2m into the profit function from (i), Π(c
2
m) = (c
2
m − c2s)(a−bc
2
m
2
). The
first term is negative if c2m < c
2
s and non-negative otherwise. The second term is always
non-negative given prior assumptions. The supplier will therefore participate if and only
if c2m ≥ c2s so she will earn non-negative profit.
(iii) Faced with w2 = c2m, and our assumption that, if indifferent, the manufacturer
will buy, the manufacturer’s second period profit function is: (a − q2s)(1/b)(q2s) − c2mq2s
subject to nonnegativity. The manufacturer’s optimal decision is q2s =
a−bc2m
2
and the
resulting profit is (a−bc
2
m)
2
4b
. In the case where the supplier does not make an offer, the
optimization is the same, except q2m replaces q
2
s .
6.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Purchasing a unit to dispose will have no first-period benefit for the manufacturer and
cost w1 > 0. By (iii) in Proposition 2, this purchase will also have no second-period
benefit.
6.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
As a result of Proposition 2, the manufacturer’s profit function in the first period is
Π(q1m, q
1
s , s
1
m) = (s
1
m)(1/b)(a − s1m) − c1mq1m − w1q1s + δ (a−bc
2
m)
2
4b
subject to s1m ≤ q1m + q1s
where c2m = Max(c
1
m−γmq1m, cm). Thus, the manufacturer’s total profit function is given
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by:
Π(s1m, q
1
s , q
1
m) =


(s1m)(
1
b
)(a− s1m)− q1mc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 , q1m < qm
(s1m)(
1
b
)(a− s1m)− q1mc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bcm)2 , q1m ≥ qm
One can show s1∗m =Min((q
1
m + q
1
s)
a
2
). Substituting s1∗m into Π(s
1
m, q
1
s , q
1
m), we obtain:
Π(q1m, q
1
s) =


(q1m + q
1
s)(
1
b
)(a− q1m − q1s)− q1mc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 ,
if q1m < qm & (q
1
m + q
1
s) <
a
2
(q1m + q
1
s)(
1
b
)(a− q1m − q1s)− q1mc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bcm)2 , q1m ≥ qm & (q1m + q1s) < a2
a2
4b
− q1mc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bc1m + bγmq1m)2 , q1m < qm & (q1m + q1s) ≥ a2
a2
4b
− q1mc1m − q1mw1 + δ4b(a− bcm)2 , q1m ≥ qm & (q1m + q1s) ≥ a2
For all four of the above profit functions, ∂Π
∂q1m
> ∂Π
∂q1s
if w1 > c1m for any possible value
of q1m or q
1
s . Therefore, the manufacturer will never buy in period 1 if w
1 > c1m.
6.1.6 Proof of Theorem 2
(i) The manufacturer is not learning so clearly he will not engage in strategic overpro-
duction, and so s1m = q
1
m + q
1
s . z
1
s = 0 is proven in section (iii).
(ii) The supplier will only participate if Πs(w
1) > 0. We will show in (iii) that w1∗ = c1m.
144
Therefore, the supplier’s profit function is:
Πs =


(c1m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) + δ(c1m − c1s + γs a−bc
1
m
2
)(a−bc
1
m
2
) if c1s − γs a−bc
1
m
2
> cs
(c1m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) + δ(c1m − cs)(a−bc
1
m
2
) if c1s − γs a−bc
1
m
2
≤ cs
Simply setting each of these profit functions equal to zero and solving for c1s yields
the result.
(iii) Given Proposition 2, we know w2 = c1m. Therefore, the manufacturer’s profit function
is Πm(q
1
m, q
1
s) = (a − q1m − q1s)(1/b)(q1m + q1s ) − w1q1s − c1mq1m + δ (a−bc
1
m)
2
4b
subject to non-
negativity of q1m and q
1
s . It can be shown that the optima are q
1
m =
a−bc1m
2
, q1s = 0 if
w1 > c1m, and q
1
m = 0, q
1
s =
a−bw1
2
if w1 ≤ c1m.
If w1 > c1m, then the supplier gets no business in the first period per Proposition 4.
Since all conditions will be the same in the second period, she will also get no business in
the second period. If the supplier gets all of the business in the first period, she also gets
all of the business in the second period. In the second period, the manufacturer will be
maximizing a single period profit function. Therefore, q2s =
a−bw2
2
if q1s > 0. Also, because
of Proposition 2, w2 = c2m = c
1
m. Thus, the supplier’s profit function (given w
1 ≤ c1m) is
Πs(w
1, z1s ) = (w
1−c1s)a−bw
1
2
−c1sz1s+δ(c1m−c2s)a−bc
1
m
2
where c2s =Max(c
1
s−γs(a−bw
1
2
+z1s ), cs).
Therefore, for w1 ≤ c1m:
Πs(w
1, z1s ) =


(w1 − c1s)a−bw
1
2
− c1sz1s + δ(c1m − c1s + γs(a−bw
1
2
+ z1s ))
a−bc1m
2
hspace7cm if w1 > a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
+ 2z
1
s
b
(w1 − c1s)a−bw
1
2
− c1sz1s + δ(c1m − cs)a−bc
1
m
2
if w1 ≤ a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
+ 2z
1
s
b
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We first note that:
∂Πs(w
1, z1s )
∂z1s
=


−c1s + δγs a−bc
1
m
2
; if w1 > a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
+ 2z
1
s
b
−c1s if w1 ≤ ab − 2 c
1
s−cs
bγs
+ 2z
1
s
b
Given the above, we solve this problem under two exhaustive and mutually exclusive
situations, (1) and (2).
(1) δγs
a−bc1m
2
≤ c1s, thus ∂Π(w
1,z1s)
∂z1s
< 0; and the optimal z1s is always equal to 0; the
profit function becomes:
Π(w1) =


(w1 − c1s)a−bw
1
2
+ δ(c1m − c1s + γs a−bw
1
2
)a−bc
1
m
2
if w1 > a
b
− c1s−cs
bγs
(w1 − c1s)a−bw
1
2
+ δ(c1m − cs)a−bc
1
m
2
if w1 ≤ a
b
− c1s−cs
bγs
(1a) c1m ≤ ab − 2 c
1
s−cs
bγs
⇒ w1 ≤ a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
; this implies the profit function above is
increasing in w1 and w1∗ = c1m.
(1b) If c1m >
a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
, then the above profit function is continuous and concave in
w1. We prove w1∗ = c1m by showing that c
1
m >
a
b
− 2 c1s−cs
bγs
, along with our assumption
c1m <
a
2b
+
cs
2
, implies ∂Π
∂w1
|w1=c1m> 0. We can rewrite c1m > ab −2 c
1
s−cs
bγs
as c1s > γs
a−bc1m
2
+ cs.
We can rewrite c1m <
a
2b
+
cs
2
as cs > 2c
1
m − ab . Therefore, c1s > γs a−bc
1
m
2
+ 2c1m − ab .
This implies c1s > δγs
(a−bc1m)
2
+ 2c1m − ab , (since 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) which is our condition for
∂Π
∂w1
|w1=c1m> 0.
(2) δγs
a−bc1m
2
> c1s. The optimal z
1
s may not necessarily equal to zero. Here, if
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c1s < δγs
a−bc1m
2
(which defines this situation), then c1s < γs
a−bc1m
2
+ 2cs (since 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
and cs ≥ 0); this is just c1m ≤ ab − 2 c
1
s−cs
bγs
rewritten. Since w1 ≤ c1m, the condition
that makes z1s > 0 possible, also means that the profit function where
∂Π
∂z1s
> 0 is possible
cannot happen. We have already shown that for the profit function when w1 ≤ a
b
−2 c1s−cs
bγs
that w1 = c1m is optimal. Thus, w
1 = c1m is the optimum if the supplier can participate.
(iv) In this case, neither party is learning. The problem separates into two single-period
problems. It is straightforward to show that the results of remark 1 apply.
6.1.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Follows immediately from Theorem 2; the supplier always charges w1 = w2 = c1m. There-
fore, (i), she gets weakly lower costs in period 2 with more learning; and, (ii) the man-
ufacturer’s profit is the same whether the supplier participates or not, and regardless of
the value of γs.
6.1.8 Proof of Theorem 3
(i) Since the supplier is not learning, if c1s > c
1
m, then for the supplier to make money w
1
or w2 will need to be greater than c1m. But, the manufacturer will not buy if this is the
case, as shown in Proposition 4.
(ii) & (iii) We first solve for the manufacturer’s response (i.e., production and purchase
quantities) for any given wholesale price w1. In solving for the manufacturer’s response,
we first solve q1m(q
1
s ), which is the optimum production quantity given a purchase quantity.
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Table 6.1: Possible optima: Only manufacturer learns
q1∗m (q
1
s) q
1
s condition
0 q1s ≥ a−bc
1
m
2 (1 +
bδγm
2 )
k
a−bc1m
2 (1 +
bδγm
2 )− (b2δγ2m − 4)
c1m−cm
4γm
≤ q1s < a−bc
1
m
2 (1 +
bδγm
2 ) &
a
2 − q1s > qm
k a2 − 2c
1
m
bδγ2m
+ 1
bγm
(a− bc1m) ≤ q1s < a−bc
1
m
2 (1 +
bδγm
2 ) &
a
2 − q1s ≤ qm
q
m
a−bc1m
2 − c
1
m−cm
γm
≤ q1s < a−bc
1
m
2 (1 +
bδγm
2 )− (b2δγ2m − 4)
c1m−cm
4γm
& a2 − q1s > qm
q
m
q1s <
a
2 − 2c
1
m
bδγ2q
+ 1
bγm
(a− bc1m) & Π(qm) > Π∗(q1m < a2 − q1s) & a2 − q1s ≤ qm
a−bc1m
2 − q1s q1s < a−bc
1
m
2 − c
1
m−cm
γm
& a2 − q1s > qm
k = (a−bc
1
m)(2+bδγm)
4−b2δγ2m −
4q1s
4−b2δγ2m
The manufacturer’s profit function is given in Proposition 4.
We first solve for q1∗m (q
1
s) as in Proposition 4. Π(q
1
m, q
1
s) is again continuous but
not necessarily concave. If a
2
− q1s > qm, then Π(q1m, q1s) is continuous and concave in
q1m. Relevant q
1∗
m (q
1
s) are given in Table 6.1. In this case,
∂Π
∂q1m
< 0 if q1m >
a
2
− q1s , so
s1m = q
1
m + q
1
s . If
a
2
− q1s < qm, then Π(q1m, q1s) is continuous but not concave in q1m. For
q1m <
a
2
− q1s , Π(q1m, q1s) is concave in q1m. For a2 − q1s < q1m < qm, the profit function is
convex in q1m. For q
1
m > qm, the profit function is strictly decreasing in q
1
m. The possible
q1∗m (q
1
s) are given in Table 6.1.
Note that s1m is zero in all cases above except when q
1
m ≤ qm & q1m > a2 − q1s , in which
case s1m is equal to q
1
m − (a2 − q1s). We note that if w1 > c1m, then q1∗s = 0 and q1m is
determined by Theorem 1. The remainder of this proof covers the case where w1 ≤ c1m,
Π(q1s) is continuous but neither concave nor convex.
Having solved for q1∗m (q
1
s), we now solve for the optimal q
1
s . This will then completely
characterize the manufacturer’s response function for a given w1. Πm(q
1
s), which is con-
tinuous but neither concave nor convex, is given now (k is defined in Table 6.1).
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Πm(q
1
s) =


(q1s)(
1
b
)(a− q1s)− q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bc1m)2 if q∗m1(q1s) = 0
(q1s + k)(
1
b
)(a− q1s − k)− kc1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− b(c1m − γm(k))2
if q∗m1(q
1
s) = k
(q1s + qm)(
1
b
)(a− q1s − qm)− q1sw1 − qmc1m + δ4b(a− bcm)2
if q∗m1(q
1
s) = qm&
a
2
− q1s ≥ qm
a2
4b
− q
m
c1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− bcm)2 if q∗m1(q1s) = qm&a2 − q1s < qm
a−bc1m
2
(1
b
)a+bc
1
m
2
− (a−bc1m
2
− q1s)c1m − q1sw1 + δ4b(a− b(c1m − γm(a−bc
1
m
2
− q1s)))2
if q∗m1(q
1
s) =
a−bc1m
2
− q1s
We first consider case (1) where a−bc
1
m
2
− q
m
> 0, or where a−bc
1
m
2
− q
m
≤ 0 but
a
b
− q
m
> 0 and wc1 ≤ ab − qm. We use c1 to denote the conditions that lead to this case.
We now solve for the optimum q1s for a given w
1 for this case. Recall that q1m(q
1
s ) has
already been specified above. There are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets of
parameters that need to be considered within this case (1a, 1b and 1c).
(1a) If c1m >
δγm
2
(a− bcm), then s1m = q1m + q1s because this condition directly implies
that for q1m = qm >
a
2
−q1s ∂Π(q
1
m,q
1
s)
∂(q1m)
< 0. In this case, the profit function is continuous and
has concave and convex regions. It is strictly decreasing as q1s → ∞ and increasing at
q1s = 0 with two local maxima in between. The two local maxima occur at q
1
s =
a−bw1
2
−q
m
and q1s =
a−bw1
2
. One can show that if w1 ≤ wc1 then q1s = a−bw
1
2
is optimal, and if
w1 > wc1 then q
1
s =
a−bw1
2
− q
m
is optimal. Table 6.2 gives the value of wc1. (1b) If
δγm
2
(a− bc1m) < c1m ≤ δγm2 (a− bcm), the same two maxima with the same condition on w1
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Table 6.2: wc values: only manufacturer learns
wc name value
wc1 c
1
m − δ2γm (a−
bc1m
2
− bcm
2
)
wc2
a
b
−√c1m − cm
√
(−4c1m − 4bc1mγm − b(−2a + b(c1m + cm))δγ2m + 4(cm + aγm)
wc3
a
b
−
√
−(a−bc1m)2(2+bδγm)2(−4+b2δγ2m)
b(4−b2δγ2m)
result, but the proof required additional steps. To prove this, we showed by contradiction
that the conditions on q1s that made the profit with strategic overproduction greater than
that without, could not exist where they would be relevant. Details are available.(1c)
c1m ≤ δγm2 (a − bc1m); in this case, the function is concave with one interior maximum,
q1∗s =
a−bw1
2
− q
m
.
(2) Next, we consider Π(q1s) for the case where
a−bc1m
2
− q
m
≤ 0 and either a
b
− q
m
≤ 0
or wc1 >
a
b
− q
m
. In this case, there is only one positive (i.e., q1s > 0) local maximum
in Π(q1s ). This maximum occurs at q
1
s =
a−bw1
2
. However, this needs to be compared to
the profit at q1s = 0. At q
1
s = 0, q
1
m(q
1
s) will be either qm or
(a−bc1m)(2+bδγm)
4−b2δγ2m depending on
the conditions given in Table 6.1 at q1s = 0. We use c2 to denote the conditions where
q1s = 0 results in q
1
m(q
1
s ) = qm, and we use c3 to denote conditions where q
1
s = 0 and
q1m(q
1
s) =
(a−bc1m)2(1+δ+bδγm)
b(4−b2δγ2m) . Under conditions c2, it can be shown that for w
1 ≤ wc2,
q1s =
a−bw1
2
and and for w1 > wc2, q
1
s = 0. Under conditions c3, then for w
1 ≤ wc3,
q1s =
a−bw1
2
and for w1 > wc3, q
1
s = 0
Having solved for the manufacturer’s response, we now solve for the supplier’s optimal
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wholesale price, w1. Given the above, the supplier’s total profit function is as follows:
Πs(w
1) =


(w1 − c1s)(a−bw
1
2
) + δ(c1m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) if w1 ≤ wc
(w1 − c1s)(a−bw
1
2
− q
m
) +Max(0, δ(cm − c1s))(a−bcm2 )
if wc1 < w
1 ≤ c1m and c1 applies
0 if w1 > c1m, or w
1 > wc2 and c2 applies, or w
1 > wc3 and c3 applies
Conditions ci i=(1,2,3) refer to the conditions used to determine the manufacturer’s
response function earlier in this proof. This profit function is discontinuous at w1 = wc.
For w1 ≤ wc, the optimal w1 is always wc due to similar arguments as in Theorem 2.
Thus, under conditions c2 and c3 the supplier charges wc2 and wc3 if she can profitably
do so.
Under conditions c1, for w1 > wc1 residual business is obtained. Within each region
(w1 ≤ wc1 and wc1 < w1 ≤ c1m), the supplier profit function is concave in w1. For
wc1 < w
1 ≤ c1m, there is one interior optimum, w1 = a2b + c
1
s
2
− 1
b
c1m−cm
γm
and the two
boundaries (we = wc1 + ε and c
1
m). The optimum of this region can be found using
boundary conditions, and then must be compared to the profit at w1 = wc when all
business is obtained. When cm < c
1
s, it is straightforward to show that the supplier will
never charge we to get only residual business. But, when cm ≥ c1s, the supplier may
charge we to get only residual business.
Note that wc1 ≤ c1m always. Also, note that wc1 < 0 if c1m < δγm2 (a − bc
1
m
2
− cm
2
). If
this is the case, if the supplier can participate, w1∗ = c1m if c
1
s > 2c
1
m − ab + 2b ( c
1
m−cm
γm
)
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Table 6.3: Possible w1∗, only manufacturer learns (conditions c1)
w1∗ conditions
wc1 (all business) c
1
m > Dc and ((c
1
m > Cc) or (Π(w
1∗, res) < Π(wc, all)))
we (residual) (c
1
m > Ec & c
1
m ≥ Dc & Π(wc, res) > Π(wc, all))
a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
− 1
b
(
c1m−cm
γm
) c1m > Ac & c
1
m < Ec & c
1
m < Gc & Π(w
1∗, res) > Π(wc, all)
c1m c
1
m < Ac& c
1
m < Gc & Π(c
1
m, res) > Π(wc, all)
Table 6.4: c1m breakpoints and derivations (conditions c1)
Name c1m = if c
1
m <
Ac aγm+c
1
sbγm+2cm
2+2bγm
Profit incr. at exit Reg. 2
Dc
2δγma−δγmbcm
4+δγmb
Reg. 1 no exist
Ec(> Ac)
2aγm+2c1sbγm+2δγ
2
mba+(4−δγ2mb2)cm
4+4bγm+δγ2mb
2 Profit incr. at entry Reg. 2
Gc
4aγm+8cm+(2bδγ
2
ma−δγ2mb2cm
8+4bγm+δγ2mb
2 Poss. Prof. in Reg. 2, given Reg. 1 exists
Reg. 1 is 0 < w1 < Min(0,Min(wc, c
1
m)); Reg. 2 is Max(0, wc) < w
1 < c1m
and w1∗ = a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
− 1
b
(
c1m−cm
γm
) otherwise. For the more complicated case with wc1 > 0,
the supplier’s choices and conditions under conditions c1 are given in Table 6.3; the
breakpoints referenced, in terms of c1m are given in Table 6.4.
PROGRESSION: If γm = 0, and c
1
s ≤ c1m, then strategy E3 is employed. At low γm,
the supplier must charge less than wc3 to get all of the business (Strategy E3), and there
is no residual business available if the supplier cannot profitably charge wc3 (Strategy A3
or B3). At moderate γm, the supplier must charge less than wc2 to get all of the business
(Strategy E3), and no residual business is present if the supplier cannot profitably charge
wc2 (Strategy A3 or B3). Finally, at high γm, the supplier must charge less than wc1 to
get all of the business (Strategy E3), or gets residual business for charging wc1 < w
1 < c1m
(Strategy C3 or D3). As γm increases, there will eventually be residual business as qm gets
smaller. γm is limited by assumptions, thus strategies beyond E3 may not be reached.
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6.1.9 Proof of Corollary 2
(i) We compare the profit γm = 0, Πs = (c
1
m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) + δ(c1m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) to the two
cases when γm > 0. First, Πs = (wc− c1s)(a−bwc2 )+ δ(c1m− c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
) when strategy E3 is
employed. Since wc < c
1
m, and from Proposition 2 we know that (wc − c1s)(a−bwc2 ) <
(c1m − c1s)(a−bc
1
m
2
). Thus, in this case the supplier is worse off. Second, Πs(w
1∗) =
(w1∗ − c1s)(a−bw
1∗
2
− q
m
) + δ(cm − c1s)(a−bcm2 ) when strategies C3 or D3 are employed.
This can be rewritten as: Πs = (w
1∗ − c1s)(a−bw
1∗
2
)− (w1∗ − c1s)(qm) + δ(cm − c1s)(
a−bcm
2
).
By Proposition 2, we know that
∂((w1−c1s)(a−bw
1
2
))
∂(w1)
> 0 for all w1 < c1m. Therefore, since
c1m ≥ cm, and w1∗ ≥ c1s, the profit function with no manufacturer learning is greater than
that with some manufacturer learning.
(ii) For γm > 0, we have two possible profit functions for the supplier. Using the notation
in (i) in this proof, and recalling that wc = c
1
m− δγm2 (a− bc
1
m
2
− bcm
2
), and that q
m
=
c1m−cm
γm
,
we can see that when strategy E3 is employed, ∂Πs
∂γm
≤ 0; this can be shown analytically
but it easier to note that second period profit is unchanged, and since wc < c
1
m, first
period profit is less by Proposition 2. For strategies C3 and D3, ∂Πs
∂γm
=
(w1−c1s)(c1m−cm)
γ2m
≥ 0.
6.1.10 Proof of Theorem 4
First, we observe that both players’ period 2 profit functions and optimal decisions are
unchanged. And, the manufacturer’s first period profit function and optimal decisions
for a given w1 are also unchanged from Theorem 3. What does change is the supplier’s
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Table 6.5: Possible w1∗, both learning
w1∗ value
wc,we c
1
m − δγm2 (a− bc
1
m
2
− bcm
2
wef a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
− 1
b
(
c1m−cm
γm
)− δγs
4
(a− bcm)
wf a
b
− 2
bγm
(c1m − cm)− 2bγs (c1s − cs)
wfc a
2b
+ c
1
s
2
− 1
b
(
c1m−cm
γm
)
c1m c
1
m
period 1 problem. As in Theorem 2, the supplier’s period 1 function is discontinuous at
w1 = wc.
First, we will show that she will never charge less than wc if employing the strategy
to get all of the business. We need to define the w1 where the supplier achieves cs in
this situation. That w1 = a
b
− 2(c1s−cs)
bγs
. If a
b
− 2(c1s−cs)
bγs
≥ wc, then the supplier has
already achieved cs by charging wc and will achieve no benefit by charging lower. If
a
b
− 2(c1s−cs)
bγs
< wc, it may be beneficial for the supplier to charge less than wc to get
the learning benefit. This proof now follows the same steps as in Theorem 2, part (iii),
replacing c1m with wc in the appropriate places. Thus, the supplier’s profit if she charges
w1 = wc is (wc− c1s)a−bwc2 + δ(c1m− c2s)a−bc
1
m
2
, where c2s is either cs if
a
b
− 2(c1s−cs)
bγs
≥ wc and
c1s − γs a−bwc2 otherwise.
Next, we turn our attention the “residual business” case. We first note that if cm < cs,
then q2s = 0 for the supplier if they get only residual business. Therefore, her learning
does not matter in the residual business case and she optimizes the first period profit
exactly as in Theorem 3.
However, if cs ≤ cm, then in the residual business case, the supplier’s second period
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profit depends on her first period actions. The supplier profit function in the relevant
region (wc < w
1 < c1m) is continuous but not necessarily concave. There are two possible
boundaries where the profit function may change. The first is where the supplier achieves
cs with just residual business; this point is w
1 = a
b
− 2
bγm
(c1m−cm)− 2bγs (c1s−cs), which we
call wf . If wc < w
1 < wf , then c
2
s = cs. The second new boundary is the w
1 value above
which the supplier gets no business in the second period, w1 = a
b
− 2
bγm
(c1m−cm)− 2bγs (c1s−
cm), which I call wg; wg > wf . If wf < w
1 < wg, then c
2
s = c
1
s − γs(a−bw
1
2
− q
m
). Note
the profit function is concave from wc < w
1 < wg. If wg < w
1 < c1m, then the supplier
gets no second period business. It may be possible that the profit function is decreasing
as w1 approaches wg, but then is increasing after wg (if the second period profit, which
hits zero at wg, was decreasing in w
1 faster than the first-period profit was increasing).
The interior optimum for the region wg < w
1 < c1m is the same as resulted from Theorem
3. Thus, only two new optimal w1 values emerge, wf and the new interior optimum in
the region wf < w
1 < wg. These are added to the possible residual business optima
from Theorem 3. We list the possible optima here on Table 6.5 but do not enumerate
the conditions for when each is optimal; these conditions are tremendously tedious. The
conditions are available from the lead author. Once the residual business optimum is
obtained, the resulting profit must be compared with the relevant complete outsourcing
profit, as in Theorem 3.
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6.1.11 Proof of Corollary 3
There exist sets of parameters in which the supplier is willing to induce strategy E3 when
she is learning, where she would not if she were not learning. This is because the presence
of learning provides a greater marginal benefit for the supplier of first period sales to the
manufacturer. To induce strategy E3, the supplier must charge wc. wc < w
1∗, which is
used to induce strategies C3 or D3. Since the manufacturer is receiving a lower price, he
can only benefit. Also, the numerical example (Figure 2.9) demonstrates that both cases
exist.
6.1.12 Proof of Theorem 5
(i) As facility i has strictly lower costs in both periods for any possible strategy, and the
manufacturer is optimizing supply chain profits, clearly only facility i should be used and
j should be ignored. Since learning is present, the strategies of Theorem 1 are relevant.
(ii)As before, in the second period the manufacturer will use the lower cost source for
all production, and q2 = a−bc
2
2
, where c2 = Min(c2i , c
2
j). As leader, the manufacturer will
always pay the supplier’s marginal cost for purchased product, as he will be strictly worse
off paying more. Thus, the manufacturer’s optimization problem becomes maximizing
the following profit function: Πm = (a− q1j − q1i )(1b )(q1j + q1i )− c1i q1i − c1jq1j +( δ4b)(a− bc2)2
where c2 = Min(c2i , c
2
j ), and c
2
j = Max(c
1
j − γjq1j , cj) and c2i = Max(c1i − γiq1i , ci). If
ci < ci < cj < cj , then clearly this function is minimized by using the results of Theorem
1 for firm i = m, s and not using firm j.
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If (a) ci < cj < ci < cj or (b) cj < ci < ci < cj, then the profit function is
neither convex nor concave in q1i or q
1
j . Solving one decision variable at a time, we note
that while Πm(q
1
j ), treating q
1
i as constant, is neither convex nor concave, Πm(q
1
j ) where
q1j >
c1j−c1i
γj
+ γi
γj
q1i is concave; we also note that if q
1
j <
c1j−c1i
γj
+ γi
γj
q1i , then in an optimal
solution, q1j = 0. Also, as q
1
i reaches
c1i−cj
γi
in both cases (a) and (b), in an optimal solution
q1j = 0. In case (b) q
1
i =
c1i−ci
γi
is less than
c1i−cj
γi
; when
c1i−ci
γi
is reached the point below
which we know q1j is zero becomes
c1j−cj
γj
. We call the smallest relevant critical q1j below
which we know q1j = 0 λ. We proceed to optimize the concave region in q
1
j for a given q
1
i ,
given q1j > λ. This solution gives critical q
1
i values, in terms of exogenous parameters. The
possible optimal q1i values, given q
1
j > λ, include
a−bc1i
2
− c
1
j−cj
γj
and zero. Conditions can
be obtained when q1i = 0 and q
1
j equals either
c1j−cj
γj
or
(a−bc1j )(2+bδγj )
4−b2δγ2j
. Whichever optimum
arises in the case where q1j > λ must be compared with the appropriate optimum when
q1j = 0; the appropriate optimum q
1
i given q
1
j = 0 is determined using the conditions of
Theorem 1. Thus, the conditions arise from first determining the optimum q1i and q
1
j given
q1j > λ, then determining the optimum given q
1
j = 0, then comparing the two possible
optima. A list of mutually exclusive and exhaustive conditions, and their derivations,
which result in each strategy being optimally employed is available (in a format similar
to Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, but with many more parameters and conditions).
(iii) Here, facility i cannot benefit from learning. Therefore, strategies that arise from its
learning benefit cannot happen.
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6.1.13 Proof of Corollary 4
The manufacturer’s profit function given in the proof of Theorem 5 is clearly non-
decreasing in both player’s learning.
6.2 Essay 2 Appendices
6.2.1 Essay 2: Variable Definitions
Table 6.6: Propensity to outsource (item reliability=.71)
PTO1 uses this ques-
tion
Over the next 3 years, how important will the following
strategies be for improving your overall supply chain per-
formance? (1=much less important, 3=same, 5=much
more important)
PTO1 Contracting with others to manufacture/assemble for you
PTO2-5 use this
question
Which directions do you expect to change over the next
3 years regarding outsourced goods? (1=Decrease, 3=No
Change, 5=Increase)
PTO2 Outsourced (purchased) finished products (from contract
manufacturers-such as private labeling)
PTO3 Outsourced (purchased) basic materials/components
PTO4 Outsourced major assemblies
PTO5 Outsourced manufacturing processes
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Table 6.7: Quality capability (item reliability=.84)
QC1-5 use this ques-
tion
Listed below are critical success factors for competing in
an industry. Please indicate how strong you feel your
business unit currently is for each capability relative to
your primary competitors in the same markets. (Rela-
tive current capability: 1=Lower, 3=Average, 5=Market
Leader)
QC1 Conformance (degree to which products meet industry
standards)
QC2 Durability (product life)
QC3 Product reliability (reduced probability of breakdown or
failure)
QC4 Performance (functionality of design/engineering)
QC5 Overall product quality as perceived by customers
Table 6.8: Quality priority (item reliability=.78)
QP1-5 use this ques-
tion
Listed below are critical success factors for competing in
an industry. Indicate how important you feel each capa-
bility will be to your business unit in order to successfully
compete over the next three years (Importance, Next 3
Years: 1=Not Important, 3=Moderate, 5=Very High)
QP1 Conformance (degree to which products meet industry
standards)
QP2 Durability (product life)
QP3 Product reliability (reduced probability of breakdown or
failure)
QP4 Performance (functionality of design/engineering)
QP5 Overall product quality as perceived by customers
Table 6.9: Cost capability (item reliability=.69)
CC1-2 use this ques-
tion
Listed below are critical success factors for competing in
an industry. Please indicate how strong you feel your
business unit currently is for each capability relative to
your primary competitors in the same markets. (Rela-
tive current capability: 1=Lower, 3=Average, 5=Market
Leader)
CC1 Manufacture products at lower internal cost than com-
petition
CC2 Offer lower-priced products than competitors
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Table 6.10: Cost priority (item reliability=.55)
CP1-2 use this ques-
tion
Listed below are critical success factors for competing in
an industry. Indicate how important you feel each capa-
bility will be to your business unit in order to successfully
compete over the next three years (Importance, Next 3
Years: 1=Not Important, 3=Moderate, 5=Very High)
CP1 Manufacture products at lower internal cost than com-
petition
CP2 Offer lower-priced products than competitors
Table 6.11: Asset specificity
Which of the following categories best describes the dom-
inant production flows of your business unit’s primary
products?
AUTO 1=Continuous flow or machine-paced line 0=Worker-
paced lines or disconnect flows through independent work
centers or no dominant flows or production organized
around a project
Table 6.12: Technological uncertainty
How much will the following factors and market condi-
tions likely affect your business over the next 3 years?
(1=Very Low, 3=Moderate, 5=Very High)
TU New manufacturing technology
Table 6.13: Emerging market
EMRG=1 China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philip-
pines, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, South Africa,
India, South Korea, Thailand, Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Portugal
EMRG=0 United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Ger-
many, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Singapore,
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, USA, Canada
Based on Hoskisson (2000) classification of countries
Table 6.14: Large company
What is the approximate number of personnel employed
at the company and/or in your business unit, worldwide?
BIG 1=Over 500 employees; 0=Less than 500 employees
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Table 6.15: Early in life cycle
What percent of your business unit sales revenues would
you attribute to each of the following stages of product
life cycle?
EAR 1=greater than 40% Introductory Stage/Growth Stage
0=greater than 60% Maturity Stage/Decline Stage
Table 6.16: Market leader
How would you assess your position in your primary
markets-the products and markets you focus on most?
MKLD 1=Market Leader-Clear Number 1 or 2 0=One of the
top 3 or 4 in the market, but not the clear leader or
Second tier–not as high as the market leaders but a strong
competitor or A minor player in the market-serving a
small niche or modest share of the market
Table 6.17: Customized product
Overall, how extensively are most products customized
in your business unit or operation?
CUS 1=Engineered to order (100% custom) or Assembled to
order/made to customer 0=Make to stock (inventory) or
Varies
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6.2.2 Essay 2: Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.18 gives the descriptive statistics.
Table 6.18: Descriptive statistics for all items
Variable N Mean StDev
PTO1 785 3.33 1.15
PTO2 702 3.33 .86
PTO3 771 3.41 .76
PTO4 640 3.25 .82
PTO5 711 3.24 .87
CC1 834 3.38 1.02
CC2 804 2.93 1.11
CP1 817 4.29 .83
CP2 801 3.66 1.14
QC1 849 4.12 .79
QC2 755 4.00 .87
QC3 803 4.06 .81
QC4 767 3.93 .82
QC5 840 3.98 .82
QP1 828 4.47 .74
QP2 748 4.18 .88
QP3 783 4.48 .71
QP4 754 4.35 .75
QP5 818 4.58 .66
AUT 793 .46 .50
TU 840 3.22 1.11
EMRG 860 .31 .46
BIG 805 .52 .50
EAR 701 .27 .45
MKLD 847 .43 .50
CUS 867 .47 .50
See Tables 6.6 to 6.17 for variable descriptions
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Table 6.19: Pairwise pearson correlations
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 CC1 CC2 CP1 CP2 QC1 QC2 QC3 QC4 QC5 QP1 QP2 QP3 QP4 QP5
PO1 1
PO2 .29 1
PO3 .23 .32 1
PO4 .30 .39 .28 1
PO5 .21 .41 .32 .49 1
CC1 -.02 -.12 -.01 -.02 -.04 1
CC2 -.02 -.08 .01 -.04 -.06 .48 1
CP1 .03 .02 .13 .04 -.03 .37 .26 1
CP2 .08 .03 .14 .11 .07 .18 .53 .37 1
QC1 -.03 .01 .02 -.01 -.01 .09 -.04 .06 -.05 1
QC2 .02 .03 .03 .06 .06 .05 -.07 .09 .07 .54 1
QC3 -.00 .05 .07 .07 .07 .15 -.03 .10 .02 .59 .58 1
QC4 -.01 -.02 .03 .04 .02 .08 -.06 .07 .01 .45 .44 .50 1
QC5 -.04 .03 .01 -.05 .02 .15 .04 .12 .02 .51 .43 .56 .41 1
QP1 -.01 -.00 .02 .02 .00 .05 -.02 .14 .04 .47 .27 .30 .28 .27 1
QP2 .03 .00 .06 .09 -.01 .10 .01 .17 .14 .33 .66 .36 .30 .29 .36 1
QP3 .02 -.00 .08 .10 .02 .02 -.04 .19 .09 .37 .41 .49 .33 .31 .43 .51 1
QP4 .07 -.00 .06 .04 -.01 -.00 -.04 .18 .08 .32 .34 .28 .55 .24 .37 .40 .49 1
QP5 -.03 .02 .06 .05 .02 .01 .01 .19 .09 .29 .27 .26 .25 .42 .39 .29 .42 .41 1
AU -.14 -.11 -.06 -.10 -.02 .08 .02 .10 .14 .00 .06 .01 -.05 .00 .03 .04 .01 -.05 .02
TU .08 .02 .06 .01 .02 .08 .09 .15 .19 -.02 -.01 -.04 .01 .03 .05 .01 .03 .05 .10
EM .06 .02 .18 -.00 .14 .00 .07 .07 .16 -.02 .06 .06 .02 .03 .01 .10 .06 .08 .04
BG .06 .04 -.02 .04 .04 .01 -.07 -.01 -.07 .01 .05 .01 .01 .01 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.04
ER .05 -.02 .04 .03 .02 .03 .03 .00 .04 .03 .01 .03 .11 .04 -.02 -.00 .02 -.02 -.04
MK -.05 .03 -.02 -.00 .02 .05 -.10 .00 -.10 .24 .15 .19 .22 .22 .13 .09 .05 .10 .06
CS -.06 -.10 .01 -.02 .00 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.01 .01 .10 .03 .08 .04 .04 .09 .03 .09 .08
See Tables 6.6 to 6.17 for variable descriptions; note: PO=PTO, AU=AUTO, EM=EMRG, BG=BIG, ER=EAR, MK=MKLD, CS=CUS
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Table 6.20: Pairwise pearson correlations (continued)
AU TU EM BG ER MK CS
AU 1
TU -.03 1
EM .03 .06 1
BG .05 -.08 -.13 1
ER -.02 .15 -.02 .05 1
MK .06 -.02 -.04 .19 -.04 1
CS -.08 .04 .01 -.10 .08 -.06 1
See Tables 6.6 to 6.17 for variable descriptions; note: PO=PTO, AU=AUTO, EM=EMRG, BG=BIG, ER=EAR, MK=MKLD, CS=CUS
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6.2.3 Common Methods Bias Tests
Harman’s Single-Factor Test Harman’s single-factor test involves performing an ex-
ploratory factor analysis with the indicators, and ensuring that they do not all load
on a single factor. We found that 8 factors were maintained (eigenvalues greater
than 1), and that the largest factor explained 19% of the variance. Examining the
factors, it is clear that the propensity to outsource dependent variable loads onto
its own factor, and does not appear to be correlated to the independent variables
due to common method bias. Since a single factor does not explain the majority
of the variance, this provides evidence that common method bias is not a major
problem. Podsakoff et al. (2003), however, note that this test is insensitive.
Method Factor Now, we use a second approach, discussed in Podsakoff et al. (2003).
In this approach, we introduce a method factor. This is a single factor that loads
onto all items. Given the size of our model, we again needed to do this with just our
multi-item scales. Here, we check to see if the correlations between the constructs
are significantly lowered by the introduction of the method factor. Importantly, we
find no significant difference in the correlations between the two models between
any of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Within the capabili-
ties and priorities, we do find significant reductions in correlations between quality
capability and priority and cost capability and priority. This would indicate that
common method variance may be a factor among the capabilities and priorities, but
not between the capabilities and priorities and the dependent variable. There are
also may be theoretical reasons (combinative capabilities, competitive progression
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theory) why these capabilities and priorities may load onto one factor.
6.2.4 Discriminant Validity
The following table gives the chi-square difference between a constrained model where
the correlation between constructs is forced to unity and a model where the correlation
is allowed to be free. We tested all multi-item constructs with the dependent construct
first, then tested among capabilities and priorities. A χ2 difference of 3.84 between
the constrained and unconstrained models indicates a significant difference between the
models, thus providing evidence of discriminant validity.
Table 6.21: Discriminant validity tests
Description χ2(constrained)* χ2(unconstrained)* Difference
CC-PTO 70.5(14) 15.2(13) 55.3
CP-PTO 106.0(14) 3.78(13) 81.5
QC-PTO 565.1(35) 54.9(34) 510.2
QP-PTO 266.0(35) 43.2(34) 222.8
CC-QC 251.4(14) 29.7(13) 221.7
CP-QP 132.2(14) 34.2(13) 98.0
*-degrees of freedom in parantheses
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6.3 Essay 3 Appendices
6.3.1 Essay 3: Expert Panelists
Panelist 1 (P1) P1 is the author of the book on foreign material prevention in foods and
president of an independent consulting firm offering expertise in assisting organiza-
tions to deliver sustainable improvements in product safety, quality, and ancillary
business processes. P1’s previous work experience includes roles in both quality
assurance and manufacturing operations with major food and consumer products.
During his tenure at a large FDA-regulated company, P1 oversaw several key areas
of their business. As their Senior Quality Assurance Manager he was responsible
for the oversight of the quality systems and personnel within their North American
manufacturing facilities. P1 transitioned to the role of Business Unit Manager later
in his career, and assumed operational responsibility for another unit. During this
time P1 was intimately involved in the commercialization of new products and the
development of the process improvement organization within their largest facility.
P1 is now a highly sought after speaker/panelist for food industry events. P1 is a
Senior Member of ASQ and holds current certifications as a Six Sigma Black Belt
(SSBB) and a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control (HACCP) Auditor.
Panelist 2 (P2) has held executive positions and extensive experience in Six Sigma,
quality improvement, customer loyalty, cost reduction, and revenue growth. P2
has served several Fortune 500 companies as the senior corporate officer in charge
of strategy, purchasing, quality, training and asset management. He has used his
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ability to integrate systems and develop new paradigms to achieve world-class per-
formance. P2’s experience in Six Sigma and major change management are derived
from both line and staff perspectives in diverse Union and Industry environments
including merger facilitation. P2 has extensive global cross-cultural experience and
is an expert at accelerating sustainable financial performance improvement. He
has had the direct corporate responsibility for improvement efforts that have been
publicly credited with over two billion dollars in benefits to the shareholders. P2
also served four years as a judge for the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award. In addition, he led a large utility company’s quality effort. This
was the first non-Japanese company to win the Deming Award. P2 has the dis-
tinction of being presented with awards for Outstanding Service to the Nation by
two Secretaries of Commerce: William Verity and Robert Mosbacher. P2 is the
founder and current CEO of a global provider of consulting and training in: corpo-
rate performance, quality improvement, Six Sigma, Lean, and Strategic Planning.
His consultants have worked with Motorola, Allied Signal, ABB, York Interna-
tional, General Electric, ASQ, ING, the Singapore Government, and PwC. His
areas of expertise includes Manufacturing, Service, Healthcare, Financial Services,
and Government institutions.
Panelist 3 (P3) P3 is Manager, Quality Assurance at a technology center of a large
medical device manufacturer where she has managed a number of quality disci-
plines, including validation, supplier quality, internal and supplier audit, inspection
and test, calibration/metrology, quality engineering, and document control. P3 has
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a B.S. in Mathematics/Economics and her M.S. in Industrial Administration. P3
is currently active in many facets of the American Society for Quality. She is cur-
rently the program chair for the Customer-Supplier Division, the education chair
for Orange Empire Section, and is active with the Biomedical Division’s Southern
California Discussion Group. P3 presently teaches the section refresher courses
for the Black Belt, Certified Quality Engineer, and Certified Biomedical Auditor
Certification Exams.
Panelist 4 (P4) P4 is currently both a senior consultant with a regulatory consulting
group and a faculty advisor to the School of Pharmacy at a major university on
FDA matters. Prior to these roles, P4 served with Food and Drug Administration
for over 30 years. During P4’s last 17 years with the agency, P4 was a District
Director where he was responsible for managing that field office and carrying out
FDA programs with specific emphasis toward the pharmaceutical industry. P4’s
responsibilities in this role included overseeing and providing executive leadership
and management direction for the agency’s programs and enforcement activities.
P4 also directed and managed the implementation of the Pre-Approval Compliance
Program. During the last several years in this position P4 also served as chair of
the Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) field drug committee where P4 interfaced
on a regular basis with Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)’s man-
agement and program specialists. P4 also helped develop the Mutual Recognition
Agreement (MRA) between the European Union and United States for pharmaceu-
tical products. For P4’s dedicated professionalism, leadership, and achievements
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with the FDA, he was granted the Distinguished Career Service Award.
6.3.2 Delphi Documents
6.3.2.1 Letter to Solicit Expert Panelists
To: Quality expert in FDA-regulated industries
Buyer Beware? Quality Risk in Outsourcing
Invitation to serve on a panel of experts
This project is being conducted by researchers from the University of North Carolina-
Chapel Hill and from Arizona State University. This work is partially funded and sup-
ported by the Juran Center for Leadership in Quality at the University of Minnesota.
We are studying conformance quality risks in outsourcing. We believe that outsourc-
ing poses a risk to conformance quality. This risk is a result of the supremacy of costs in
outsourcing decisions, misaligned incentives with regard to investments in robust quality
improvements, and difficulty in observing the implementation of robust quality practices.
As a proxy for conformance quality capability, we are using data from Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) audits. These audits are generally thorough, multi-day audits.
Plants are required by law to provide any relevant information requested by the FDA.
As such, we believe they provide the best available assessment of the robustness of a
firm’s quality systems at the establishment level.
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We have obtained a database of all domestic audits performed by the FDA (in the
drug, cosmetic, and medical device industries) since 1994 through the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. We are awaiting similar databases for the food industry and for all foreign
audits. The database contains the name and location of each facility, the date(s) of the
audit(s) at each facility, and the audit results. Audit results are given in two parts. First,
a “Y” is given if a Form 483 was issued during the audit by the auditor. Second, the
District Decision is given in the database, with one of four possible decisions listed on
the following table:
See Table 4.2
We are looking to utilize this data to ascertain an establishment-level measure of
conformance quality capability. We would like to believe we have enough information to
create a valid and reliable measure from the database.
Requirements of a panel member
We expect the panel to consist of several people; at least one with auditing experience
with the FDA. We anticipate that each panelist will have 2-3 individual conversations
(less than 1 hour) with John Gray between March and June of 2006. We would then
attempt to have a concluding conference call/meeting with the whole group.
Benefits to the panel member
The panel member will help answer the question of whether or not there is a quality
risk in outsourcing, help create a measure of ”quality capability” at the establishment
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level based on publicly available data that could be used for future research. The panel
member will also gain easy, legal access to quality data on all firms audited by FDA,
and a small network of academics and practitioners interested in quality performance.
Finally, the panel member will receive a copy of the study when complete; and input into
future research projects.
Outcomes
The outcome of the work of this panel will be either a specific formula that transforms
the audit frequency and results (483 and district decision) into an index of conformance
quality capability at the establishment level, or a realization that this is not possible,
and a more detailed approach utilizing complete audit reports documented.
If interested, please contact me using one of the methods above,
John V. Gray
6.3.3 Round 1 Delphi Questionnaire
Thank you for taking the time to talk to me. My purpose in talking to you is two-fold:
My primary (and only required) objective is to utilize experts like you to help me create
a valid and reliable measure of conformance quality capability from publicly available
FDA data. A secondary objective is to get suggestions from practitioners like you as to
interesting research studies that could be performed utilizing this data.
172
I plan to record this call to prevent me from needing to write everything you say. Are
you okay with that?
First, let me tell you a little bit about the data I have collected. Through the Freedom
of Information Act, I have been able to obtain Excel spreadsheets containing information
about all audits performed by the FDA in the drug industry from 1994-2005. These
spreadsheets contain the name and address of the firm, the date of the audit, and two
measures of the audit outcome: a “Yes/No” indicating whether a Form 483 was issued,
and an indication of the district decision (No Action, Voluntary Action, Official Action,
Referred to State, pending). Official Action should be accompanied by a warning letter,
which is generally available. We can also get recall data, for any relevant firms that have
had recalls. I hope to use this data for several research projects; I hope to use experts in
industry (like you) to determine how to best use this data.
I first wish to get a handle on your background and experience with manufacturing
in general:
(1) Please briefly describe your experience in manufacturing in industries or processes
NOT regulated by the by FDA.
(2) Please briefly describe your experience with manufacturing in FDA-regulated
industries. Include experience in staff roles, with suppliers, etc.
Next, I’d like to get a handle on your experience with the FDA auditing process.
(3) Please briefly describe your experience with FDA audits. Include direct partici-
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pation, training on audits, “mock” audits, audits of your operation, etc.
(4) Please describe your familiarity with the FDA’s Form 483.
(6) Please describe your familiarity with the process an audit report takes after the
site visit (district decision, etc.).
Finally, I’d like to get to the main purpose of this process-to get a Panel of Experts
to come to a consensus on the appropriate way to use the data I have obtained from the
FDA.
First, let me assess your comfort with the term “conformance quality capability.”
(7) I define “Conformance Quality Capability” as the ability to consistently ship
product that is free of defects (either specified or not). Do you understand this definition?
Note: here I discuss how this is normally measured in academic research-perceptual
surveys comparing one plant’s/MBU’s capability to others and/or (less commonly) mea-
suring actual internal or external defect rates by some method
(8) Do you feel FDA audits provide a reasonably accurate assessment of conformance
quality capability? Explain
Ultimately, I’d like to get to a mathematical transformation of the readily available
data to a valid and reliable measure of conformance quality capability. The goal should
be that we have some confidence that the “score” that results from this transformation
has two properties: (i) it is monotonic in what we are trying to measure (i.e., a higher
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score indicates a higher conformance quality capability), (ii) a specific difference between
two scores across the scale corresponds to the same specific difference in conformance
quality capability. Do you understand what I am trying to do?
I will use this variable to do studies where “conformance quality capability” is the
dependent variable or the independent variable.
(9) We have information on whether a Form 483 was issued and the district decision
for each audit, as well as the frequency and recency of audits. We also can obtain actual
warning letters and recalls when they exist (i.e., when “official action is indicated”).
Let’s talk through how these data may be used to obtain information about a firm’s
conformance quality capability to achieve the objective discussed above.
(10) We also know whether a firm is ISO 9000 certified or not. Does that provide any
additional information of its conformance quality capability, in your opinion?
(11) How would you recommend using these pieces of data (and only these pieces of
data) to measure conformance quality capability?
6.3.4 Round 1 Delphi Summary to Experts
Summary of Round 1: All experts selected and spoken to are highly qualified to help
with this research. After the first round, all are willing to continue.
The panelists helped clarify the process an inspection report takes: (1) inspector
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comes (for cause or not for cause), (2) inspector issues 483s (if any) with EIR (Estab-
lishment Inspection Report), (3) inspector gives firm the opportunity to discuss every
item on 483; firm sends response, (4) EIR goes to district; decision by district is based
on report from investigation branch (EIR) and other data (recalls, consumer complaints,
violative samples, etc.) to make a decision, (5) “Referred to State” cannot necessarily be
classified as more or less severe than “VAI” or “OAI.” States are contracted for specific
things and may get reports of varying severity. (6) Net, we have one two-level variable
(Form 483 Yes or No), and one three level variable (NAI, VAI, OAI) which may be
supplemented with the contents of a warning letter or recall.
Importantly, ALL panelists feel that FDA audits provide a reasonably accurate as-
sessment of “conformance quality capability,” as I defined it in round 1 (“the ability to
consistently ship product that is free of defects (either specified or not)”)
However, no panelists were completely comfortable with the definition of “confor-
mance quality capability” above. REVISED CONSTRUCT: “Quality Risk” is the propen-
sity for a product produced by a given facility to fail to perform as intended, due to
manufacturing-related issues. (*note: the above definition slightly revised from the def-
inition used in the Delphi process (“propensity” above replaced “likelihood.” Delphi
participants contacted and concurred with the change.)
I gave examples of how conformance quality has been measured in previous academic
research. None of the panelists liked the idea of surveying managers to assess them-
selves relative to competitors for quality capability, as is often done. All were satisfied
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with checking actual conformance (percent defects in plant, warranty, etc.), but under-
stood that would limit the study to very similar manufacturing processes and products.
One suggested surveying customers to get their “independent measure of the quality of
products.”
There were varying levels of comfort with my overall idea of using FDA inspection
data as a proxy for quality risk/conformance quality capability.
We made little progress (as expected) on actually transforming the data. Importantly,
all panelists understand what I want to do. Most felt the Form 483 was a lower bar than
an Official Action Indicated/Warning Letter.
One stated that a “483 indicates the firm didn’t do a good job on some system, a
warning letter is so serious it indicates the company did not even pay attention to a
major quality system.”
One panelist was deeply concerned that two firms that received OAIs or a 483 could
be vastly different (similarly, two 483s) in terms of the severity of quality risk; i.e., this
panelist was concerned about using only the spreadsheet as opposed to complete reports.
This panelist gave an example of how restaurant scores “A” or “B” give only a little
information; big difference between A=90 and A=100.
Another panelist thought it would be important to know the number of items in a
483 and the reason for the audit. I have called the FDA and neither of these are readily
available. We will need to proceed without this knowledge.
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One panelist gave an example that judged quality risk based on how easily a problem
can be fixed. I hope not to focus on what happens after the audit; I want us to focus on
the audit as an assessment of current quality.
Focus of Round 2
Review new definition of what we are trying to measure: “Quality Risk” is: The
propensity for a product produced by a given facility to fail to perform as intended, due
to manufacturing-related issues.
Reaffirm comfort with FDA inspections’ assessment of the above construct., and
discuss my assumption that FDA audits assess behavior with regard to quality risk, and
agree to ignore/declare negligible any effect past FDA audits have on future behavior.
Reevaluate the use of just the spreadsheet data as a proxy for “Quality Risk.”
Attempt to create a “first-cut” mathematical transformation of data available (think
of weights of each variable and the effect of time/frequency).
6.3.5 Round 2 Delphi Interview
Thank you for your insights last time we spoke, and thank you for scheduling time to
speak with me again. I am enjoying the process of working with you. On this interview,
we will begin by discussing what I learned from all of you on the first round, and then
we will quickly get into how we are going to utilize this data.
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Before we begin, I’d like to schedule another time to speak.
First, we learned that all of you have a significant amount of knowledge with regard to
the FDA auditing process, and quality practices. Also, you all bring diverse perspectives.
Your varied perspectives are helpful for this kind of work. They will increase the likelihood
that any consensus reached is valid.
(1) Did you have a chance to read the Summary document I sent out on Wednesday,
April 5th?
If no, and they have it front of them, ask them to look it over.
If no, and not in front of them, review some of the key points on the document.
(2) Do you have any questions/comments/concerns about the document?
Okay, now I’d like to progress forward. We have a few key things to review before
getting to the mathematical transformation of the data.
First, I have changed my construct name and definition to better define what I am
trying to measure. The new construct name and definition is/are:
QUALITY RISK: The propensity for a product produced by a given facility to fail
to perform as intended, due to manufacturing-related issues.
(3) Do you think FDA inspections provide a reasonable/good assessment of the above
construct?
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More than one panelist spoke, directly or indirectly, about how inspection results can
drive future behavior. This came out at different points of discussion. The two examples
were: a discussion about how firms that have received multiple 483s are a greater risk
than those who have received a warning letter because a warning letter will drive real
action, whereas 483s will make the firm feel as if they have slipped by; and a discussion
about examples of possible outages where the panelist was judging severity based on how
easily the problem can be addressed, not how likely there was a quality risk based on the
problem that was identified.
I believe it confounds our discussion if we include the endogenous effect of the audits
on future behavior. My preference is to focus our discussion on how well FDA audits
assess quality risk, and neglect the possible effect that these have on future behavior.
(4) Are you comfortable doing this?
The final “sticky issue” before we get to transformation of the data is whether we
can utilize only the spreadsheet data as opposed to having actual inspection reports. I
understand that more data would be better, but make the following case for using only
the spreadsheet data:: “coding” of audits would be quite subjective. It may be clear that
a given warning letter is more severe than another warning letter (.e.g. intentionally and
consistently releasing bad product vs. temporary error in one subsystem). However, it
will rarely be so clear cut. While there will be some benefit, it will be less significant
than one first might think; attaining inspection reports will take at least a year, even
for a small subset of the database, and would be practically impossible for the complete
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database. Coding them would take months. Thus, the cost will likely be greater than first
thought; all of you agreed that a firm that has received a Form 483 likely poses a greater
quality risk than one that does not. Thus, a simple solution to this problem would be to
measure quality risk very coarsely, with a “1” for those firms that received a 483 in their
last inspection, and a “0” for firms that did not. But, this seems to be wasting some
available data that we have (multiple audits, district decisions, warning letters/recalls);
finally, recall that other methods used for large-scale studies (e.g., surveys) are also quite
limited. If we come up with something better than the standard, we are doing well.
(5) Given my above arguments, what is your assessment about the possibility of
coming up with a valid measure of quality risk using only the data available on the
spreadsheet?
(Assuming I can get past this point.)
Now we need to get serious about transforming the spreadsheet data. We have the
following information: date of audits and the district decision and Form 483 Y/N for
each audit.
We don’t immediately know when the plant was started up or if it still exists; let’s
ignore that complexity for the moment.
As a way to tease out how you might come up with a score, I’m going to ask you
some general questions:
Fill in the blank in the following statement: “For a given audit, I would consider
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that a firm which receives an injunction, seizure, or recall as a result of an audit was x
times more likely than one that just received a warning letter to have posed a quality
risk prior to the audit.” Fill in the blank in the following statement: ”For a given audit,
I would consider that a firm which receives a warning letter was x times more likely than
one that just received a 483 to have posed a quality risk prior to the audit.” Fill in the
blank in the following statement: “For a given audit, I would consider a that firm which
receives a Form 483 was x times more likely than one that did not receive any action to
have posed a quality risk prior to the audit.”
Given what you have said, let’s fill in the following table, for a single audit:
(Similar to Table 4.3)
How do you think I should handle multiple audits?
6.3.6 Round 2 Delphi Summary to Experts
All calls went well. More than one panelist had interesting research suggestions and
other comments which are not directly related to creating a valid and reliable measure of
quality risk at the establishment level; I do not record these on this writeup (but I have
recorded them elsewhere).
We have settled on a definition of the construct we are measuring, at least for drugs
(pharmaceuticals and OTC medicines):
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QUALITY RISK: The propensity for a product produced by a given facility to fail
to perform as intended, due to manufacturing-related issues.
One panelist felt that for medical devices, there may be some very important parts
of the device that could “fail to perform as intended” that the FDA does not check in an
inspection. This panelist was comfortable with this definition for drugs.
All panelists feel that FDA inspections provide a reasonable assessment of quality
risk.
All panelists are comfortable with using only the spreadsheet data, for the following
reasons: (1) cost of doing more is high (time, resources, money), (2) benefit of doing
more may be low (subjective coding), (3) all panelists agree that establishments that get
a 483 pose, on average, a higher quality risk than those that do not; we are doing more
than this, (4) what we are doing is better than has done
The following points were made by one or more panelists regarding the use of spread-
sheet data: (1) It is not perfect, especially given the fact that we don’t have the number
of observations per 483. But, it seems better than other measures available (surveys,
measures of conformance in tight industries), and therefore is useful. (2) Any research
using this data should use a large enough sample that no individual plant scores are re-
vealed. This is because there is enough noise in this quality risk score that we should not
use this score for consulting/advice on the risk of specific plants. If actual Establishment
Inspection Reports (EIRs), 483s, and Warning Letters were studied, this concern may
be alleviated. (3) Inspections are a “coarse filter” of assessing quality risk; i.e., a clean
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inspection does not mean there is not a quality risk; an inspection with observations
implies a quality risk.
All panelists believe that the stream is important; that is, we should treat differently
an inspection history that shows improvement (e.g., warning letter, only 483, clean) as
opposed to one that shows no improvement.
One panelist believes that we should use only plants that have multiple inspections.
This would cost us 1776 of our 4171 establishments in the drug database. I’d like to
discuss this with all panelists in round 3; my preference is to keep these establishments.
Here are the scores assigned by each panelist in round 3, assuming no injunction or
seizure (all panelists stated that an injunction or seizure led to a quality risk roughly 3
times that of their highest score).
Table 6.22: Single audit “quality risk” score based on audit outcome
483/District Dec District Decision P1 P2 P3 P4
No N-No Action 1 0 0 0
No E-Voluntary Action 2 0 0 1
No A-Official Action 3 3 3 3
Yes N-No Action 1.5 1 1 1.5
Yes E-Voluntary Action 3 1 1 2
Yes A-Official Action 4.5 3 3.5 3
Note: Panelist #’s do not match their descriptions in Appendix 6.3.1
I was amazed at the striking similarity between the panelists (particulary 2 and 3).
Panelists 2 and 3 essentially gave no weight to a VAI from the district, which I found
interesting; they also gave a lot of weight to a warning letter.
Given the similarity, I propose the following single audit score:
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See Table 4.3
Multiple inspections were also discussed. All panelists agreed that the stream of
inspections should be considered, and improvement should be rewarded. Details were
not discussed in any of the calls.
Focus of Round 3
Review proposed quality scoring system for single inspections (as described above).
Discuss how to handle multiple inspections.
A more complex solution is necessary to reward improvement.
Discuss how to handle firms with only one inspection.
Attached are inspection histories for a few establishments for which I have complete
inspection reports (I decided to use these because then I can assess, by looking at the
reports, the validity of our score). Use our system to come up with scores for these
establishments and assess our comfort level with how our scoring system is working
(Note: we looked at scores in round 3 that included both the trend and multiple audit
adjustment; I have not included those scores here for brevity).
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6.3.7 Round 3 Delphi Interview
First, thanks again for continuing with this process. I hope you are finding it interesting.
I have truly enjoyed it.
(1) Did you have the opportunity to read the summary I sent?
(2) Do you have any questions or comments?
Key points: we are measuring quality risk, we agree that FDA inspections provide an
assessment of quality risk, we are okay with using only the spreadsheet data.
Now, how to score:
(3) Here are my proposed consensus scores; do you feel these are okay?
See Table 4.3
(4) Are you okay with scoring any inspection-related injunction or seizure at a 10?
We now have a score for a single inspection. No one was comfortable simply averaging
those scores for an establishment’s quality risk score.
(5) Should we raise quality risk due to frequent inspections (not knowing the cause)?
(6) Should we reward improvement/punish declines in inspection scores?
(7) Do you think we can include establishments with only one inspection?
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(8) Let’s look at some of the plants I sent out and try to score them, using our agreed
to scoring system. (Note: we checked these with both the final scoring system after
Round 3; panelists felt they were reasonable assessments given the audit patterns. The
inspection histories checked are attached after the Round 3 summary)
6.3.8 Round 3 Delphi Summary to Experts
All calls went well. All panelists agreed on the following consensus score for a single audit.
This score was not much different than any of the individual panelist’s suggestions:
See Table 4.3
All panelists agreed that an inspection-related seizure or injunction should result in
a score of 10 on this scale.
Because of some concern about the coarseness of this measure, I discussed with some
of the panelists the possibility of actually reading the warning letters (since they do not
require FOIs to obtain) and thus adding some information to the cases where warning
letters were issued (most OAIs have warning letters). This would a subjective interpre-
tation, but could lead to increased validity and more granularity in our assessment of
quality risk. We would use a scale from, say, 2.5 to 10 and grade the warning letters
subjectively. One panelist agreed to help with this (if any others are willing to help, let
me know). Another had concerns about the subjectivity of coding warning letters. For
the first study using this data, a coding scheme for warning letters may be attempted
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with at least one panelist.
One panelist expressed concern (which has been expressed before by others) that
the reason for the inspection may affect the likelihood of a 483 being issued. This
panelist felt that the above scoring system would be most valid if we considered only
“routine” (district office work plan) inspections. I am still working with the FDA to
try to get classifications, but cannot guarantee that I can get them. If I cannot, audit
type will be additional “noise.” If I can, it would be possible to determine how much
“reason” independently affects outcome, and/or perform the study with just the routine
inspections to eliminate one source of “noise.”
Panelists had varying levels of concern about the validity of using a plant with a
single audit. Comments ranged from (each panelist should see one bullet below reflecting
their opinion): -It’s not a concern at all -It’s only a concern if the audit is old -It may
be a concern because anything can happen on an audit, but the data loss might be too
severe to eliminate all single-audit plants. -It is a concern; to check how big a concern it
is studies should be done with and without single audit plants. I plan, if possible, to do
a study with and without the single audit plants to see if it has an impact.
We then discussed how the quality risk score should be changed for multiple audits.
There are two factors we considered:
(1) Is the fact that an inspection occurred a proxy for risk? That is, do we believe that
if one plant has one audit with a 483/VAI and another has six audits with a 483/VAI,
does the one that has had six audits carry a higher risk just because the FDA chose
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to go there? 3 of 4 panelists thought so after the call (although one of those three was
concerned that this was confounding product risk-i.e., public health impact of failure-
with our definition of quality risk), and we had tentatively agreed on the following way
to use this (n=# of audits, QR=quality risk score for a given audit, t=# years plant
existed 1994-2005):
∑n
i=1QRi
n
(1 +
n− 1
t
)
But, the 4th panelist interviewed noted that: “Work plan” (i.e., routine) audits are
generally performed randomly; PreApproval audits are performed because of a new drug,
and have no relation to the FDA’s assessment of quality risk at the plant; The above
two types of inspections are the majority of inspections; the inspections that are “for
cause” will often be the result of a bad previous inspection, which would already be
incorporated in the quality risk average score. Thus, this panelist felt (and convinced
me) that we should not increase a plant’s quality risk score due to frequent audits. Thus,
before incorporating trend, the quality risk score would simply be the average. I will
check back with the other panelists to see if they agree.
(2) Should we adjust quality risk scores for a trend? All panelists thought we should,
and all agreed with the following as a first cut adjustment, simply added to the average
quality risk score. It is up to me to ensure that this adjustment does not cause negative
scores, or overly award improvement:
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∑n−1
i=1 QRi+1 −QRi
n
Given the above the above discussion, the quality risk score will be either:
∑n
i=1QRi
n
(1 +
n− 1
t
) +
∑n−1
i=1 QRi+1 −QRi
n+ 1
Or
∑n
i=1QRi
n
+
∑n−1
i=1 QRi+1 −QRi
n + 1
depending on whether we adjust for the number of audits.
My current proposal is to use (ii) above, as the fourth panelist convinced me that
adjusting for the number of audits would be less valid than not adjusting. Other panelists,
please let me know if you agree with using (ii), given the arguments presented above.
The main upcoming work is: (1) “cleaning” the data set so that I can get a distribution
of our chosen quality risk score, (2) looking into adding some granularity to the quality
risk score classified contract manufacturers and internal plants, based on reading the
warning letters (with one or more panelists).
Next Steps for Panel
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(1) Give your input on eliminating the multiple audit adjustment, given the arguments
above. (note: panel agreed to not adjust for multiple audits) (2) Help code warning letters
(currently one panelist agreed to do this, others?)
(3) Later, I will organize a call with the entire panel to discuss the process and research
that can be done using this data set. That call will occur in mid-May.
6.3.8.1 Sample Audit Histories and Resulting Quality Risk Scores
In Table 6.23, we show the audit histories shared with the panel.
Each audit is represented by two letters. The first letter represents whether a Form
483 was issued (Y/N). The second letter indicates the district decision (N/E/A).
Table 6.23: Audit histories shared with panel for validity check
Audits (483,District Decision) QR Score
NN, NN, NN 0
YE, NN .25
NE .5
YE, YE, NN .63
YE, NE .67
NN, NN, NN, YE .68
YE,NN,YE,NN,YE,NN,YE .86
YA,NN,YE 1.17
YN,YA,YA,YA,YN,NN,NN 1.66
NN,YE,NE,NE,YA,YA 2.17
NE,YA,YA,YE,YA*,NN,NN,NN,YA,YE,YA 2.81
YA,YA,YA*,NE,NN 2.92
YA 3.50
Note: Audit histories are in chronological order; *=recall
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6.3.9 Delphi Wrap-Up Conference Call
Hi, everyone. Thank you for calling in. Did any of you get my e-mail from yesterday?
Do you have it in front of you?
First, although I know all of you fairly well, none of you know each other. So, let’s
begin with introductions.
(1) Introductions (all)
We’ll go through the panel alphabetically. Please give some detail about your expe-
rience and what you currently do.
Ok, thanks. I hope you can all see that everyone on this panel has both experience
in the topic we are working with and energy to help us figure out how best to use it.
Next, let me review the process we followed. We used the “Delphi” process, which
has the purpose of “obtaining the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts
by a series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback.”
The Delphi process was first used by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s to determine
the optimal US targets for the Soviets, and the number of A-Bombs required to reduce
the munitions output by a required amount.
This method was appropriate in our case because our situation had the following
characteristics: a clear problem/objective (how can we best use this data?), complex
subject matter, multiple iterations appropriate, diverse experts with no history of com-
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munication, helpful to preserve heterogeneity of experts; helpful to understand ”why”
experts believe what they do; dislocated/busy experts.
For problems with the above characteristics, it makes sense to utilize the Delphi
method.
Next, let me review the highlights of the process and our main results (deleted for
parsimony):
Okay, so that’s a brief summary of 10 hours of phone conversations with you over the
course of a month. Now that we’re all together, I’d like to give each of you an opportunity
to express two things: your comfort-level with the outcome and your assessment of the
process.
Thanks for all of that. Next, I’d like to talk about our future work (some new future
work may have just been created).
One of you agreed to review warning letters of the companies included in the study,
so that we can possibly use the additional information readily available to us to better
measure the quality risk of plants with warning letters (which often, but not always,
accompany an official action).
Finally, I’d like to ask the panelists if they have any suggestions for future research
utilizing our measure. Thanks again for your time. I will send you any papers that come
from this research and will likely be in touch again.
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6.4 Description of Process to Classify and Retain
Companies for the Study
The initial round of classifications selected companies based on their websites, SEC fil-
ings, news reports, etc. There were eight possible classifications (contract manufac-
turer, internal plant, upstream(for a chemical plant), pharmacy, medical gas, generic,
mixed(produced both internal brands and on contract, for example), and “unable to
classify.” Only plants classified “contract manufacturer” or “internal plant” were consid-
ered for further analysis.
Separately, lists of contract manufacturers were found from trade publications and
websites. Also, lists of drug brand names and manufacturers were found and searched
as possible candidates for internal plants. And, we created a list from local store shelves
for possible manufacturing plants.
From these two sources, plants that we thought might be contract manufacturers or
internal plants were further studied. We generated a data sheet on each company. This
data sheet contained our coding of whether a company was producing “only regulated”
product or not; we coded companies that appeared to primarily producing regulated
products as “only regulated.” We also discovered, through the standard search process,
that three small internal plants actively disagreed with the FDA’s right to regulate them;
we have discarded those three facilities as the drivers of their quality risk are different
than those hypothesized here. Virtually all contract manufacturers’ plants were from
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small companies.
The data sheet included the variables obtained from Harris and ReferenceUSA. Some
plants for which we were otherwise confident did not appear in either database, and
so were discarded. In just a few cases, a plant for which we had a high confidence
was not listed in Harris but was listed in Reference USA. In these cases, we used the
ReferenceUSA data to input plant size, age, and company size. We decided that Refer-
enceUSA’s estimates would be superior to imputation.
Importantly, in this second round, “confidence of classification” scores were added.
Plants with a score of 5 were so classified for one of two reasons. First, there may
have been some slight contrary evidence, but the balance of evidence still favored the
classification. Or, there may have just been extremely little evidence available. Plants
with a score of 6 were those for which detailed specific information about the plant
operation could not be found, but there was no opposing evidence. We scored plants
with a confidence of seven when we had some supporting evidence (such as a news report
on the plant; or a very informative website) that nearly positively identified the plant’s
classification.
In the end, we had 258 observations, 154 of which were classified with a confidence
score of 7. We examined a subsample of the data, and observed the plants classified 5,
6, and 7 differed in the variables of interest in the study. After this examination, we
decided to keep only those plants for which we had the most confidence, as inclusion of
the other plants could add significant noise to the analysis.
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6.5 Description of Data Sources Used for Control
Variables
The control variables of age, size, and financial health are obtained from existing databases.
Private company data is notoriously difficult to obtain (Ojala, 2005)Refworks:1259. Also,
plant-level information on any company can be a challenge. As noted by Ojala (2004),
“Frequently the best bets for private company information are the company’s own web-
site, assuming it has one, and news sources.” (p.46) Where possible and necessary, we
also used web sites and news sources to confirm and find information. Below is a descrip-
tion of the two databases used. Harris was used in most cases; ReferenceUSA was used
for the few plants that were not listed in Harris. While we cannot absolutely guarantee
the validity of the data, we believe that these databases provide reasonably accurate
assessments of the control variables, as described below.
Harris’ Company Reach
This database is available by subscription. Harris focuses on manufacturing, as out-
lined in their website (http://www.harrisinfo.com/harrisinfo/products/data/index.aspx)
Harris’ special commitment to premium manufacturing data is supported by
relationships with numerous state and regional chambers of commerce and
business associations. Our database is the only one published in cooperation
with the National Association of Manufacturers.
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The sources utilized are numerous. The following information is taken from the
company website (http://www.harrisinfo.com/harrisinfo/products/data/dunsright.aspx)
Dun and Bradstreet’s extensive business information database covers over 82,000,000
companies worldwide. Information is collected from a wide variety of sources, includ-
ing: direct investigations and interviews with the company principals; payment and
banking data from company suppliers, which provides over 650,000,000 payment expe-
riences annually; suits, liens, judgments, UCCs, business registrations, corporate details
and bankruptcy filings from state and county courthouses, resulting in over 130,000,000
records on file; corporate financial reports and filings within 48-72 hours of filing; con-
tracts, grants, loans and debarments from the federal government; web source and mining
of over 27,000,000 domains; news and media sources; phone books and print directories.
Harris, which is a subsidiary of Dun and Bradstreet, compiles and maintains the
databases. The DUNSRight process is utilized to make the database as accurate as
possible. This includes 2000 automated checks as well as manual checks to drive accuracy.
We checked the data against several plants where we had inside information and it was
reasonably accurate.
ReferenceUSA
This database is maintained by InfoUSA, Inc. An independent assessment in Library
Journal recommended ReferenceUSA over other databases due to “the producer’s com-
mitment to accuracy and quality control.” Thousands of telephone books, annual reports,
10-K reports and other SEC documents, and trade journals are used to collect this data.
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Thousands of telephone calls are made to verify the facts. This fastidiousness shows in
the final product, where this reviewer came across just one typo. (e.g., Tallent, 2002).
In spite of the recommendation, we found deviations between ReferenceUSA and
reality in plant size for plants for one plant for which we had firsthand data, and did
not find the same problems with the Harris database. Thus, we chose to use the Harris
database as the primary source of data for our control variables.
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